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Resumo 
Esta tese é sobre modelos de competição espacial à la Hotelling. Começamos por fazer 
uma revisão de literatura detalhada sobre este tópico, com o foco em artigos cuja 
principal questão de investigação é a localização óptima das empresas. Também 
fazemos uma análise bibliométrica para compreender a evolução deste campo científico 
nos anos mais recentes. Depois, contribuímos para a literatura desenvolvendo os nossos 
próprios modelos, tanto em competição por preços como em competição por 
quantidades. Nos preços, averiguamos se a localização das empresas muda devido à 
existência de incerteza no seu custo marginal de produção. Também introduzimos um 
estágio de investimento como primeiro estágio do jogo, onde este estágio permite às 
empresas investirem com vista a reduzir o seu custo de marginal de produção. Em 
competição às quantidades, construímos um modelo para perceber qual a localização 
óptima escolhida pelas empresas e por um regulador quando as empresas possuem 
custos marginais de produção distintos. Adicionalmente, introduzimos um modelo com 
um recurso natural, sendo este essencial para que as empresas produzam os seus bens 
finais, e verificamos de que forma mudanças no custo unitário de transporte do input 
afecta as localizações escolhidas pelas empresas.  
Concluímos, no caso da competição por preços, que incerteza nos custos pode levar as 
empresas à aglomeração se a diferença entre as duas diferentes possibilidades de custos 
marginais de produção forem suficientemente elevados. Concluímos também que a 
possibilidade das empresas investirem para reduzir os seus custos marginais as leva para 
um dilema do prisioneiro, onde estas ficariam melhor se não tivessem a hipótese de 
investir. Nas quantidades, concluímos que as empresas não reagem a diferenças entre os 
seus custos marginais, na altura de escolher a sua localização. No entanto, um regulador 
preferiria mudar a localização da empresa ineficiente. No caso do modelo com um 
recurso natural, as empresas preferem mover-se aglomeradas para perto do recurso 
natural, à medida que o custo unitário de transporte do input aumenta. 
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Abstract 
This thesis is about spatial competition models à la Hotelling. We do a thorough survey 
of the literature in this topic, focusing on articles whose main concern is the optimal 
location choice of firms. We also do a bibliometric analysis to assess the evolution of 
the field in the last years. We then give our own contribution by developing models 
both in price and quantity competition. In price competition, we test whether the 
location decisions of firms change, given that there is uncertainty in their marginal cost 
of production. We also introduce an investment stage as the first stage of the game, 
which allows firms to invest in order to reduce their marginal costs of production. In 
quantity competition, we build a model to assess what the optimal location chosen by 
firms and by a social planner are when firms have different marginal costs. 
Additionally, we introduce a model with a natural resource that is essential for firms to 
produce their final goods, and we check how changes in the unit input transportation 
costs affect firms’ locations. 
We conclude that, in the case of price competition, cost uncertainty may lead to 
agglomeration of the firms if the difference between the marginal cost outcomes of both 
firms is large enough. We conclude as well that the possibility of firms investing in 
cost-reduction activities leads them to a prisoner dilemma situation, where they would 
prefer not to have that possibility. For quantity competition, we conclude that firms are 
unresponsive to changes in their cost structure. However, a social planner would prefer 
to change the location of an inefficient firm. In the case of the presence of a natural 
resource model, firms move together towards the location of the input as the unit input 
transportation cost becomes higher.  
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1. Introduction 
The current document aims at contributing to the already vast literature on the 
subject of spatial competition. The main focus is based on the model that was developed 
by Harold Hotelling (1929) more than eighty years ago, and was subsequently extended 
by a various number of researchers. Nowadays, it is still a popular way to analyze the 
interaction between firms in markets in which the spatial component is crucial. 
However, this framework soon gained importance not only as a spatial component, but 
also as a microeconomic component: the linear city of Hotelling, which was designed to 
represent spatial markets, has also gained relevance as a way to model the product 
space, that is, if a given product has a certain characteristic, the “linear city” may as 
well be the most appropriate way to model different preferences of consumers regarding 
the product space, as well as the differentiation positioning of a given product.
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This type of models has a huge variety of purposes that can be grouped into two 
categories. The first one being: scientists explored the Hotelling model because they 
were interested in justifying the location of firms, when these are competing on a 
different set of circumstances. If there is one big conclusion that can be taken from 
studying this literature is that the location choice of firms is highly dependent on the 
circumstances the firms are competing in. Different circumstances arise due to variables 
such as: the dimension of the market; the value of the unit transportation cost paid by 
consumers and/or firms to “move” in the linear city; the nature of these transportation 
costs, that is, if these are convex, concave, linear, quadratic, linear-quadratic,…; how 
differently consumers are distributed in the market; the number of firms that are allowed 
to compete in the market; other agents that may participate in these markets, such as 
regulation authorities, social planners, agents hired by owners, input suppliers. Many 
circumstances can change the nature of markets and any of these may have a significant 
role in justifying the location of firms when pursuing profits and subsequent success in 
their businesses. 
                                                          
1
 Therefore, it is important to mention that we have tried to write this document with a focus on the 
geographical argument started by Hotelling. However, in most cases we refer to location, linear city and 
transportation costs, but we could be referring in a similar way to product differentiation, product space, 
and product conversion costs, respectively. 
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The second main purpose of the usage of Hotelling models is to check whether 
adding a location/horizontal differentiation setting in different situations contributed to 
change these exact situations. For instance, researchers sought how would considering a 
market with a spatial component changed, for instance, the conditions for which firms 
were able to sustain collusion, to address if a spatial market allowed for a larger or 
smaller number of firms in a given market: if it facilitated monopolists to craft entry 
barriers, if it changed the relationship between a first-mover and a follower, and many 
more. Summing up, authors were either interested in using the Hotelling approach to 
justify the location chosen by firms, or in using the approach as a spatial component that 
would help justifying different strategies pursued by firms regarding topics other than 
location. The focus of this work is on the first category: we are interested in 
understanding why firms act in a given manner towards their location decisions.  
The question of “where should firms locate?” has been an interesting subject in 
the science of Economics. Broadly speaking, location choice of all sorts of economic 
agents is crucial to the attainment of their objectives in a variety of situations. For 
instance, one of the earliest location phenomena we all experience in our lives is 
location choice in the classroom. Seating on the front or back-row location has different 
consequences regarding how active you are in the classroom, on your grading results, 
on your behavior in the classroom, and on the teacher-student relationship (see, for 
instance, Stires (1980)). Moreover, location in the classroom is usually a tool used by 
the teachers to manage misbehaved students, or students that are not performing so well 
during the academic year. Many other location decisions affect our everyday lives, 
some less relevant, as location choice in a theatre, concert, or cinema, or when choosing 
where to park your car; and others more relevant, like the place you choose to live and 
how close it is to other amenities, such as the place where you work, the place where 
your children study, and how close you are from important places like a supermarket, an 
hospital, or to the town landfill, which in this case you would want to avoid. 
When it comes to business, this variable plays a dramatic role. There are many 
advantages and disadvantages associated with each location choice when choosing 
where to locate your business, and those perks depend as well on the type of 
business/industry in question. Two locations that are a few meters distant from each 
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other may have significant differences in terms of visibility, which may determine the 
difference between the success and the failure of a business. Globalization, the 
technological developments on the dissemination of information, and the overall 
lowering of unit transportation costs in both labor and capital might have led, on the one 
hand, to the lowering importance of location choice in the success of a business. On the 
other hand, the location possibilities of an agent are also amplified with these changes. 
Firms can be located, with more or less barriers, within any location in the world, which 
enhances the heterogeneity of advantages and disadvantages that each location can 
provide to a certain type of business. Location is a significant factor in determining, to 
name only a few: the rent paid for land usage, the visibility of the business to 
consumers, the reputation of the firm, the wages you will be able to pay to your 
workers, the price you may be able to set for your goods, the working conditions of 
your staff in terms of environment or accessibility in terms of parking spaces or public 
transportations, and so on. 
The Hotelling framework also has an important characteristic. Models that 
involve the study of the location choices and were based on the linear city are mainly 
solved by using Game Theory vocabulary and tools. Most models included competition 
between two or more firms as the main ingredient behind the location choices of firms, 
which amplified the importance of location as a strategic variable. Strategy and firms’ 
strategic behavior is, therefore, a key argument on justifying the results found in most 
papers on the subject. 
Therefore, this thesis is based on the Hotelling framework. We use it because we 
believe it is the better way to have a deeper understanding of the location decision of 
firms when they face certain conditions. Namely, we have a deeper look on how firms 
react when their marginal cost of production varies due to different circumstances. 
Either because there are exogenous differences in the marginal costs of both firms; 
because of uncertain information in the formation of this costs of production; or because 
there are vertical relationships in the market, that end up shaping the cost firms have to 
incur to manufacture their good. 
Next follows an outline of the thesis, and a justification/logic behind the choices 
of the chapters and their content. The following chapter is a critical literature review of 
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the linear city framework and subsequent developments. We started by providing a 
bibliometric analysis to understand the evolution of the field throughout the years, as 
well as to identify the most influential authors and the geographical patterns behind the 
publications in the field. Then, we summarize the location results found in the literature. 
We would like to reinforce that the focus of the literature review is on articles in which 
the contribution to understand the location result of firms is substantial. We have also 
focused more on articles that surveyed duopoly competition instead of competition 
between more than two firms. Summarizing the literature that included all papers that 
have used the Hotelling framework would be unfeasible. Still, we think that the review 
allows the reader to understand the complexity and the deeper attention that these 
models received in various questions around the economics field, as well as contributing 
to understand the various different ways the model has been treated. That is possible 
because the review is separated between models that have core changes in their 
assumptions, namely models with mill price competition; models with price 
discrimination; models with quantity competition; models with competition within a 
non-linear city; models with imperfect information; and experiments that were carried 
in these models.
2
 
The next chapters are our own contribution to the literature on spatial 
competition. Chapter 3 addresses how imperfect information may change the location 
patterns of firms in the classic Hotelling framework with quadratic transportation costs. 
We assume firms do not know exactly what their marginal production cost will be 
before they choose their location. Firms do know, however, that their marginal cost (and 
their opponent’s) varies between two options that may occur with a given probability. 
Our most important conclusions for this chapter are that firms may choose to be in the 
same point of the linear city, contrary to the results found in perfect information for 
different production costs between firms. In addition, if firms were given the possibility 
to choose, they would choose to be placed in an imperfect information situation for a 
significant array of the values of their marginal costs. The reason being that imperfect 
information provides firms with a credible way of pursuing a riskier behavior, which 
results in a higher (expected) profit. 
                                                          
2
 A smaller version of the review in Chapter 2 has been accepted for publication in Papers in Regional 
Science, and is listed in the references as Biscaia and Mota (Forthcoming). 
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Chapter 4 attempts to give an endogenous explanation on why firms would have 
different production costs in this framework, while retreating to the perfect information 
case. Both firms are allowed to invest in cost-reducing activities before choosing their 
location, that is, firms participate in a three-staged R&D-Location-Price game. By 
allowing firms to have different technological access to R&D investments, firms may 
have different costs of reducing their marginal cost of production. We conclude that 
firms still prefer to disperse in the linear city, as predicted in the framework without 
R&D investments. However, we were not able to solve the problem for all the values of 
the technological efficiency, due to the fact that the profit function of both firms is a 
piecewise function, which does not allow the finding of the subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium with a single calculation. That is the main reason we have not explored this 
issue further by considering R&D investments with imperfect information regarding its 
outcome. Still, we have found that in the case when firms have the same investment 
technology, they are trapped in a Prisoner’s Dilemma with regards to their investment in 
R&D. This means that firms would be better off by not having the option to invest at all. 
However, since they do, both are forced to invest in the reduction of their marginal cost 
in order to defend their demand areas. Nevertheless, since the Hotelling model is 
bounded, and the demand is inelastic, firms end up having lower operational revenues, 
since they have the same demand but they charge a lower price for their good. 
Moreover, firms have to spend money in defending their market position. Therefore, the 
higher the technological capabilities of both firms, the higher the pressure they have in 
defending their position, and the lower their profits will be. 
Chapter 5 has an important change regarding the two previous chapters, since 
competition in the last stage is now done in quantities (Cournot) instead of prices 
(Bertrand), and therefore it is situated in a different strand of literature comparing to the 
other two chapters. We shifted our focus to Cournot competition, and we attempt to 
understand the consequences for the firms’ location decisions of having different 
marginal costs in the quantity competition setup. Our conclusion is that the result 
previously found in the literature, in which both firms prefer to be agglomerated in the 
center of the linear city, holds for any difference between the marginal costs of 
production of both firms. In other words, the production costs have no effect on the 
location result. We proceed on analyzing the robustness of this result if, instead of 
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having firms choosing their own locations, there was a regulator/social planner that 
would be allowed to choose firms locations, but not their quantities. We conclude that 
the social planner would still prefer to have the firms located in the city center. 
However, if one of the firms becomes too inefficient relatively to the other, the central 
agglomeration result ceases to be equilibrium, but we are unable to find a proper 
mathematical solution for a new equilibrium. We are led to believe by intuition that the 
social planner would prefer to put the inefficient firm at the extremes of city, in order to 
have it producing as fewer quantities as possible, since the efficient firm is able to 
produce goods at much cheaper cost. We extend the analysis to the case where the 
social planner, if it wants to, could remove the inefficient firm out of the market. We 
find that if the firm is too inefficient, the social planner would prefer to keep a 
monopoly in place, for the sake of the social welfare. The monopolist would naturally 
locate in the center of the linear city. 
Chapter 6 analyses a model in which the different marginal costs of production 
are endogenous and location-dependent. We assume that in order to produce one unit of 
the good, firms require a unit of a natural resource input that is controlled by a 
monopolist who is located in one of the extremes of the linear market. Therefore, when 
deciding their location, firms have to consider their distance to the input resource, as 
well as their distance to the demand. We conclude that if the unit input transportation 
costs are equal to zero, we have the basic case in the literature, which implies firms 
agglomerating in the city center. However, if these transportation costs start to rise, 
firms move closer to the location of the natural resource in a quasi-linear fashion (with 
respect to these transportation costs), while they are still agglomerated with each other. 
For values of the unit input transportation cost equal to or higher than the unit output 
transportation cost, firms prefer to agglomerate in the location of the natural resource. 
We then extend our model to the case where firms’ owners delegate the quantity 
decisions to managers, which aim to maximize the average between the profits and the 
revenues of the firms. We conclude that such delegation movement is toxic for 
downstream firms and very beneficial to the upstream monopolist, since the former will 
demand more quantities comparing to the case with no delegation, which leads to the 
escalation of the input prices. The location rationale is similar: downstream firms will 
move, while agglomerated, closer to the natural resource location as soon as its 
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transportation costs rise. However, they do not move in a linear fashion, and therefore 
delegated firms will be always closer to the center for the same values of unit input 
transportation costs, when comparing to the case with no delegation. 
All the core chapters in this thesis share the same research lines. All of them 
revolve not only around the linear city of Hotelling, but more specifically, around the 
marginal costs of production of firms. In a comprehensive way, this thesis aims at 
verifying, for different market conditions (i.e. competition by prices vs. competition by 
quantities, endogenous marginal cost differences vs. exogenous marginal cost 
differences, social planner as a decider vs. firms as a decider, and perfect information 
vs. imperfect information), what is the effect of having different marginal costs of 
production in the location outcome of firms. While these articles have this link, the 
thesis can be fully separated in each of its chapters, as all of them include their own 
original findings and contributions to the spatial competition literature. We hope that 
this work can be an important contribution to the literature, in the sense that it can open 
different research paths for scientists to explore.  
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2. Literature Review and Recent Developments 
2.1. Introduction 
Spatial economics is “concerned with the allocation of scarce resources over 
space and the location of economic activity” (Duranton, 2008, p. 1). It may therefore be 
related to a very broad set of questions, as most economic questions involve space and 
location issues. However, according to Duranton (2008), the main focus of spatial 
economics is the location choice of the economic agents. In order to explain how agents 
choose to locate in certain places, specific modeling problems arise because of the 
difficulty of inserting location in the framework in a realistic way. 
The starting point is the neoclassical paradigm, which assumes perfect 
competition and constant returns to scale. Accordingly, Debreu (1959) suggests that 
spatial economics is all about adding a spatial dimension to the goods and agents, 
meaning that every commodity and agent has different characteristics because they are 
located in different places, while there are transportation costs of commodities between 
different locations. In this framework, economic activities will be evenly distributed 
across a homogeneous space. 
However, Starrett (1974) came up with a particular model where the locations 
are homogenous. Each location, as long as the production and consumption of goods are 
perfectly divisible and transportation is costly, will satisfy its own needs, reducing its 
transportation costs to zero, operating as an autarchy. Therefore, the equilibrium results 
failed to mirror the reality as there is no trade between different locations in the 
economy: every agent would maximize its utility by interacting only in its location. This 
finding gave rise to the Spatial Impossibility Theorem, which states that models of 
competitive equilibrium never involve transportation of commodities, which is counter-
factual. 
In order to explain the location choices of economic agents and the 
agglomeration of agents in certain locations, one must relax the core assumptions of the 
competitive framework. According to Fujita and Thisse (2002), three alternatives 
emerged and received huge attention in the literature: the assumption of heterogeneity 
of locations, in which there is an uneven distribution of resources, as in comparative 
9 
 
advantage models (e.g. Ricardo, 1963 [1821]; Hecksher-Ohlin, 1991 [1919]) or in 
pioneering static location models (e.g. Von Thünen, 1966 [1826]; Weber, 1929 [1909]); 
the externality models, in which the economic activity endogenously generates 
spillovers that motivate the agglomeration of the agents (e.g. Marshall, 1920; 
Henderson 1974); and the assumption of imperfect markets, implying that agents have 
to interact with each other, with location being an important variable, as in spatial 
competition models (e.g. Hotelling, 1929) or in the monopolistic competition approach  
(e.g. Lösch, 1954 [1940]; Krugman, 1991).  
This review will focus on the development of spatial competition models à la 
Hotelling. Specifically, the main purpose is to study models in which the location 
choice by the firms plays a major role, instead of those models in which, regardless of 
the spatial nature of price competition, the location of the firms is fixed. 
This topic is extremely appealing, firstly because it mixes Game Theory tools 
with Regional and Urban Economics in order to explain firms’ locations; secondly, 
because it offers some interesting insights into Industrial Organization, because of 
firms’ strategic interaction and behavior; and finally, because of the huge literature in 
this research field and the recent insights gained regarding asymmetric information and 
its application to this subject. As a whole, this topic makes a very solid contribution to 
micro-economic science. 
In subsection 2.2, the roots of spatial competition are reviewed. In subsection 
2.3, along with a bibliometric approach to the papers in this area, some of the most 
important developments in the field are presented, with the focus directed at the optimal 
location decision. Subsection 2.4 presents the concluding remarks. 
 
2.2. Spatial Competition – The roots 
Spatial competition is mainly concerned with the locational interdependence 
among economic agents under the constraints of imperfect competition. According to 
Smith (1981), the first major contribution to studying interdependence among firms was 
by Fetter (1924), who constructed the law of market areas. According to Fetter, 
consumers compare the prices in both firms and the freight costs needed to buy that 
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product before making their choice and the locations of consumers who are indifferent 
about buying at either location defines the market boundary of those firms. Some of 
Fetter’s ideas influenced the work of most location theorists in the 1930s, but the most 
influential paper was that of Hotelling (1929).
1
 
Hotelling’s model was in fact one of the most significant historical landmarks in 
the development of Location Theory. In his model there exists a city represented by a 
line segment, where a uniformly distributed continuum of consumers has to buy a 
homogenous good in order to survive. Consumers have to pay transportation costs when 
buying the good, which is to be bought from one of the two firms existing in the city. 
Within this framework, firms simultaneously choose their locations and afterwards set 
their prices in order to maximize their profits. 
Hotelling was actually more intent on proving the existence of a stable 
equilibrium in duopoly markets than developing a spatial framework. According to him, 
the main feature of the paper was the elimination of discontinuities in the demand of 
each firm, i.e. small changes in price would only capture part of the demand existing in 
the market, which would solve the Bertrand (1883) paradox, in which small changes in 
price would capture the whole market for one of the firms, leading the firms to an 
(unrealistic) equilibrium situation with no profits. 
Moreover, Hotelling did not think of his framework as a location model, despite 
mentioning transportation costs. He introduced “distance” between firms as a way of 
modeling differentiation between the goods produced in each firm, with the goods being 
homogenous except for the location where they were  produced, which is a similar 
concept of location introduced later by Debreu (1959). However, in the second part of 
the paper, Hotelling introduced the following question: given the location of a firm, 
which is the location for the other firm that maximizes its own profits? This question 
attracted scientific attention to this framework, which was extended in numerous ways 
in order to answer many different questions within, for instance, location theory (as will 
be shown later), game theory, industrial organization, social welfare and even 
mathematical issues such as the existence of equilibrium. 
                                                          
1
 One can notice that the Fetter’s law of market areas is present in Hotelling’s framework, but Fetter 
overlooked the issue of the optimal location or even the optimal price decision of the firms and was more 
concerned about modeling the demand behavior of the market.  
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In a quite different approach, Chamberlin (1950) introduces the concept of 
monopolistic competition. This approach arises because of product differentiation, in 
which firms may combine characteristics of being both in a monopoly and in pure 
competition, as they possess a somewhat unique product in a competitive market. 
Product differentiation may refer to many characteristics of the product, including its 
location. This “middle point” between pure competition and monopoly has new 
implications for the behavior of the firms when it comes to maximizing their profits. 
The parallel with the Hotelling framework is evident, as the “linear city” is meant to 
represent product differentiation throughout the market under study.  
This review follows the framework of Hotelling, as the subsequent publications 
around this framework are more concerned with the agents’ location behavior than the 
developments of Chamberlin, which are used more as a building block for product 
differentiation; or than the framework of Fetter, which has been relatively forgotten. 
 
2.3. Developments in spatial competition modeling à la Hotelling: a critical review 
2.3.1 A bibliometric exercise on research in spatial competition 
Before proceeding to the analysis of the main contributions in spatial 
competition modeling that focus on the location decisions of firms, a numerical study is 
conducted in order to better understand the temporal development of the field. The 
analysis begins in 1979, the year that d’Aspremont et al. (1979) published what can 
now be considered a classic paper in the field, and ends in 2012.  
The search engine used was Scopus and only articles in the subject area of 
“Social Sciences & Humanities” were considered. Document type was filtered to only 
include peer-reviewed articles and exclude comments, rejoinders, book reviews and 
corrigendas. The database was constructed using the keywords “spatial competition” or 
“Hotelling” that were sought in the articles’ title, keywords and abstract.2 Finally, in 
                                                          
2
 As an alternative, we searched for the keywords “spatial competition” OR “Hotelling” in whole texts of 
papers, obtaining a total of 4,543 articles. However, most results were not directly related to the topic 
under study, and therefore, we chose to search only in titles, abstracts and keywords. Additionally, we 
also searched for the words ‘spatial competition’ in articles’ titles, abstract and keywords (341 records) 
and in the whole text (1,383 records), as well as other possibilities (“spatial OR spatially” AND 
12 
 
order to develop a clear description of spatial competition modeling we have excluded 
any record that is not related with this field, by direct inspection of each article’s title 
and abstract.
3
 As a result, the database includes a total number of 398 journal articles 
published since 1979. Our intention is to give an idea of the development of the field, 
without intending it to be completely exhaustive. 
By analyzing the distribution through time, we can see a gradual increase in 
publications, suggesting a positive evolution in the field’s output (Figure 2.1). However, 
in relative terms, compared with the total number of peer-reviewed articles in Scopus – 
Social Sciences and Humanities, that is not the case, with an irregular trend in the 
importance of spatial competition over time being observed (Figure 2.2).
 4 
Figure 2.1 – Number of Articles on Spatial Competition, 1979-2012 
 
This evidence of the importance of the field of spatial competition is not 
surprising to anyone who is familiar with the literature discussed in the remaining of 
this section. In fact, spatial competition was a hot topic in the eighties and nineties, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
“competition OR competitive” OR “Hotelling” OR ‘product differentiation’”; spatial AND competition), 
and adopted the best option as far as proximity to our subject was concerned. 
3
 We had this necessity because Hotelling was also known for a statistical test, a famous rule in the field 
of exhaustible resources and for the "Hotelling's lemma” in microeconomic theory. Therefore, we 
excluded these articles to obtain a better assessment of research in spatial competition. 
4
 It should be said that Scopus database covers a large set of journals after 1996, but has some limitations 
in the period before, which might justify the increasing pattern shown in Figure 1, as well as the absence 
of d'Aspremont et al. (1979) in the searched records. 
(http://files.sciverse.com/documents/pdf/ContentCoverageGuide-jan-2013.pdf). 
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when a huge modeling effort was devoted to examining the effects of changing every 
Hotelling assumption on the subsequent equilibrium conditions. 
Figure 2.2 – Published Articles on Spatial Competition (% of total Scopus), 1979-2012 
 
With respect to the authors’ efforts regarding the spatial competition modeling, 
information about the most relevant researchers is displayed in Table 2.1. Noriaki 
Matsushima and Stefano Colombo are the authors with more articles in this research 
field, immediately followed by Toshihiro Matsumura and Jacques-François Thisse. In 
addition, when we take into consideration the average number of citations per paper, we 
may conclude that Jacques-François Thisse and Nicholas Economides are an important 
part of the most prominent researchers on this topic, together with Takatoshi Tabuchi, 
Debashis Pal and Jiotirmoy Sarkar
5. Additionally, information about authors’ 
geographic affiliation (Figure 2.3) reveals the importance of European authors’ research 
into spatial competition. 
 
 
                                                          
5
 There are two important setbacks to highlight in our analysis: First, the number of articles is in full 
counts. This means co-authored articles still count as a full number. This means as well that there are 
duplicated articles, due to the collaboration of authors in Table 2.1. Examples being Matsumura and 
Matsushima, or Pal and Sarkar; Second, the indicator “number of citations per article” benefits authors of 
older papers, since, ceteris paribus, these papers had more time to be cited. 
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Table 2.1 – Top authors in Spatial Competition, 1979-2012 
Author Number of articles Citations per article 
Matsushima, N.  11 9.09 
Colombo, S.  10 2.20 
Matsumura, T. 8 8.50 
Thisse, J. F. 8 32.38 
Pal, D. 7 23.43 
Braid, R.M. 7 3.71 
Hamoudi, H. 6 5.33 
Tabuchi, T. 6 21.83 
Norman, G. 6 4.50 
Straume, O.R. 5 8.40 
Lai, F.C. 5 11 
Meagher, K.J. 5 4.60 
Gupta, B. 5 17.60 
Economides, N.  4 32.50 
Brekke, K.R. 4 9.25 
Grofman, B. 4 1.75 
Sarkar, J. 4 23.75 
Sanjo, Y. 4 3.75 
Lambertini, L. 4 10.25 
 
Figure 2.3 – Authors’ geographic affiliation, 1979-2012 
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In order to assess the quality of the research in spatial competition modeling, a 
selection of the most frequent journals in this field has been undertaken (Table 2.2). As 
expected, the vast majority are journals specialized in Regional and Urban Economics, 
besides other journals dealing with Industrial Organization or Public Economics. 
However, it is not only specialized journals that are interested in spatial competition, as 
more general ones also contain articles in this field, with Economics Letters and 
European Economic Review amongst those with the most publications in this area of 
research. Regarding the impact factor of these journals, we can see that approximately 
half of the journals containing at least 5 articles on spatial competition have an impact 
factor higher than 1, which implies that a significant number of publications in the field 
are published in journals that recently have at least a moderate impact. 
Table 2.2 – Top journals in Spatial Competition, 1979-2012 
Journals Number of 
articles 
% of total Spatial 
Competition 
Impact factor 
2011 
Regional Science and Urban Economics 49 12.31% 1.008 
Economics Letters 38 9.55% 0.447 
International Journal of Industrial Organization 31 7.79% 0.841 
Public Choice 13 3.27% 0.913 
Economics Bulletin 13 3.27% N.C 
Journal of Economics Zeitschrift Fur Nationalokonomie 11 2.76% N.C. 
Papers in Regional Science 11 2.76% 1.430 
European Economic Review 9 2.26% 1.527 
Journal of Regional Science 9 2.26% 2.000 
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 8 2.01% 1.093 
Journal of Urban Economics 7 1.76% 1.892 
Journal of Industrial Economics 7 1.76% 1.040 
Games and Economic Behavior 7 1.76% 0.829 
Annals of Regional Science 6 1.51% 1.026 
Social Choice and Welfare 6 1.51% 0.440 
Journal of Economic Theory 6 1.51% 1.235 
Economic Theory 5 1.26% N.C. 
Shanghai Jiaotong Daxue Xuebao Journal of Shanghai 
Jiaotong University 
5 1.26% N.C. 
Research in Economics 5 1.26% N.C. 
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To sum up, the number of articles on spatial competition has been growing at a 
good pace. In addition, most of these articles have been published in journals with at 
least “moderate” impact in Economics, that is, journals with an impact factor of the 
recent issues higher than 1. 
After this brief bibliometric overview of the research into spatial competition 
modeling, this chapter critically reviews the main models for each of the four research 
paths that we have identified after the work of Hotelling (1929). These paths are ordered 
according to the greatest frequency of publication, as exemplified in figure 2.4. The first 
group is Bertrand competition, which immediately follows Hotelling’s (1929) model in 
terms of its assumptions, and shows the highest number of publications; secondly comes 
Cournot competition, differing from Hotelling’s spatial-price competition, focusing on 
quantity competition in the second stage; in third place are non-linear markets such as 
circular or triangular markets, diverging from Hotelling’s linear city; more recently, 
models of incomplete information between players have appeared, which extend 
Hotelling’s complete information model. We also expose how the field of Experimental 
Economics has contributed to this literature, by presenting some of its papers in the 
review.
6
 
Throughout the remainder of the review, the focus is directed on the papers 
related to the location behavior of the agents, rather than their pricing or quantity 
behavior. This means that other important articles of “spatial competition à la 
Hotelling”, possibly included in the bibliometric search undertaken earlier, are not 
reviewed. 
                                                          
6
 It should be said that in the bibliometric approach, it is impossible to separate the papers between these 
different research paths because of the difficulty of finding keywords that are able to do so. For example, 
comparisons between Cournot and Bertrand competition are very frequent in papers of both research 
paths. As a result, no single keyword can reliably identify whether a paper contained in the search belongs 
to a particular research path. 
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Figure 2.4 – Main research paths in Spatial Competition 
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2.3.2 Bertrand Competition 
2.3.2.1 Mill Pricing 
The Hotelling model is an ideal basis for examining the behavior of firms when 
it comes to their price and location decisions because it allows for easy understanding 
and it has an appealing logic, and also because of its usefulness in studying firms’ 
interactions. The Hotelling model is based on the following assumptions: two firms are 
the players in a two-stage location-price game, in which at the first stage, firms must 
choose their location on a linear and bounded city and at the second stage compete on 
prices. The good sold by the firms is homogenous except for the location they have 
chosen in the first stage. Demand is perfectly inelastic; i.e., consumers in that city must 
buy one unit of the good, while incurring a linear transportation cost when travelling to 
one of the firms. In the second-stage, firms compete in a mill price setting, i.e., they 
choose a price for their good, bearing in mind that each consumer takes into account the 
price plus the transportation costs when deciding from which firm to buy the good. In 
the mill price setting, a Nash equilibrium in the price stage is defined when both firms 
simultaneously choose prices (given their previous choice of locations) that maximize 
their profits, given the price set by the other firm. 
With these assumptions, Hotelling concluded that firms would agglomerate at 
the center of a linear city, thereby laying the foundations for the “Principle of Minimum 
Differentiation”, so called by Boulding (1966). This principle was undisputed and was 
used as a starting point for research, with its conclusions being studied and extended 
into many branches of research. However, almost half a century later some scientists 
started to question this principle, mainly by using the Hotelling model with some 
different assumptions. The most important conclusion is the one drawn from 
d’Aspremont et al. (1979), which introduced quadratic transportation costs1. The 
introduction of this feature removed the discontinuities verified in the profit and 
demand functions, which was a problem in the Hotelling model since there were no 
Nash price equilibrium solutions for all possible locations of the firms. The location 
decision for the firms in the presence of quadratic transportation costs is to locate at the 
                                                          
1
 Quadratic transportation costs are a realistic assumption when we are thinking of transportation costs 
different from the physical costs, for instance, consumer tastes. 
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extremes of the market (principle of maximum differentiation). Firms wish to 
differentiate more and more in order to relax price competition and thus obtain larger 
profits. 
2.3.2.1.1. Models with the focus on location 
Following the paper of d’Aspremont et al. (1979), the majority of the models 
abandon the linear transportation costs assumption, except for the cases where scientists 
were once again testing the cost functions, such as Gabszewicz and Thisse (1986) and 
Anderson (1988), who test a transportation cost function with a linear and a quadratic 
component. They prove that in some cases there is no price equilibrium for fixed 
symmetric locations and that in most cases no location-price equilibrium exists in the 
two-stage location game.  
The assumption for the bearer of the transportation costs is changed, for 
instance, in Anderson and Thisse (1988), Anderson et al. (1989) and Hamilton et al. 
(1991). Hamilton et al. (1991) introduce a model where consumers are allowed to 
bargain between the two firms. This results in firms choosing the socially optimum 
locations, 0.25 and 0.75. The bargaining in the model is only possible because firms do 
not observe the consumers’ locations in the city. The other authors reach no specific 
conclusions regarding location patterns: Anderson and Thisse (1988) and Anderson et 
al. (1989) focus more on the existence of equilibrium than on the location of the firms. 
Different Consumer Preferences 
In Hotelling’s model, firms were interacting in a linear and bounded market, 
with only one differentiating dimension, and selling homogenous goods. Demand is 
assumed to be perfectly inelastic, meaning that consumers will always buy one unit of 
the good, whatever the price (if there is no reservation price). One important step in the 
literature is in the work of Economides (1984), who abandons the assumption that 
reservation prices had to be high enough such that all consumers would be covered, in 
an approach that became known as “the uncovered market model”. The author 
concludes that for these lower reservation prices, firms would move away from the 
center, and that for even lower reservation prices, firms would prefer to move further to 
the city extremes in order to obtain local monopolies in each of the sides of the market, 
leaving some consumers in the city center uncovered. This analysis is extended by 
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Hinloopen and Van Marrewijk (1999), which conclude that for “intermediate values” of 
the reservation price, there is a unique equilibrium where both firms locate 
symmetrically from the city center and cover the entirety of the market. Chirco et al. 
(2003) extend this analysis by studying the quadratic transportation case. Departing 
from maximum differentiation, as the reservation price gets low enough, firms start 
moving closer to the center until the minimum transportation costs point of 25.01 x ; 
75.02 x . For lower values, multiple equilibrium locations exist in which firms are 
local monopolists. 
While the linear and bounded market assumptions seem not to be too binding, 
the others seem quite unreasonable in terms of reality, but are easily understandable. 
The analysis of the equilibrium of the two-stage game with more than one dimension or 
with elastic demand proved to be a hard obstacle to overcome, while finding a way to 
quantify heterogeneity of the goods was not obvious.  
Tabuchi (1994) introduce a model with two differentiating dimensions. The 
author concludes that the Nash equilibrium result involves firms maximizing 
differentiation in one of the dimensions (the one with a larger dimension, if that 
dimension is sufficiently larger comparing to the other), but minimizing differentiation 
in the other. On sequential location, firms differentiate always on the larger market 
dimension. In an ambitious paper, Irmen and Thisse (1998) extend the Hotelling 
problem to an n-dimensional market where consumers may weight each dimension 
differently. They conclude that when a characteristic is sufficiently strong, the situation 
in which the firms fully differentiate in one characteristic and locate in the center for all 
the others is a global equilibrium for the usual two-stage game. Therefore, “Hotelling 
was almost right”2, in the sense that firms apply the principle of minimum 
differentiation except for the most important characteristic. The framework of n-
dimensions is further extended in Larralde et al. (2009), which introduce heterogeneous 
logit-distributed consumer tastes similarly to Anderson et al. (1992). The conclusion is 
that equilibria other than maximum differentiation in all dimensions except on the most 
important one do arise, and involve partial differentiation in more than one setting, but 
are less profitable than the equilibrium found by Irmen and Thisse.  
                                                          
2
 That expression is part of the title of the paper written by Irmen and Thisse (1998). 
21 
 
Another change in the demand configuration is developed by Kim and Serfes 
(2006). The authors assume that it is possible for a consumer to buy the good from both 
firms, due to brand differentiation (with an example being the newspapers). However, 
purchasing the good from one firm decreases the utility of consuming the second good. 
The authors conclude that maximal differentiation is the equilibrium whenever the 
valuation of the second good bought is low. But when that valuation increases, the 
equilibrium jumps to agglomeration at the city center. The reason being that for such a 
high valuation, locating in the middle no longer means a decrease in the demand of both 
firms, since the majority or all consumers will buy both goods anyway.  
Kohlberg (1983) takes the original Hotelling model and adds a waiting time cost 
to the consumers, which naturally is higher the higher the number of consumers visiting 
a certain store. Similarly to d’Aspremont et al. (1979), the author verifies that this 
adaptation eliminates the demand discontinuity problems of Hotelling, but no location 
patterns are given. This theoretical approach has been continued by Di Cintio (2007) 
which, in the linear unit transportation costs framework, introduces “crowding” and 
“congestion” effects per store, that is, the consumer utility varies positively and 
negatively according to the number of consumers that purchase their goods in a given 
store, due to crowding and congestion effects. The author concludes that the existence 
of these effects allows firms to have positive profits in the city center, similarly to goods 
heterogeneity cases presented in the next paragraph. The resulting location is 
agglomeration at the city center. This paper received a scientific reply from Ahlin 
(2008), which exposes that the crowding and congestion effects only solve the demand 
discontinuity problems of the original Hotelling model if these are big enough, and 
therefore the model is not valid for lower values of these crowding and congestion 
effects. Ahlin and Ahlin (2013) further analyze the linear transportation model with 
congestion costs, assuming consumers pay an extra cost for buying at a certain store, 
based on the number of quantities purchased there. They conclude that whenever pure-
strategy equilibrium in prices exists, locations are as closer to the city center as possible. 
The greater the congestion costs relatively to transportation costs, the closer firms will 
be to the center, as a higher number of pure pricing equilibrium strategies exist. The 
author also concludes that, for quadratic transportation costs, the introduction of 
congestion costs leaves unchanged the maximum differentiation result. 
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Some authors address the assumption of homogenous goods by introducing 
heterogeneity into the model. Three different approaches appeared in the literature:  De 
Palma et al. (1985), Anderson et al. (1989) and Ben-Akiva et al. (1989). De Palma et al. 
(1985) only change the homogeneity of the goods and conclude that when prices are 
fixed and equal for both firms, agglomeration at the center occurs and the profits for the 
firms grow with the degree of heterogeneity of the products (when the degree equals 
zero, we have the Hotelling case). In the two-stage game, agglomeration equilibrium 
may occur, but only if the degree of heterogeneity is high enough. Anderson et al. 
(1989) test different price schemes for a fixed location by comparing consumer and 
producer surplus in those cases, but since locations are fixed no conclusions can be 
drawn regarding location theory. Ben-Akiva et al. (1989) introduce a second dimension 
to the problem by considering brands which are intended to model heterogeneity. When 
firms play for location and price simultaneously with exogenous brands, agglomeration 
equilibrium at the center of the city occurs if the heterogeneity in consumer tastes is not 
too small. This result is very similar to the one found in Irmen and Thisse (1998), since 
if firms are able to differentiate on brands, they have the incentive to choose the central 
location because price competition is already softened due to product differentiation. 
Anderson and Engers (1994) solve the two-stage location-price game for more 
than two firms and assume an elastic demand. The conclusion for the case of two firms 
is that if the demand is perfectly inelastic (Hotelling) or sufficiently inelastic, such firms 
will still prefer to agglomerate at the center. However, the nature of this game is 
different from that of Hotelling, as pricing in the second-stage is defined by a social 
planner. 
A strand of literature focuses on “unilateral” models of Hotelling. The main 
differentiating assumption presented in this strand is that consumers can only travel in 
one direction of the linear city, which changes significantly the “rules” of the model. 
The main motivation for the introduction of this assumption is that sometimes it is only 
possible to travel in one direction, either passengers in one-way roads or in highways, 
either commodities, with one way pipelines of gas and oil (Kharbach, 2009) or one way 
river streams with fishermen attempting to catch fish (Lai, 2001), or when dealing with 
time (Cancian et al. (1995); Nilssen and Sørgard (1998)). Applications in the two stage 
location-price/quantity game are a recent strand in literature. However, as early as in 
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1995, Cancian et al. (1995) design a model where consumers could only move to one of 
the directions in the linear city, and conclude that when maximizing demand there is no 
location equilibrium for two firms. The authors’ work is then extended by Nilssen and 
Sørgard (1998), who consider the sequential decision of two firms and a second discrete 
differentiation variable. Lai (2001) study the sequential location decisions of two firms 
in the directional market, and his work is extended by Sun (2012) to allow for three 
firms. However, we recall that these models implicitly fix the price decision of firms, 
turning the location problem into a demand maximization problem, which falls out of 
the scope of our analysis. 
With the exact Hotelling assumptions except for the directional assumption, 
Kharbach (2009) shows that if the consumers can only walk to the “right” of the linear 
city, one of the firms would locate at 3/5 of the city, while the other firm would be 
located at the right extreme.  However, Ebina and Shimizu (2012) prove that the 
solution found by Kharbach is not a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, since in his 
solution the firm at the right has a monopoly of consumers, and therefore could charge 
the highest price possible without losing those consumers, which Kharbach did not 
consider by assuming the standard “indifferent consumer” way of calculating demand, 
which is not the most adequate on the unidirectional setting. The authors therefore 
conclude that this solution is only valid if the ratio between the utility the good gives to 
the consumers and the unit transportation cost is not too high. A later extension is due to 
Xefteris (2013), which studies a model in which firms only receive a payoff if their 
market share is higher than their opponents’, but with fixed pricing. The results are 
generalized for any consumer distribution. The author concludes that there is no pure-
strategy equilibrium, but there is a mixed equilibrium where firms locate half of the 
times in the median consumer, and other half of the times in the extreme to where 
consumers can travel to. However, this equilibrium is not unique. 
Consumer distribution 
The main feature of the following authors is to change the assumption that the 
costumers/consumers were distributed uniformly along the linear city. Shilony (1981) 
tests, for linear transportation costs, the effect of more general consumer distribution 
functions on location equilibrium. The author concludes that for any consumer 
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distribution the lack of pricing equilibrium problem found by d’Aspremont et al. (1979) 
still exists, but another consumer distribution that leads to a price equilibrium result can 
be always found. Most importantly for our review, the author concludes the 
agglomeration principle of Hotelling holds whenever equilibrium exists. Neven (1986) 
tests whether a symmetric to the center consumer density, in which consumers are more 
concentrated in middle positions of the city, pushes firms out of the extremes. The 
author concludes that for some uneven distributions, the firms would still prefer to 
locate in the extremes. However, for larger concavities, firms start moving to the center 
until the location levels of 0.125 and 0.875 for firm 1 and firm 2, respectively. Anderson 
et al. (1997) change the density of the consumers to a symmetric log-concave function. 
The conclusion is that if the density function is too concave, asymmetric equilibrium 
appears in the location decision. Furthermore, if the consumer density function is 
concentrated more at the center that does not always lead to closer equilibrium 
locations. Transportation costs make no difference to the equilibrium location. 
Moreover, with this specification of the density function, there is excess differentiation 
in the product compared to the social optimum. 
Changes in the nature of competition 
Hotelling considered the case of only two firms in a two-stage game, deciding 
first their location and then prices simultaneously with pure strategies. However, the 
characteristics of this game have also been changed to address different issues or to 
search for a better overall realistic framework. 
Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) prove the existence of mixed-strategy equilibrium 
for the pricing sub-game for all possible locations of the firms, paving the way for 
Osborne and Pitchik (1987), who discover that when mixed strategies are allowed only 
at the second stage, using only pure strategies in the first stage, the symmetric location 
where firms are located at 0.27 and 0.73 is an equilibrium. This equilibrium is near the 
social optimum, which are the location of firms that minimize the total transportation 
costs of the population. However, the transportation costs per unit distance in this model 
were set as a constant equal to one. Anderson (1988), as previously mentioned, 
concludes that there is no pure strategy perfect equilibrium for most cases when the 
transportation cost has a linear and a quadratic component. Nevertheless, allowing for 
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mixed strategies at the price stage, the game becomes well defined, but if the 
transportation function is not convex enough, symmetric location equilibria must 
involve mixed strategies in pricing. 
Neven (1987) tests sequential decision for the Hotelling model with quadratic 
transportation costs. For the case where firms are duopolists, the result is the same than 
in simultaneous decisions, that is, firms differentiate maximally in the city. However, 
the first firm can deter a second firm from entering if it locates at the middle, and given 
the fixed costs of entering are high enough. If the second firm enters, both firms will 
start to move symmetrically to the city center to deter entry from a third firm. Boyer et 
al. (1994) study the case of sequential location decisions within a uniform delivered 
price setting. In this game with three stages, one firm chooses its location first, followed 
by the other firm, after which both firms enter into price competition. With 
transportation costs equal to one and equal marginal costs, firms choose to locate at 2/5 
and 4/5, respectively. The same framework, but with the mill pricing setting, is studied 
by Boyer et al. (2003a). If firms have the same marginal costs, the results are the same 
as those of d’Aspremont et al. (1979). However, if one firm has an advantage in its 
marginal costs, it starts to move progressively to the center, while the firm with the 
higher marginal costs always chooses the opposing extreme of the market. Gotz (2005) 
extends the work of Neven (1987) by analyzing entry conditions in market size changes 
instead of changes in the magnitude of fixed costs, and the location pattern changes a 
bit. The first entrant can still block a firm by locating at the center, but with a big 
market size, the third firm is blocked by the sole movement of the first-mover, instead 
of the symmetric two-firm movement that occurs in the case of Neven. 
Lambertini (2002) builds a model where two firms enter a market sequentially, à 
la Hotelling, but take the lag between the entries of both firms as a variable. The main 
conclusion is that the longer the second firm takes to enter, the closer the first firm will 
locate to the center, while the second firm will always choose one of the extremes of the 
market. The first firm prefers to locate in the center because there it can set a higher 
price and still capture the entire market. 
Ago (2008) consider n firms on monopolistic competition à la Chamberlin 
(1950), and conclude that all firms agglomerate at the city center independently of the 
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pricing scheme used (between discrimination, and uniform mill and delivered pricing), 
as long as the transportation costs in the economy are low enough.  
Allowing firms to locate outside of the linear city, Tabuchi and Thisse (1995) 
conclude that firms would prefer to be located outside, in order to further soften price 
competition, in locations -0.25 and 1.25, respectively. Further results in the unrestricted 
model are given by Lambertini (1997a). When there is a sequential decision, the first-
mover stays at the center, while follower stays at one distance unit from the first-mover. 
When there is sequential decision in prices, the price leader chooses to locate at the 
border of the city, while the price follower stays two distance units away from the 
leader, to the side of the city (for instance, locations 0 and 2 for leader and follower, 
respectively, in a city with length 1). If firms are alternate leaders, that is, one of them 
leads in the location stage, while following on the price stage, the equilibrium found is 
that the location leader stays in one of the extremes of the city, while the price leader 
stays outside of the city in the opposing city side (e.g. 0 and 4/3 would be the locations 
for the location and price leader respectively). When firms lead/follow in both stages, 
the leader ends up locating in the city center, while the “double follower” gets pushed 
way out of the city, in location 13/6. 
Firms’ production costs 
Some articles focused on changing the assumption that firms had the same 
marginal costs of production for their good. While others did so in an exogenous 
approach, focusing on those effects on the location outcome, some literature also 
justified the sources of cost differentiation either by assuming location-dependent 
marginal costs, either by allowing firms to invest in cost-reducing activities such as 
research and development. 
An important exogenous approach is the one from Ziss (1993). The author tests 
what would be the optimal location of firms in the d’Aspremont et al. (1979) setting for 
any array of marginal costs of production firms could have. The conclusion is that 
maximum differentiation holds as the optimal location until a certain threshold of the 
marginal cost difference. Then, no location equilibrium exists as the low cost firm 
wishes to be as closest as possible to the high cost firm, while the latter would prefer to 
be as far as possible. An extension to the previous result is in Matsumura and 
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Matsushima (2009), who allow for mixed strategy equilibrium in locations for the same 
setting. The authors concludes that when no pure strategy equilibrium exists, there is a 
single mixed strategy equilibrium, which involves both firms locating in one of the 
extremes of the linear city with 50% probability. Another interesting extension is due to 
Meza and Tombak (2009). The authors model a three stage game of timing-location-
price, where the timing stage determines which firms will enter first on the market, or 
whether they enter simultaneously. The authors are interested in checking how 
exogenous changes in the marginal costs of production affect the location outcome. If 
the cost differentials are too low, both firms are interested in maximally differentiating; 
hence firms enter as soon as possible and differentiate. For higher values of the 
difference, the lower cost firm will always obtain a monopoly if it enters in the middle 
of the city. For intermediate values of the marginal cost difference, the high-cost firm 
never enters first (because it would be instantly removed on the next instant by the low-
cost firm), therefore the low-cost firm always enters first, which results in maximal 
differentiation for a larger array of values than what Ziss (1993) predicted; and for a 
further difference, the high cost firm will always be as far as possible to the low cost 
firm, while the low cost slowly moves closer to the center, and then after some 
threshold value finds it more profitable to “jump” to the middle of the city, obtaining a 
monopoly. 
An endogenous approach was taken by Aiura and Sato (2008), which consider 
location dependent marginal costs, that is, firms have different marginal costs of 
production depending of their location in the linear the city. The approach is 
endogenous because the authors place a “natural resource” in the middle of the linear 
city, which is necessary for firms to make their good. All other assumptions of 
d’Aspremont et al. (1979) are followed. The conclusion is that if the transportation costs 
of the raw material are less than three quarters of the costs of consumers’ transportation 
to the shop, the firms move symmetrically from the extremes in the direction of the city 
center. For higher values of that proportion between costs, another equilibrium result 
appears, in which one of the firms stays in the city center. However, if the raw material 
transportation costs are higher than 3 times the consumer transportation costs, firms 
prefer to agglomerate in the city center. 
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A different endogenous approach, more directly related with the topic of 
Industrial Organization, is pursued by Harter (1993), who considers R&D investments 
in a given industry. Two firms compete in a three-stage game and have a chance of 
inventing a given product first. In the first stage, firms choose what type of product to 
invest, and start investing. The second stage occurs after one firm has successfully 
discovered a product, and therefore entering the market first with the degree of 
differentiation it has chosen for its product. The non-innovator must choose between 
maintaining the investment in the same type of product; changing to a different product; 
or stopping the R&D investment and leaving the market. In the later stage firms choose 
their prices. However, the author is unable to provide an equilibrium pattern for the case 
where the two firms keep investing and will therefore enter the market.  
In Gerlach et al. (2005), firms invest without costs in a project that has a given 
chance to succeed. If it succeeds, firms enter the market and are able to produce the 
good; if not, they stay out of the market. The key ingredient is that firms only know the 
result of the R&D after deciding where to locate. If the probability of the investment is 
low, firms locate in the city center. However, as the probability becomes higher, firms 
gradually move to the outside of the city, until the probability reaches 12/13, and then 
for higher values, firms maximally disperse. 
In a combined approach with a mixed duopoly, Matsumura and Matsushima 
(2004) consider endogenous marginal costs of production in the typical d’Aspremont et 
al. setting. The authors introduce an initial stage where firms may reduce their marginal 
cost by paying an amount of money, and increasing amounts of money are required in 
order to reduce the marginal cost further. The authors conclude that equivalently to 
Cremer et al. (1991), having one public firm is sufficient to guarantee that both firms 
will choose the social optimal locations. This location is characterized by having both 
firms in ¼ and ¾ when there is no difference in their marginal costs of production, and 
by having the efficient firm moving towards the center and the inefficient firm moving 
towards the city extreme, with both firms being always separated by half of the city. 
Later on, Matsumura and Matsushima (2012a) study a model where firms are allowed 
to invest in cost-reducing activities in the first-stage. Their focus is not on location, 
since the resulting location outputs that arise from different marginal costs are already 
covered in Ziss (1993) and Matsumura and Matsushima (2009), and so they conclude 
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that the optimal location (if unrestricted by city boundaries) leads to excessive R&D 
investment in terms of social welfare. 
Ferreira and Thisse (1996) introduce a setting where firms have different unit 
transportation costs between them. Though their paper does not focus on the location 
decision of firms, the authors introduce the idea that firms should be able to invest in 
their own transportation technologies in the linear city setup. 
2.3.2.1.2. Location as a strategic variable 
An important share of the published articles use the spatial 
competition/horizontal differentiation setting not only with the focus of assessing the 
location outcome of firms, but also with the purpose of checking what is the effect of 
location as a strategic variable in topics such as: mergers, collusion, delegation, vertical 
relationships, R&D investments, and so on. We present some of these papers, but our 
main focus continues to be the location outcome that results from the introduction of 
any of these previous “ingredients” in Hotelling model. 
As for collusion, Chang (1992) adopts and Hotelling approach in which firms 
are given a certain location, and are given the chance to relocate at a fixed cost F. In 
terms of location, the author concludes that if one of the firms deviates, firms would 
only relocate to the market extremes if their original positions were too close. Friedman 
and Thisse (1993) introduce a game in which location is played in the first stage, and 
then there is a repeated game in which players keep choosing prices for n periods. As 
the game is repeated, firms play a trigger strategy regarding prices. Allowing only for 
collusion in the price stage, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for this game is 
agglomeration at the center of the city, with partial collusion being chosen for both 
firms at the price stage. Hackner (1995) extends the Hotelling case by allowing for 
endogenous locations and collusion in both stages. He concludes that if the discount 
factor is low, firms maximally differentiate, but as the discount factor raises firms move 
symmetrically to the center until they reach the minimizing transportation costs location 
of 0.25 and 0.75. Correia-da-Silva and Pinho (2011) consider the collusion possibility 
when there are different marginal costs of production along the linear city, with the 
cheaper production spots being in the center. When firms are only allowed to collude in 
the location stage, they locate in the maximum differentiation position at the city 
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extremes for lower differences in the marginal costs of production between points. 
However, if costs outside the city center become increasingly higher, firms agree to 
move in the direction of the city center. When in full collusion, firms locate at the social 
optimal locations for lower values of the difference, and move in the center direction if 
the difference becomes too high. 
In terms of applications to the delegation question, an important work is the one 
from Barceno-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga (2005). The authors study the classic Hotelling 
model with quadratic transportation costs and unrestricted locations, with firms 
delegating the price stage decision to a manager. The authors conclude that delegation 
puts owners choosing to be located farthest than in the case with no delegation, that is, 
in -0.75 and 1.75. However, if the managers choose locations, the location results ends 
up being the same than in the unconstrained model of Tabuchi and Thisse (1995), that 
is, -0.25 and 1.25. Therefore optimally, firms would prefer to delegate their decision to 
managers, but only in the price stage, keeping the location stage choice to themselves.
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Using an uncovered market approach as in Economides, Liang et al. (2011) compare 
Bertrand and Cournot outcomes when owners choose the location stage and managers 
sets the prices/quantities, in a linear transportation cost setting. The location outcomes 
for the Bertrand case are symmetric and range between agglomeration on the city center 
and 0.25 and 0.75 for each firm, depending on the ratio between reservation price and 
transportation costs. The higher the latter, the closer firms are to the city center. 
A question addressed in Hotelling’s model is mixed duopolies, that is, duopolies 
where one of the firms is private, and other has a public nature, that is, its objective 
function is not solely profit maximization. Cremer et al. (1991) provide the baseline 
framework for this case, and conclude that having one public firm is enough for having 
both firms located at the optimal best: the first and third quartiles in the linear city. 
Matsumura and Matsushima (2003) analyze the same question with sequential location, 
and conclude that when the public firm is the leader, the location result is the same as in 
simultaneous decision. However, when the private firm decides location first, the 
resulting solution is 1/6 and 1/2 for the public and private firm respectively. Lu and 
Poddar (2007) extend the previous analysis by considering partial ownership, i.e., a firm 
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 This result is important to the Industrial Organization literature, as it reverses the usual conclusion, 
which is that firms end up losing if they both choose to delegate their decisions. 
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can be partially owned by public and private shareholders, which reflects on its 
objective function. By having a private firm and a partially owned firm, the author 
concludes that if the share belonging to public shareholders of the partially owned firm 
is lower than one half, maximum differentiation holds. However, as the public share 
becomes higher, both firms move symmetrically and in a linear fashion towards the 
Cremer et al. (1991) result. Kumar and Saha (2008) test exactly the same conditions as 
Lu and Poddar (2007), but consider a different type of partial ownership. Instead of 
having the partially owned firm maximizing a weighted combination of social welfare 
and profits, the authors consider a version proposed by Fershtman (1990), in which the 
weighting of the response function is considered instead. The results are similar, with 
firms moving to the Cremer et al. (1991) result for earlier values (one third) of public 
ownership. Ogawa and Sanjo (2008) consider a mixed duopoly with a multinational 
firm, that is, the public firm does not consider part of the private firm’s output on its 
social welfare, depending on its share of national capital. The conclusion is that if the 
share of national capital decreases (note that 100% national capital is equivalent to 
Cremer et al. (1991)), the public firm starts moving closer to the city center at a quick 
pace, which pushes the private (multinational) firm away from the center. Additionally, 
the authors test the sequential game, and conclude that when the public firm leads, the 
movement of the firms is similar, with the public firm moving towards the center and 
the private firm moving away from the center with decreases in the national ownership 
(the 100% case is equivalent to Matsumura and Matsushima (2003)). 
Other approach was in the line of vertical relationships, that is, usually there are 
two types of firms – upstream and downstream firms. The former produces the 
necessary goods for the latter to make its goods, which are then sold to the final 
consumer. Matsushima (2004) analyses endogenous downstream firms’ location in a 
linear city model. Upstream firms’ locations are exogenous and restricted to symmetry 
relatively to the city center, and these firms incur quadratic transportation costs in order 
to sell their good to downstream firms. All other assumptions are equal to d’Aspremont 
et al. (1979) model. The conclusion is that firms are still maximally differentiated if the 
input transportation costs are not too high relatively to the output transportation costs 
and not too far to the location of the closest upstream firm. However, for higher values 
of the input transportation costs, firms start moving symmetrically towards the center. 
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When both firms’ location choice is endogenous and simultaneously chosen, both firms 
start by locating in the extremes of the city, but for higher output transportation costs, 
downstream firms move first in the direction of the city center, then for higher values 
the upstream firms follow. Matsushima (2009) extends his previous work by studying 
the effects of integration in the upstream and downstream firms’ optimal location 
decisions. If the input transportation costs are low, no integration occurs and the results 
are the same as in Matsushima (2004). For increasing values of this parameter, there is 
in the first place partial integration, and then full integration. For the former case, the 
integrated firm will always be located at the extreme of its market area, while the non-
integrated firms move together towards the city center for higher levels of the input 
transportation cost; for the latter case of full integration, integrated firms mimic the 
d’Aspremont et al. (1979) result and stay maximally differentiated whatever the values 
for the input transportation cost.  
Liang and Mai (2006) add vertical subcontracting to the model. They assume, in 
the d’Aspremont et al. (1979) setting, that there are two vertical integrated firms in the 
market, but one of the firms produces the input at a higher cost, and therefore 
subcontracts the other firm to obtain the input cheaply. The input market also has 
quadratic transportation costs. If the subcontractor gains all the benefits from the 
subcontracting contract (i.e. has all the bargaining power), the firms maximally disperse 
if the input transportation costs are relatively low, but may end up agglomerating at 
0.125 (given the consignor started in the left-end of the market) as the input 
transportation costs converge to infinity. When the consignor has full bargaining power, 
the main difference is that for higher values of the input transportation cost, firms will 
agglomerate in the extreme where the subcontractor was initially located.
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Lai and Tabuchi (2012) introduce inputs in the linear city of Hotelling, and firms 
have to locate also according to the location of the inputs and their transportation costs, 
in an approach more related with Weber (1929 [1909]). They conclude that if the output 
price is fixed and high enough in relation with input transportation costs, both firms will 
agglomerate at the center. However, if the price is decided in the last stage and inputs 
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 Andaluz (2009) extends this model for vertical differentiation, and therefore falls out of the scope of our 
study. 
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are asymmetrically distributed in the city, then the firms disperse symmetrically around 
the monopoly location, and surprisingly earning the same demand and profits. 
 Matsushima and Mizuno (2012) consider a setting where three firms are in the 
linear city in each production stage (three upstream and three downstream firms), but 
the location of one upstream and downstream is fixed in the city center. The location 
results imply analyzing various different cases of integration between different firms, 
and are therefore too many to place in this article.   
2.3.2.1.3. Other extensions 
This subsection focuses on extensions to the Hotelling model that have had less 
attention compared to others, but have provided with more explanations for the location 
decision rationale. 
Another topic dealt with is fiscal regimes, that is, the tax that public authorities may be 
able to set to influence the location decisions of firms. A starting point is provided by 
Lambertini (1997b), which studies the introduction of taxing/subsidies in the classic 
d’Aspremont et al. (1979) framework. He concludes it is possible for the regulator to 
attribute a subsidy/tax dependent on the location that firms choose, such that firms 
would prefer optimally to move towards the social optimal locations. A different 
conclusion is reached by Kitahara and Matsumura (2006), which find that both the ad 
valorem and the fixed tax are neutral towards the firms’ location outcomes, both in the 
linear and in the circular market. However, if firms are allowed to have different 
marginal costs, the ad valorem tax may have some effects in the location outcome, in 
the line of Ziss (1993). 
Lai and Tsai (2004) introduce zoning regulation, which means that the social 
planner may forbid firms from locating at a given area in the linear city. Only one side 
of the city is zoned, and therefore the location conclusion is that firms do maximally 
differentiate as well, but the firm on the zoned side is forced to be located closer to the 
center. This firm will earn more profits than the unconstrained firm. Matsumura and 
Matsushima (2012b) use the zoning argument combined with delegation to show that 
restricting the locations (for firms to be inside the linear city only) may not always be 
optimal for the social welfare.  
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Bertuzzi and Lambertini (2010) introduce an initial advertising stage and 
dynamics in the standard Hotelling game, in which firms may advertise the product 
benefiting both firms in the market in an equal manner.
5
 The conclusion is that when the 
dynamics are unaffected by pricing and location and location is costless, there will 
never be a pure strategy equilibrium in the dynamic game. However, the authors assume 
costly reallocation, which allows for the existence of equilibrium. The main conclusion 
is that if the discount rate for future period earnings and the decay rate of the 
advertisement investments are larger, the larger is the differentiation between firms. 
With the rationale being that investments in advertising, when these are cheaper and 
permanent, are used as a way to increase firms’ profits. The higher advertising costs 
become, the larger is the firm incentive to soften price competition through increasing 
differentiation.  
To conclude this subsection, it is clear the relative importance of linear city mill-
pricing competition in the spatial competition literature. The number of articles is fairly 
larger in this branch comparing to other pricing schemes. The reason is probably 
because this was the style originally introduced by Hotelling, and therefore these types 
of studies were regarded highly in the literature. In addition, it is clear to see in the last 
papers presented in the subsection that the number of applications of the linear city in 
Industrial Organization related topics is relatively high, and these are not replicated in 
such scale in other types of spatial competition models à la Hotelling. Regarding the 
location results, the highlight should be done on the multiplicity of results arising from 
the different models studied. The departure point in most cases seemed to be to find 
effects that would “face” the incentive to differentiate and shake price competition: an 
objective which was attained in some of articles presented here. 
2.3.2.2 Spatial Price Discrimination Setting 
Another frequent way of treating price competition in the linear city model of 
Hotelling is by introducing the so-called spatial price discrimination. In this setting, 
firms, instead of fixing a single price in their store, are allowed to set a price for each 
location in the city. This price will no longer be the price at the store, but is the 
delivered price, i.e. including the transportation costs, which are now incurred by the 
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 This model is based on Piga (1998), but the author fixes firms’ location at the market endpoints. 
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firms. This setting allows firms, when they are monopolists, to fix the maximum price 
possible in each location, given that each consumer still buys the good. When there is 
more than one firm, Nash equilibrium in this price sub-game occurs when all the firms 
participating in the game do not wish to change their delivered price, given the 
delivered price set by the other firms, for every location in the city. 
This setting was introduced by Hoover (1937) and Lerner and Singer (1937), 
while analyzing the location results of Hotelling and using Hotelling’s other 
assumptions. Hoover (1937) was more cautious in deriving a location result, since it 
depended too much on the type of industry considered; while Lerner and Singer (1937) 
argue that the equilibrium locations of a finite number of discriminating firms on a unit 
interval are the same as the socially optimal locations. Greenhut and Greenhut (1975) 
studied the profits and prices of firms with different exogenous firm locations. Although 
not directly studying the two-stage location-price game à la Hotelling, this paper had a 
significant influence in the spatial price discrimination literature. However, in spite of 
the relevance of these three papers, their results are not entirely related to the two stage 
location-price game that is the main object of this review. 
Moreover, within this setting, the usual focus of researchers is not the two-stage 
location-price game. Most of the papers present models in which the location of both 
firms is fixed, and so the focus is the profit and price results of the firms, as well as 
social welfare for the agents in the linear city. In this subsection, the focus is on the 
papers that contribute to explaining the location choice of firms, and therefore most 
articles on spatial price discrimination are not included in this review. 
A starting point is Hurter and Lederer (1985). The authors state that the location 
of the plants that minimizes social costs in a city is an equilibrium result of the game. 
The reason is that every plant benefits largely from having consumers that live close by, 
allowing them to price discriminate effectively among those consumers without the 
“intrusion” of other plants. 
An interesting exception is Anderson and de Palma (1988), who study the case 
where the products are assumed to be heterogeneous regarding consumer tastes. They 
conclude that, when the degree of heterogeneity is zero, the model is equivalent to 
Hurter and Lederer (1985)’s model and the location result is the social optimum. 
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However, as the degree of heterogeneity rises, both firms move away from the city 
center. But a further increase in the heterogeneity brings the firms closer, and after a 
given threshold, agglomeration at the center is an equilibrium result of the two-stage 
location-price game. This non-linear behavior happens because of two opposite effects: 
when the degree of heterogeneity increases, the concept of market areas becomes 
blurred, i.e. a consumer may prefer the firm located on the left, while another consumer 
located to the left of the first consumer may prefer the firm to its right. This makes the 
firms more competitive, and so they prefer to differentiate more in order to lessen price 
competition. However, as the degree of heterogeneity grows sufficiently, firms gain 
more monopoly power, as changes in prices become less important in defining each 
firm’s demand, which causes firms to locate closer to each other. This last effect is 
similar to the one observed by De Palma et al. (1985) and Ben-Akiva et al. (1989) for 
the mill-pricing literature. 
The paper of Anderson et al. (1989) provides a comparison between the profits 
and prices in different pricing schemes for the firms when products are exogenously 
heterogeneous in the eyes of the consumers. Although the locations are fixed, one can 
conclude that when in a duopoly, the profits for the firms and total social surplus are 
both higher in a mill pricing than in a price discrimination setting for any value of 
products’ heterogeneity. 
Although they focus more on finding the equilibrium conditions in a circular 
market setting (a disc), Lederer and Hurter (1986) prove that it is impossible for two 
identical firms that are price discriminating to be located at the same point in the 
market, since this leads to zero profits for both firms. In the same line of research, 
MacLeod et al. (1988) allow the firms to choose the number of stores to build in a linear 
city. After concluding that there is a Nash Equilibrium at the price sub-stage for every 
possible location of the plants, the location that minimizes social costs still remains an 
equilibrium result of the game. In terms of the number of firms entering the market, the 
authors are inconclusive, stating that: “In addition, we find that equilibrium may 
generate the socially optimal level of product variety, but may also produce more or less 
product variety than is socially optimal” (MacLeod et al., 1988, p. 444). 
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In a short paper, Gupta (1992) examines whether firms still locate at the socially 
optimum places in the case of sequential entry. The paper states that, in the case of two 
firms, the first mover will locate closer to the center (0.4) while the second mover has to 
settle at a greater distance from the central location (0.8). Pires (2005) tests whether the 
second-best social optimum (that is, when the social planner controls only the location 
of the firms, but not the pricing), still emerges as an equilibrium result of the location-
price game. The author concludes that when demand is perfectly inelastic or when firms 
practice first-degree price discrimination, the second-best location is achieved. Else, 
firms will disperse more than the social optimum.  
Braid (2008), after a good summary of the results in the literature, models a two-
stage location-price game in which consumers have an exogenous preference (other 
than location) over the goods of the firms. The author concludes that firms choose to 
locate in the socially optimum locations for the model. 
Similarly to the mill pricing case, some work has been done in order to find the 
location consequences of studying the unidirectional Hotelling model. The starting point 
is Colombo (2009), who allows for price discrimination in the second stage of the game. 
The author concludes that one of the firms locates in the middle, while the other locates 
in the endpoint where the consumers can only travel to. Colombo (2011) extends this 
analysis by introducing elastic demand, concluding that one of the firms locates in the 
same endpoint, while the other stays in the center if the unit transportation cost is zero, 
but moves progressively to the endpoint with the increase in the unit transportation 
costs. 
The mergers phenomenon is analyzed by Rothschild (2000) in a spatial price 
discrimination model of three firms, which two of them can potentially merge. 
However, the location analysis is too complicated to be resumed in a single result. 
Nevertheless, firms have the incentive to merge and to relocate after the merger. 
Rothschild et al. (2000) analyze a similar question, but they treat the merger option 
exogenously, with a merger happening between two firms with a probability p. If the 
merged firms split their incremental profits resulting from merger, and as the probability 
of both firms merging increase, they will locate closer to each other and farther from the 
firm that did not merge. 
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Following the example of Liu and Serfes (2007), who treat collusion in the price 
discrimination setting, but fixing the location of the firms, Colombo (2010a) analyzes 
collusion for endogenous location choices, and concludes that the firms’ location, given 
that they are symmetrically located with respect to the city center, does not interfere 
with the decision of colluding when firms are colluding on discriminatory prices. 
For the literature of mixed duopolies in the spatial price discrimination setting, 
the main contribution comes from Heywood and Ye (2009a), which found that 
simultaneous location in these duopolies does not change the location and welfare result 
comparing to the two private firms competing case. However, on sequential location, 
having the public firm as follower increases welfare, as it pushes all other private firms 
to more symmetric locations in the linear city. The same authors (Heywood and Ye, 
2009b) also analyze the case where there is a foreign firm in the market, similarly to 
Ogawa and Sanjo (2008) in the mill pricing case. Introducing a foreign firm in a 
duopoly has no effect in the equilibrium locations chosen by both private (foreign) and 
public firm. 
Some attempts have been made to introduce vertical relationships in the spatial 
price discrimination setting. An early approach is due to Gupta et al. (1994), who 
consider an upstream monopolist serving n downstream firms, which have to choose 
their locations in the linear market. The conclusion is that in the case of two firms, their 
optimal locations will be 1/2 and 5/6. Beladi et al. (2008) test a model where 
downstream firms cannot make all varieties demanded by the consumers: each firm 
makes a unique variety, and a common variety, but upstream firm supplies an input that 
suits all varieties. In result, firms locate symmetrically to the center and are as distant to 
it the higher the fraction of consumers that wants to buy the common variety, the higher 
the price paid for the input and the lower the fraction of consumers that prefers to buy 
the unique variety. Beladi et al. (2010) test the exact same model but with sequential 
location decision between the downstream firms. The conclusion is that the first-mover 
manages to get closer to the center than the other firm, and therefore snatching higher 
profits. 
In terms of tax effects, two opposing results appear in this framework. On the 
one hand, Cazado-Izaga (2010) extends the Kitahara and Matsushima (2006) result in 
39 
 
mill pricing to conclude that both fixed and ad valorem tax are neutral regarding firms’ 
locations in the Hurter and Lederer (1985) example. On the other hand, Colombo 
(2010b) extends the framework to allow for elastic demand in each point of the market 
(and with uniform delivered pricing instead of perfect discrimination pricing), and 
removes the neutrality results of the model. The conclusion is that 1) the higher the tax 
rate the lower is the equilibrium distance between the firms; and 2) both ad valorem and 
fixed taxing have equivalent results on the location equilibrium.  
To conclude this subsection, we can state that the location results for the game 
when firms are allowed to price discriminate against the consumers, according to 
literature, tends to be around the socially optimum values. This seems to happen 
because of two effects: on the one hand, each firm is interested in locating as far as 
possible from its opponents, allowing a better price discrimination against the 
consumers that are, in a sense, exclusive to the firm; on the other hand, what keeps the 
firms from settling at the extremes of the market is that they are responsible for paying 
the transportation costs of the good. Therefore, firms want to locate in a place that 
minimizes their transportation costs when transporting the goods to the potential 
demand. These two effects lead to the straightforward conclusion that in a duopoly in 
which the linear city model is symmetric in all its characteristics, i.e. in which neither 
side or firm has an advantage, firms share the market evenly and locate in the middle of 
their market areas, which coincides with the socially optimum result that minimizes the 
transportation costs of the economy. 
2.3.3 Cournot Competition 
This review will deal with the two-stage location game in which firms compete à 
la Cournot (in quantities), instead of competing à la Bertrand (using prices), at the 
second stage. The assumption of competition in quantities is usually less realistic than 
competition in prices when we think about competition among firms. The price of a 
good is an important determinant of the demand for it in most cases, while the quantities 
placed in a market seem to be a more indirect determinant of demand. However, in 
modeling non-spatial duopoly cases, the Bertrand (1883) model produces less realistic 
results than the Cournot (1897 [1838]) model (Mas-Collel et al., 1995, p. 394). In some 
industries, however, competition in quantities is a better assumption than competition in 
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prices: the Cournot assumption is more appropriate for markets where quantity is less 
flexible than price at each market point (Anderson and Neven, 1991; Pal and Sarkar, 
2002), and also when there are significant lags between the production decision and the 
price setting (Hamilton et al., 1994). It is not a surprise, then, that some authors have 
decided to analyze this kind of location games. 
It should be stressed that the way Cournot spatial competition is modeled has 
some significant differences relative to the Bertrand competition case. In the two-stage 
location-quantity game, firms select their location simultaneously and then choose the 
quantities supplied. However, at the second stage, instead of setting a quantity for the 
whole market and waiting for the consumers to travel to their store (as in the Bertrand 
case), each firm chooses to supply a quantity for each location in the city (similar to the 
spatial price discrimination setting, applied to quantities), which implies that the 
combination of quantities chosen by each firm in each location determines the price of 
the good in each location. Thus, a Nash equilibrium is defined at this second stage when 
for all locations in the city, all the firms set a quantity such that there is not a single firm 
that wishes to change its quantity delivered, given the quantities delivered by other 
firms (i.e. there must be a Nash equilibrium in all the locations of the city). 
As the reader may have noticed, the agents that pay transportation costs within 
this framework are the firms, as they have to take the good to each location in the city. 
This framework can be better understood if we think that firms compete in a typical 
Cournot setting in every location of the city, with their “marginal costs” equal to the 
price of the good plus the cost of delivering the good to the chosen location. The profits 
of the firms will be the sum of the resulting profits in all locations of the city. 
In terms of results, this different framework has new implications. In Bertrand 
competition with a mill-price setting, firms have their own market areas based on the 
existence of an indifferent consumer. In quantity competition, firms compete in every 
location of the city in a typical Cournot setting. Therefore, instead of having a “market 
area”, both firms may sell their homogenous good everywhere in the city, which seems 
to provide a more realistic result. Additionally, the assumption of inelastic demand must 
be dropped, since competition in quantities in this type of demand would result in 
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corner solutions in which the price would be infinite, somewhat analogous to the zero-
profit condition in Bertrand competition (Hamilton et al., 1989).  
The starting point for this framework is considered to be the work of Greenhut 
and Greenhut (1975), who adapt the setting of spatial price discrimination, allowing for 
more than one firm competing in the market. Although not directly based on the 
Hotelling framework, firms select quantities when interacting with each other. This 
paper derived the profile of the delivered price schedule, paving the way for future 
studies into spatial Cournot Competition. 
The baseline case used in this subsection will be that of Hamilton et al. (1989), 
who compare the case of price and quantity competition. The authors conclude that in 
the framework of quantity competition, for all values in which there exists a solution, 
firms will always agglomerate in the central location of the city. This is in contrast with 
the case of price competition, in which firms never agglomerate for any feasible range 
of values for transportation costs, given exactly the same assumptions. 
Anderson and Neven (1991) extend these results by studying the equilibrium 
conditions of this two-stage location game. Ensuring that the reservation price is high 
enough such that in all locations every consumer buys from both firms, they conclude 
that when the demand is linear and transportation costs are convex, there is a unique 
equilibrium in the game, where both firms locate at the center of the market. 
Furthermore, for any changes in the demand or cost transportation functions, any 
location equilibrium in this game must involve symmetric locations between firms. 
Later, Chamorro-Rivas (2000a) relaxes the assumption of high reservation prices 
and found that for lower reservation prices, the agglomeration equilibrium at the center 
ceases to be unique, although it is still an equilibrium result. For even lower reservation 
prices, Benassi et al. (2007) find that the central agglomeration location is no longer an 
equilibrium result. The unique equilibrium found is a dispersed symmetric equilibrium. 
Therefore, agglomeration does not hold when the reservation price (transportation costs) 
is too low (or high). 
Hamilton et al. (1994) examine the two-stage game of location and quantities 
with Cournot competition where consumers pay the linear transportation costs. In this 
framework, there is no pure strategy equilibrium in quantities for all possible locations 
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of the two firms (see Hamilton et al. (1994), p. 913, for a very intuitive graphical 
explanation). However, considering only the case for symmetric firm locations, the 
authors solve the two-stage game and conclude that firms locate very near to the center, 
where low values for transportation costs pertain, even if at the second stage mixed 
strategies are played. 
The following three papers, in line with the Bertrand competition strand, change 
some assumptions regarding firms’ and consumers’ conditions for operating in the 
market. Mayer (2000) introduces the assumption of different production costs 
throughout the city, meaning that the location of the firms also matters in relation to the 
cost structure for the production of the goods. The main result is that if the global 
convexity of the production cost distribution holds, there is an agglomeration 
equilibrium result between the minimum cost location and the center. Depending on the 
cost distribution of the city, firms face a trade-off between the demand effect and the 
diminution of the marginal cost of production. However, they may still agglomerate 
even if it is not at the central location.  Gupta et al. (1997) change the distribution of 
consumers in the city using a consumer density function, in a similar way to Anderson 
et al. (1997), in the case of price competition. They conclude that in the case of two 
firms, non-agglomeration cannot occur if the population density is sufficiently “thick” 
for all points of the city. Also, the agglomeration equilibrium found is unique. Shimizu 
(2002) introduces product differentiation into the Hamilton et al. (1989) framework. 
However, the main location result does not change and the central agglomeration 
equilibrium is unique for any relationship between the products of both firms, that is, if 
these are substitutes, complements or independent between them. 
Extensions also appear in the case of competition within n firms. Anderson and 
Neven (1991) conclude that all firms agglomerate at the center, given linear demand 
and linear transportation costs, while Gupta et al. (1997) prove that agglomeration is the 
unique equilibrium if the non-uniform consumer density is not too “thin” along the 
linear city. 
Pal and Sarkar (2002) introduce the interesting case whereby two firms compete 
by having more than one store, i.e. they can choose more than one location in the city. 
The main conclusion is that if the two firms have the same number of stores and the 
43 
 
demand is high in relation to transportation costs, both firms choose their monopoly 
locations, thus partially agglomerating in the city. The results for the case where firms 
have a different number of stores vary significantly depending on the numbers involved. 
The unidirectional Hotelling model has also some adaptations to the quantity 
competition case. An interesting case is the work by Sun (2010), who considers the 
unidirectional case in a circular market, and allows firms to choose to which direction 
they prefer to supply their product, since contrary to the Hotelling case, firms support 
the transportation costs to the consumer.  The author concludes that when both firms 
can only travel in the same direction the equilibrium involves an equidistant location. 
On the other hand, if both firms can travel in opposite directions, then they agglomerate 
in any point of the city. If firms are allowed to choose to which way they can travel, the 
only solution in the three-stage game, or even in the two-stage game where firms choose 
their travelling direction and their location simultaneously, is that firms agglomerate 
and choose to distribute their product in different directions. Colombo (2011) considers 
the linear city model, and concludes that for lower values of the unit transportation cost, 
both firms agglomerate in the extreme of the market to where the consumers can walk 
to. As the unit transportation costs gets higher, one of the firms moves progressively 
until being one third away from the extreme where the other firm is located. Building on 
Colombo, Andree (2011) extends the model by introducing product differentiation in 
the style of Shimizu (2002). The result is similar than Colombo, and firms agglomerate 
for lower levels of the transportation costs, with one of the firms progressively 
dispersing from the extreme as unit transportation costs arise above a certain threshold. 
The main conclusion is that the introduction of product differentiation facilitates 
agglomeration, since it raises the value of unit transportation cost needed for dispersion 
to occur. Later, Colombo (2013) relaxes the assumption of “unidirectionality” by 
considering that firms pay different transportation costs to travel for different sides of 
the market, an assumption followed as well by Nilssen (1997) out of the context of the 
two-stage game. The author concludes that for the circular city, an equidistant 
equilibrium is the unique solution independently of the transportation costs for each 
direction. For the linear case, the author concludes that the standard agglomeration 
result occurs, but firms move away to the center in the direction where travelling is 
more expensive, in order to save on the transportation costs. 
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In terms of mergers and collusion, Norman and Pepall (2000) analyze the merger 
possibility of two firms in the Anderson and Neven (1991) framework. The authors 
conclude that the merger of two firms can be profitable due to the relocation possibility 
of firms.
6
 The merged firms coordinate their locations such that one sells only in the left 
side of the market, while the other serves the right side. The optimal decision of firms is 
then to locate symmetrically to the center, but closer to the market extreme, due to the 
larger competition happening in the central locations. Tomé and Chamorro-Rivas 
(2007) analyze the collusion possibility when an infinite game is played in the second-
stage, similarly to Friedman and Thisse (1993) in price competition. In terms of location 
outcomes, if firms collude, they split the market and position themselves in 0.25 and 
0.75 respectively. However, attaining collusion is harder when the locations are defined 
endogenously. 
Regarding the problem of delegation, Liang et al. (2011) analyze the Cournot 
case for an uncovered market with inelastic demand (therefore, in a different approach 
than the one of Anderson and Neven) The location outcomes for the Cournot case are 
equal to the Bertrand case: they are symmetric and range between agglomeration on the 
city center and 0.25 and 0.75 for each firm, depending on the ratio between reservation 
price and transportation costs. The higher the latter, the closer firms are to the city 
center. 
In terms of endogenous production costs of firms, Wang and Chen (2008) 
introduce the hiring of workers by firms and analyze the equilibrium conditions with 
wage bargaining.  For lower values of the transportation costs, firms agglomerate in the 
middle of the city. However, as transportation costs become higher, firms have the 
incentive to move away from the center in a symmetric fashion, in order to sell fewer 
quantities, which drive the wages of workers down. 
In the zoning literature, Chen and Lai (2008), in a similar way to Lai and Tsai 
(2004), extend the literature by analyzing the effects of zoning regulations on the 
optimal decisions of firms. Firms are forbidden to be located in a central area which is 
symmetric to the city center. In addition, the authors assume that the firms do not have 
                                                          
6
 Remember that in the classic non-spatial Cournot approach, where it is assumed that there no efficiency 
gains from a merger and firms are assumed to be equal, a merger between two firms is only profitable if 
these firms are alone in the market (e.g. Szidarovsky and Yakowitz (1982) and Salant et al. 1983), which 
is the so-called “merger paradox”. 
45 
 
to sell the products in all points of the market, similarly to Chamorro-Rivas (2000a). 
The authors conclude that firms will locate at the endpoints of the zoning area, that is, 
as closer to the center as possible.  
To sum up regarding quantity competition, one can say that in these models à la 
Hotelling, the conclusions are similar to those relating to the non-spatial quantity 
competition when comparing with the price competition setting in Industrial 
Organization: Cournot competition has less realistic assumptions, such as the delivered 
price setting and the competition in quantities itself, which is less realistic than 
competition in prices; however, the results are more fitting to reality, as the 
agglomeration result may be obtained more easily, and it is a fact that firms sell 
everywhere in the city, in contrast with the less realistic result of a “market area” for 
each firm. We can see that fewer assumptions from the Hotelling model in the location-
quantity game are changed throughout time compared with the location-price game. 
This is one proof that the literature on price competition is more developed and that it is 
the result of the high attention that location theorists have paid to this kind of 
competition, seeking to solve the Bertrand paradox. 
2.3.4 Alternative market specifications 
One of the lines of research that followed Hotelling (1929) abandons the 
assumption of a simple linear market while remaining in the two-stage location-price 
framework. The most significant “deviation” from this assumption is the circular market 
framework developed by Salop (1979). In this subsection we also include quantity 
competition in the second stage, whenever it is developed in an alternative market 
specification. 
Why should one work on circular markets? First of all, it is interesting to analyze 
the results for the location of firms, given that there are no extremes in the market. One 
can see that in the circular market, no location is a priori better than any other, which is 
not the case in linear market models (Gupta et al., 2004). Secondly, there are some 
markets that may be better represented by a circular market, for instance, time-
dependent markets, such as television companies who must choose time slots to 
broadcast their programs (Gupta et al., 2004), or travelling companies who have to 
choose the schedule for their travelling services (buses, trains, airplanes).  
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Salop (1979) varies the Hotelling framework by assuming that consumers are 
located on a circle rather than on a line segment, although his paper is not the first to 
assume a circular city model (see Vickrey et al., [1999 (1964)] or Eaton and Lipsey 
(1975) for an early reference). The choice of this city specification is due to allowing 
“the "corner" difficulties of the original Hotelling model to be ignored” (Salop 1979, p. 
142). This paper does not undertake an analysis of the two-stage location game, because 
it takes location as given. However, it is important as a starting point for all the 
subsequent two-stage game analysis in circular markets. 
In the context of spatial price discrimination, Lederer and Hurter (1986) 
conclude that when firms have identical marginal costs and transportation rates, the 
agglomeration result cannot be equilibrium. Moreover, when firms are not identical, the 
equilibrium involves both firms being located on the opposite side of the diameter of the 
circle when the market is given by a disc. Within mill-pricing competition, the “base” 
result comes from Kats (1995), who concludes that in the circular market with linear 
transportation costs, firms optimally locate in opposing locations in the circular city. 
In a short paper, Pal (1998) introduces the circular market into the two-stage 
location game in order to prove that Cournot competition does not yield spatial 
agglomeration in all situations. He concludes that, in equilibrium, two (or more) firms 
will locate equidistantly from each other on the city circle, which is a maximum 
differentiation result. Matsushima (2001) extends the conclusions to the case of n firms 
and proves the existence of partial agglomeration equilibrium, that is, half of the firms 
agglomerate at a point and the other half agglomerate at the diametrically opposite point 
of the circular city, given that the number of firms in the market is even. Gupta et al. 
(2004) take an important step in the study of circular markets, by identifying multiple 
equilibrium locations for a given number of firms, in which the findings of Pal (1998) 
and Matsushima (2001) are included. The highlight of the results is the existence of a 
huge number of equilibrium locations, though none of them involves agglomeration of 
all firms at the same point. An interesting result is that in the case of an even number of 
firms, all equilibrium situations yield equal profits and equal consumer surpluses. 
Matsumura and Shimizu (2006) conclude that independently of any profile of the 
transportation cost functions as long as it is increasing, the location equilibrium for two 
firms will always be the equidistant equilibrium location. Yu (2007) found that the 
47 
 
location equilibrium in the case of spatial Cournot discrimination and spatial Bertrand 
discrimination are equal, meaning that if firms are discriminating sales per market point, 
it is indifferent for the location outcome whether they are competing in quantities or in 
prices.  
Chamorro-Rivas (2000b) extends the analysis for two firms that can have more 
than one plant. In the case of two firms and two plants, the conclusion is that in 
equilibrium, the plants locate in each quarter of the market, with each firm setting its 
plants at diametrically opposite points. 
Yu and Lai (2003) investigate what is the location decision of firms in the 
circular market depending or the degree of substitutability between products sold 
between two firms. The conclusion is that when firms are substitutes (for any degree of 
substitutability), the location equilibrium is having two firms located in the opposing 
side of the circle, while for any degree of complementarity, the optimal result is 
agglomeration at any city point. When there is not any relationship between the 
products, naturally any location pattern is location equilibrium. Similarly to Chamorro-
Rivas (2000b), the authors extend their framework allowing firms to have more than 
one store in the city, and conclude that for two stores for any degree of substitutability 
the stores disperse one in each quarter of the circle, while partial agglomeration of two 
stores occurs in opposing locations, for the case of complementarity.
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De Frutos et al. (2002) study the consequences of the introduction of non-linear 
transportation costs in the circular framework, and conclude that for any convex 
transportation cost function there is a concave function for which the two stage location-
price game is strategically equivalent. Matsumura et al. (2005) extend the previous 
framework by assuming as well nonlinear transportation costs. However, the paper 
considers the existence of four isolated markets in the city rather than a continuum of 
consumers. The main objective was to assess which equilibrium (Pal, 1998 vs. 
Matsushima, 2001) was the more robust, by checking its existence, given different 
configurations of the transportation cost function. It is shown that in the case of 
simultaneous entry, the location pattern identified by Pal is always an equilibrium, 
while the one identified by Matsushima only occurs if the transportation costs are not 
                                                          
7
 A quick summary of the location results in this strand of the literature is in Table 1 of Yu and Lai (2003, 
p. 577). 
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“too concave or too convex”. In the case of sequential entry, the location pattern of Pal 
is the unique equilibrium if the transportation costs are non-linear. Therefore, dispersion 
equilibrium seems more robust than partial agglomeration equilibrium. 
There are a number of variations of the Salop circular city model. For instance, 
Brueckner et al. (2002) distribute the firms and the skills of the workers in a circular 
city, adapting the framework to the study of labor markets; and Arakawa (2006) applies 
the framework to studying the location problem of shopping centers, following an 
application of Henkel et al. (2000) which uses the well-known model of monopolistic 
competition in a spatial framework. 
Regarding collusion and mergers in spatial competition models, in a rather 
complete approach, Posada and Straume (2004) analyze how firms relocate after the 
existence of a merger, or after the partial collusion possibility in either location or price 
stage. The authors assume that three firms are located equidistantly, and have to pay a 
cost to relocate their business. For a market with linear transportation costs, a merger 
between two of the firms results in a relocation of the merged firms towards the firm 
that did not merge. However, if firms collude only in the price stage, if there is 
relocation, the merged firms will move away from the firm that did not merge, while the 
reverse happens when firms are only able to collude in the location stage.  
Similarly to the linear market case of Aiura and Sato (2008), Karlson (1985) 
introduce earlier a way to turn endogenous the marginal costs of production of firms by 
setting a natural resource in the circular city model of Salop, but allowing for elastic 
demand at every point. The author concludes that if no natural resource existed, firms 
would maximally differentiate due to the assumption of elastic demand. The existence 
of the natural resource brings firms closer, as the higher the importance of the natural 
resource in the model, that is, the higher the transportation cost required to transport the 
resource, the closer firms will locate to the natural resource and therefore, the closer 
they will be. Wang and Chen (2008) introduce wage bargaining in a quantity 
competition setting, but the conclusion is that it does not change the equilibrium 
locations found by Pal (1998). 
The zoning topic, brought up by Lai and Tsai (2004) in Bertrand competition has 
also been extended to the circular market case by Hamoudi and Risueño (2012). The 
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authors consider the classic two stage location price but add a first stage where a social 
planner chooses the area where firms are allowed to be located in. The unique location 
chosen by firms under this setting is one firm in each of the extremes of the zoned area. 
The social planner, knowing that firms will choose this location setting, will decide to 
zone half of the city, meaning firms will maximally differentiate. However, if the social 
planner places a weight higher than 4/7 on the firms’ profit, the planner will only allow 
firms to be located in a single point in the city, therefore firms will be agglomerated. 
In short, the conclusions arising from the assumption of circular markets are 
quite different from those found in the previous sections of this review. The main 
differences are that while a unique equilibrium was easier to find in a linear market 
setting, multiple equilibrium locations often arise in a circular market. Moreover, 
agglomeration of all firms in one location is rarely an equilibrium outcome in circular 
markets, in which most commonly partial agglomeration arises. 
Turning to other market specifications, a different type of market is studied by 
Braid (1989), who examines the two-stage location-price game along intersecting 
roadways, and concludes that there is no equilibrium in the first stage of the game, for 
any number of firms, given that transportation costs are linear. Braid (2013) extends the 
model for n finite roads intersecting at a central location, but with the quadratic 
transportation costs assumption. There is one firm exogenously fixed in the intersection, 
but there is one additional firm for each line of the market, and it can only choose to 
locate there. The author concludes that the location of the firms in the line depends only 
on the number of firms, with the rationale that a higher number of firms changes the 
pricing incentives of the firm located in the middle. The higher the number of 
intersecting lines (and therefore, firms), the closer firms in the line locate to the center. 
The social maximizing location is between the resulting locations when there are 2 and 
3 firms and intersecting lines, so firms deviate more from the social optimum the larger 
the number of intersecting lines. 
Another possibility is to consider triangular consumer densities in the one 
dimensional models. Tabuchi and Thisse (1995) show that if the model of d’Aspremont 
et al. (1979) is extended to allow firms to locate outside the unit interval, then the 
symmetric location pattern (-1/4, 5/4) is obtained, but if the model is further extended to 
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allow a symmetric triangular consumer density with a peak in the middle of the unit 
interval, then there are two possible location patterns, both asymmetric: (-0.272, 0.680) 
and (0.320, 1.272). In a slightly different approach, Mulligan (1996) assumes a market 
in which consumers are located uniformly in three different lines that form a triangle. 
His main important finding regarding the location behavior of firms is that the market 
configurations are critical to the equilibrium result, and therefore more realistic 
configurations should be sought instead of the classic linear or circular approaches. Tsai 
and Lai (2005) also assume a triangular market, in which firms are restricted to choose 
their location in only one of the lines, denoted as the “main street”. However, similarly 
to Tabuchi and Thisse, firms are also allowed to locate outside of the interval that forms 
the “main street” line. For a symmetric triangle, the authors conclude that firms locate 
in the location pattern (-1/4, 5/4), similarly to the uniform distribution case and contrary 
to the findings of Tabuchi and Thisse for a symmetric triangle. 
Huang (2009) models a case where firms locate in a linear city but demand is 
located in a parallel line, with the distance between those being an exogenous variable. 
The conclusion is that the original demand discontinuity problem of the Hotelling 
framework with linear transportation costs can be solved if the distance between the 
lines becomes sufficiently big. For intermediate values of this distance, firms depart 
from the center and choose symmetric equilibriums with intermediate differentiation, 
but for higher values the location equilibrium becomes maximum differentiation. 
To conclude this section, the location results from alternative market 
specifications are naturally very dependent on the type of market specification assumed. 
The circular market is the most popular variant, and for some reason, quantity 
competition seemed to be the type of approach that was more explored in the circular 
literature. Other alternative approaches were usually sought when authors were 
intending to analyze very specific characteristics of a given market. Another interesting 
fact is that an important share of these articles are short notes with less than 10 pages, 
and published in journals that accept this type of articles, such as Economic Letters. 
2.3.5 Incomplete Information 
Now we shall turn to a more recent strand in the literature, dedicated to studying 
the location equilibrium of firms in cases where the agents do not have perfect 
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information. As is known, the assumption of perfect information is quite unrealistic, as 
firms usually do not know the precise cost structure of the other firms or even the tastes 
of the consumers regarding their product and other competitors’ products. The literature 
on this subject differs depending on the type of lack of information assumed. 
In some of the following models, location is usually observed by all the firms 
and therefore it is used by the incumbent or by the first mover as a signal to the other 
firms of its cost structure or the quality of its good, previously determined by “nature”. 
This type of games may be defined as signaling games (Macho-Stadler and Perez-
Castrillo, 2001). 
Boyer et al. (1994) study the case of sequential location decisions within a 
delivered price setting, where two firms choose their locations and afterwards their 
prices in a context of asymmetric production costs. Firm 1 first chooses its location 
having either equal or lower marginal costs with a given probability. Asymmetric 
information arises because firm 2 does not know the marginal costs of firm 1 before 
choosing its location. Therefore, location for firm 1 is used as a signaling mechanism 
for its cost structure. 
When the difference between the marginal costs is low, a unique refined 
separating Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) exists, with firm 1’s location being 
closer to the center compared to the case of complete information when it has both low 
and high costs. However, when the difference between the efficiency of high and low 
cost firms becomes too marked, the only refined PBE is pooling, and the incumbent 
finds it more profitable to locate in the same place independently of its cost efficiency. 
Its position in the linear city will depend on the beliefs of firm 2 that firm 1 is a lower 
cost firm. 
Later, Boyer et al (2003a) develop a similar model, but with a mill pricing 
setting. In this case, there is a unique separating equilibrium if firm 1’s possible 
disadvantage is not great enough or if it’s possible advantage is very significant, which 
implies that high-cost firm 1 locates at the extreme and the low cost firm moves 
progressively to the center as its possible advantage is great, while firm 2 locates at the 
other extreme. If the relative advantage is not too big (for either of the sides), there is a 
unique pooling equilibrium at the extremes of the city for both firms. 
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In a similar context, Boyer et al. (2003b) study the case where there is an 
incumbent who might have a high or low marginal cost and an entrant who has to 
decide if it will enter the market. However, the entrant does not know the true cost of 
the incumbent, which allows the latter to use location as a signaling mechanism. 
Agglomeration equilibrium never occurs, for both delivered and mill price settings. This 
happens because in the pooling equilibrium, the incumbent chooses a central location, 
preventing the entry of the second firm, while for the separating equilibrium, whenever 
the incumbent chooses a location closer to the center it is because it is a low-cost firm, 
thus pushing the entrant to the other extreme of the market. 
The following models also deal with lack of information, but have a different 
modeling perspective, other than the signaling game explained by Macho-Stadler and 
Perez-Castrillo (2001). 
Vettas and Christou (2005), allowing for vertical differentiation, study 
Hotelling’s two-staged location game. Two firms know the existing quality difference 
between them, but do not know who has the better quality. In the first stage they decide 
on their locations, while in the second they know the relationship between both qualities 
and so compete in prices. If there is no quality difference between the firms, the results 
for the location game are the same as those shown by d’Aspremont et al. (1979). As the 
quality difference grows, firms tend to draw close to the center. This mechanism occurs 
because firms compete in prices, which implies that the equilibrium prices when the 
firms are agglomerated are exactly the quality difference for the firm with the higher 
quality and zero for the other firm. Therefore, there is an incentive to agglomerate if this 
quality difference (keeping the transportation cost constant) improves, because the 
possible monopoly profits are very high in the case of a firm with better quality. 
In a paper by Harter (1996), uncertainty is in the demand location. Firms have to 
decide their location knowing only that demand is randomly located: The linear city is 
[0, 2], but the consumers of the good are only located in [θ, θ+1], with θ belonging to 
the interval between 0 and 1. An additional assumption is that firms that have chosen to 
locate out of the linear city will automatically earn 0 profits. In a sequential location 
game, the first firm will locate close to center (1.01), while the second firm chooses the 
middle of the larger market side (0.50). In a similar setting, Aiura (2010) studies the 
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equilibrium locations of three firms when location is decided sequentially among them. 
That is, the game has three stages, at the first stage of which firm 1 chooses its location 
and so on until all the three firms have chosen their locations. Prices are fixed, which 
implies that maximizing profits is equal to maximizing demand. The linear city is 
similar to the one in Harter (1996), so there is uncertainty in the location of demand. 
The asymmetric information problem arises because firms do not know θ when 
choosing their locations. However, the subsequent firms can observe the demand of 
those that have already chosen their location, thus updating their beliefs about θ. The 
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium result is that firm 1 locates in the center, firm 2 also 
locates in the center and firm 3 unambiguously chooses to locate infinitesimally to the 
left or right of both firms. The rationale is very intuitive: firm 1 chooses the value that is 
expected to capture the maximum demand possible in the future. Firm 2 chooses the 
same as firm 1 in order not to provide firm 3 with any kind of information. Firm 3, since 
it does not know anything about the true location of θ, will randomly choose to capture 
one of the two sides of the market. Therefore, agglomeration equilibrium at the center 
of the city occurs in this interesting case. 
Although the following papers do not mimic the classic problem of information 
presented in microeconomics, the problem identified in these articles is very similar to a 
signaling problem. Meagher and Zauner (2004) model a different type of demand 
uncertainty, with the parameter that defines demand following a normal distribution 
instead of a uniform one. Bonein and Turolla (2009) extend the type of demand 
uncertainty in Meagher and Zauner to account for sequential location decisions, with 
only one of the firms having perfect information about the demand location. In both 
cases, the results are derived with respect to the normal distribution parameters, and are 
therefore hard to summarize in our work. 
In opposition to the previous problems, Schultz (2004) considers a case where 
the uncertainty comes from the consumers, which are unsure about the degree of the 
horizontal differentiation that the goods sold by the firms, that is, consumers are not 
certain about the location of the firms before they buy the good. The author concludes 
that the higher the degree of consumers that do not know the exact locations of the 
firms, the farther firms will locate from the city center (given they depart from the out-
of-the city result by Tabuchi and Thisse (1995) in an unrestricted model). Therefore, 
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uncertainty benefits firms, but it worsens the consumer situation and the total social 
welfare. In a similar model, Schultz (2005) analyses the effect of this uncertainty in the 
collusion possibilities of the firms in a Hotelling model. However, locations are fixed in 
the city extremes. Krol (2012) introduces uncertainty in the location of demand as well, 
but additionally firms do not know the unit transportation costs incurred by the 
consumers to purchase the good. This leads firms to make an expectation about how 
their profits will be, and the authors use a minmax criterion, in which firms combine 
linearly the best and the worst possible outcome. The conclusion is that if firms are too 
pessimistic, an increase in demand uncertainty leads to a decreasing differentiation 
between firms. Moreover, if firms were allowed to choose their “degree of pessimism”, 
firms would choose maximum pessimism, which would lead them to locate optimally in 
closer locations than they would under other degrees of pessimism. 
The following model by Valletti (2002) is a typical case of adverse selection. 
The consumer has private information before the purchase of the good and therefore the 
firm has to design different goods and prices for each type of consumer (Macho-Stadler 
and Perez-Castrillo, 2001). Valletti (2002) builds a model where consumers are 
distributed within a linear city but there is also a vertical component, determined by the 
quality of the good. In each location, there are two types of consumers: the ones who 
prefer a high quality product and those who prefer the low quality one. Therefore, the 
two-stage location game played by the duopoly firms is slightly different from the 
Hotelling location-price game. In the first period firms choose their location but in the 
second period they offer discriminatory contracts, as is usual in the case of principal-
agent problems. The conclusions regarding the locations in the two-stage location game 
depend on the ratio between the high quality and the low quality goods demanded by 
the consumers. However, firms’ locations will always be close to the socially optimal 
levels for any value of this ratio. The main changes that different values for the ratio 
induce are in the distribution of the surpluses between the firms and the consumers. 
To conclude, the agglomeration results in this literature seem to depend heavily 
on the type of asymmetric information assumed. Models without the standard 
specification of asymmetric information are able more easily to find conditions for 
agglomeration of the firms. 
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Within a different framework, Rusco and Walls (1999) develop an auction 
model, in which two firms located at the extremes of the market compete for the 
purchase of some good, which is randomly located somewhere within Hotelling’s linear 
city. The game has two stages: in both stages, firms participate in an auction in order to 
acquire the good. The main feature of the model is that the firm that wins the first stage 
will have an expected lower utility in the second stage auction. The imperfect 
information issue arises because firms do not know where the second auction will take 
place, which will condition their behavior at the first stage, since if they lose the first 
auction they will have a relative advantage over their opponent in winning the second 
auction. Although this approach does not reach any conclusions regarding the location 
of the firms, its interesting framework may be developed in order to explain the location 
behavior of firms when participating in an auction. 
To conclude this section, and in our opinion, the literature is not yet fully 
developed on this topic. Imperfect information is a realistic assumption when competing 
in a duopoly. Competing firms are usually very motivated in gaining the upper hand 
relatively to its opponents, and therefore imperfect information may arise because, on 
the one hand, the secrecy of firms actions is an important topic, and firms must act 
without knowing the exact conditions in which its opponents operates, or in which 
conditions the quality/variety of its own product relatively to the product/variety of the 
opponent is perceived by the consumers; on the other hand, duopoly firms have the 
capacity and are  pushed to invest in R&D to obtain different or better varieties, and 
there is a natural uncertainty regarding the output of R&D investments. How this 
uncertainty relates with the optimal location of firms is already being answered in the 
articles summarized in this subsection. However, we feel that there is still a long way to 
go in terms of finding how different forms of uncertainty, in markets that present very 
different conditions and specificities, factor in the firms’ choice of optimal location. 
2.3.6 Experimental approaches 
An important and recent approach has been the one related with experimental 
economics. In this type of empirical testing, instead of dealing with databases and 
subsequent econometric estimations to verify the validity of a theory or a theoretical 
result, scientists analyze the reactions of economic agents in an environment close to a 
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laboratory, since the rules of game and subsequent outputs are explained to the 
experimental subjects, whose reactions are compared with the reactions that are 
predicted in theory. In models à la Hotelling, typically the former empirical analysis is 
not used, due to the difficulty of finding a real-world variable that represents product 
differentiation, especially horizontal differentiation. Therefore, economic experiments 
appeared in this framework essentially because of the lack of real-world variables 
(Barreda-Tarrazona et al., 2011). 
A first approach in spatial competition is due to Brown-Kruse et al. (1993). The 
authors test what would be the location outcome of the experiments in a duopoly, with 
prices fixed, and with the game being repeated for a finite number of stages (the game 
could end after each stage with a probability of 0.125), to allow for a profitable 
collusion between the players. In addition, the market points had a linear demand, 
which allowed for an increasing penalty to the firms of being distant from a certain 
market point. An interesting ingredient is that in some cases the experiments were 
allowed to communicate between them before choosing their location, which allowed 
testing if the opportunity to communicate led to more or less cases of collusion. The 
experimental results were that when there was no communication, the players chose 
very often to stay around the city center, which is the safer position since it has the 
highest “worst income possible” of all locations. However, when both players choose 
the city center, the payoff is the minimum. The results when communication is allowed 
was significantly different, as players often found out the maximum output they could 
earn by playing this game, which was location on the quartiles of the market. 
Brown-Kruse and Schenk (2000) do a similar approach than in the previous 
paper, but the main difference is in the distribution of consumers in the linear city, in 
which now non-uniform distributions are tested, with consumers being either 
concentrated in the city center or more concentrated in the extremes, alongside with the 
usual uniform distribution. Then, the authors also test the experimental results of a 
simple 2x2 decision matrix that sums up the Pareto and Nash equilibrium options, to 
understand if a simpler decision environment changes the experimental results. The 
most important results were that symmetric play was observed between the 
experimental subjects, but the joint profit maximization option was harder to achieve. 
Simplifying the decision array of the subjects helped them in achieving a collusion 
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solution, but again the communication between the subject rose as the most important 
facilitator for cooperation. Another approach was done by Collins and Sherstyuk 
(2000), who consider three firms in the market, and inelastic demand in each point, in 
an assumption closely related to the Hotelling original model. However, the price 
decision is still exogenous, and between different sessions the players changed, 
removing chances of collusive behavior between the players. The experimental results 
were somewhat in line with the theory, with the players locating between the first and 
third quartiles very often, which corresponds to the mixed equilibrium result found by 
Shaked (1982) in this three-player game. However, there were a few differences, 
namely with the dispersion values of the location points chosen, that were higher in the 
experimental case. The authors test some reasons for this behavior, and concluded that 
risk-aversion had a role, since the solutions of the experiment were closer to a risk-
averse theoretical prediction than to a risk-neutral one. Huck et al. (2002) extend the 
analysis to a four firms setting with the same assumptions from Hotelling. The 
theoretical Nash equilibrium is firms partially agglomerating in the first and third 
quartile, as in Eaton and Lipsey (1975). The objective was to test if the given 4 subjects, 
during 50 consecutive rounds and having perfect information about what happened in 
previous rounds, were capable of converging to the equilibrium which is not very 
intuitive. The authors conclude that there was concentration of answers around the first 
and second quartiles, but a smaller concentration around the city center was verified. 
Across time, the distance between the players did not show a decreasing trend, 
suggesting lack of long-run convergence to the Nash Equilibrium. 
An important breakthrough in this strand of literature is in the consideration of a 
characteristic closer to the two-stage game à la Hotelling, which is the main focus of 
this revision. Further experiments took in account that the distance between both firms 
affects the price they can set, and therefore the way that it affects their profits. 
Camacho-Cuena et al. (2005) consider that the experimental subjects may choose their 
location and then, given the locations that were previously chosen, the price sub-game is 
repeated either two or five times, in order to assess the effects of different location 
rigidities on the output level. The assumptions are as in Hotelling, with a significant 
difference being the fact that the consumers are not uniformly distributed in the city, but 
instead choose their locations after the sellers. The theoretical model, calibrated with the 
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assumptions tested in the experiment, predicts that firms would locate sufficiently apart 
from each other. The authors conclude that longer periods of the price game resulted in 
a location closer to the center, therefore in a more defensive position, which resulted 
from the fact that the subjects could not change their location often. 
In an experiment that was designed specifically to test the “principle of 
minimum differentiation”, Barreda-Tarrazona et al. (2011) simulate the two-stage 
location price game of Hotelling in a city with seven discrete points, and with the 
possibility of players choosing price levels such that the market may become uncovered. 
Given the parameters set, the collusive equilibrium would be locating (approximately) 
on the first and third quartiles and setting the highest price possible to cover all the 
market, while the non-collusive equilibrium would imply the same locations but with 
lower prices. The results were clear: The players preferred to locate closer to the center 
than what was predicted, possibly due to the demand incentive. Players were then kept 
with their location decision for 5 price rounds, but were unable to find the collusive 
solution, because they were so closely located that a price war emerged. However, for 
the cases where a level of differentiation was attained, the price behavior followed what 
was predicted by theory, with price competition being relaxed, players were able to set 
higher prices and therefore profits. In addition, in almost all the cases the market was 
always covered. 
To conclude, this section shows the interesting nature of the Hotelling 
framework. The field of Experimental Economics excels in showing how simple 
assumptions like the profit/utility maximization rationality are not always easily 
achieved by players/human beings. The world presents too many variables for any 
player to be able to maximize entirely the outcome of his daily actions, as a 
mathematician does. Of course, these actions become even harder to understand and 
attain when there is competition between players, as it is in the case of competition 
games as the one developed by Hotelling. In fact, in the articles we have summarized 
before, players struggled in many cases to achieve the location decisions that theory 
predicts they would do, and that is the main contribution of this strand in the literature, 
which definitely calls for a deeper understanding of the human behavior when humans 
are being placed in similar conditions as theoretical models invite to: as Hotelling 
players. 
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2.4. Conclusion 
After the appearance of the Hotelling (1929) model and the important findings 
of d’Aspremont et al. (1979), scientists had access to a simple and successful means of 
introducing a spatial component into the modeling behavior of economic agents. This 
review has focused on the developments that were intended to explain the equilibrium 
locations of the firms, mainly when competing in a duopoly. However, many successful 
variants of this framework were used to justify spatial price discrimination and different 
market specificities, to furnish two examples.  
In the 80s, this field became a hot topic for research. There are numerous 
applications of the Hotelling model, which mainly focus on changing the framework 
assumptions. The field developed significantly with the successful modeling experience 
of Hamilton et al. (1989), which allowed for competition in quantities.  
More recently, Pal (1998) combined the circular framework of Salop (1979) in 
order to study the location decision of firms. In addition, the development of the 
asymmetric information framework in microeconomics and its successful adaptation to 
the context of spatial competition again led to the extension of the field. The approaches 
extended to the field of Experimental Economics, where several papers have been made 
based on Hotelling’s theoretical approaches. However, these last approaches did not 
receive similar attention. 
After a brief look at the numerical exercise done in section 3.1, it would seem 
that most of the important features that justify the spatial behavior of firms have already 
been explored. The future of the field depends on the researchers’ capacity to find an 
(even more) interesting and innovative way of studying spatial competition. There is a 
high proportion of spatial competition models à la Bertrand or à la Cournot, compared 
with the most recent assumptions presented in this review. In that sense, we think that 
future researching efforts in spatial modeling should be made in the incomplete 
information setting. Furthermore, researchers could intensify the relationship between 
spatial competition and Industrial Organization. For example, spatial competition may 
provide a more complete answer in relation to vertical differentiation/integration of 
duopoly firms or to the R&D investment decisions by firms, in line with the seminal 
work of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). 
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In terms of how the next chapters contribute to the above-mentioned topics in 
the literature, all chapters have a concern on how firms will react given that they may 
face different marginal costs than their opponent. Chapter 3 contributes in the line of 
Ziss (1993), with firms having different marginal cost of production between them, but 
with the ingredient that they are uncertain about what their marginal cost is before 
choosing, and therefore contributing to the literature of incomplete information. Chapter 
4 is more connected with Industrial Organization topics, with firms being able to choose 
endogenously their marginal cost of production before setting their location and prices. 
Chapters 5 and 6 are in the framework of quantity competition. Chapter 5 assesses what 
happens when firms have different marginal costs between them, while chapter 6 
contributes in the literature of vertical relationships, with firms needing a localized input 
to make their output goods.  
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3. Firms Location Decision under Marginal Cost Uncertainty 
3.1. Introduction 
Quite often firms have to decide their exact location without having full 
knowledge about their costs, even considering that previously they carried out detailed 
market and technical studies to support their location decisions. Only after locating the 
plant and starting the production process, firms understand their true production costs. 
This is the situation that we study in this work.  We analyze the behavior of two 
competitors in the framework of Hotelling (1929) but we depart from the classical two-
staged location-price game by introducing uncertainty regarding firms’ costs. We 
assume that firms are only fully aware of the costs between the two stages of the game, 
that is, firms only know their true marginal costs of production only after deciding 
where to locate in the linear city.  
There are innumerous conditions that have significant impact on costs, and that 
firms only learn after setting up their plant in a given location. As an example of such 
condition we have, for instance, a correct assessment of costs needed to enter in the 
market, the consumers’ behavior towards the product; the type of relationship with 
suppliers and with rival firms; or the technological capacities. In spite of the various 
determinants, cost uncertainty in this chapter is referred to as being caused by 
technology features. Before setting up their plant firms are expecting certain productive 
behavior as a result of investments made in technology and capacity. However, only 
after locating the plant and starting the production firms fully understand the effects of 
these investments on their marginal production costs. 
We analyze a simple type of cost uncertainty. We assume that firms can only 
have two possible marginal costs: low marginal cost (which corresponds to a successful 
investment) or high marginal cost (which corresponds to unsuccessful investment). The 
unsuccessful marginal cost is equal for both firms, while the successful marginal costs 
are allowed to be different. This hypothesis is justified, for instance, when firms are 
expecting the results from cost-reducing R&D investments. If these investments fail, 
firms maintain their high marginal cost. However, if R&D investments are successful 
and a more efficient technology becomes available for production, the firm will have 
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lower costs. We allow firms to have different costs, in case both firms have successful 
R&D investments. This represents the fact that firms may have invested differently 
before and/or that they have a different technology advantage a priori. 
In addition, we assume that firms can only be located at the extremes of the 
linear city. This assumption is adequate to represent the situation of industrial firms, 
which may be forced to be located in the suburbs, away from central positions in the 
city. That may happen either because those industries are specifically forbidden to be 
located closest to the populations for example, due to their pollution, noises and 
increased fire risk. Or because of the higher rents in urban central locations, that inhibits 
firms to locate there, since these industrial firms usually require significant extensions 
of land to be able to work. Other example could be found in the distribution sector, as 
big suppliers’ markets are usually located in the outskirts of cities, supplying their 
produce to retailers who are distributed closer to central locations in the city. 
Therefore, the main question we want to answer is if firms that are uncertain 
about their marginal costs and are forced to be located in the extremes of the cities, have 
any incentives to choose different locations, or if they prefer to locate close to each 
other. We analyze this question comparing our results with the perfect information 
situation developed by Ziss (1993),who concluded that, if there is equilibrium, firms 
choose to locate in different extremes of the city. 
Our main contribution is that agglomeration is an optimal outcome when there is 
uncertainty about costs. This conclusion is in clear contrast with the results obtained 
under perfect information (Ziss, 1993) as in this case firms are either dispersed 
throughout the linear city or are located randomly, depending on their marginal cost 
difference. Our results highlight the importance of considering imperfect information 
about costs when studying the location decision of firms. Firm agglomeration is a 
frequent phenomenon in several industries
1
, and our model presents an explanation for 
this reality. We conclude that the agglomeration result happens mainly because firms 
are able to risk agglomerating and face a typical Bertrand competition setting in which 
they could conquer all the market and obtain high profits. The dispersion solution would 
                                                          
1
 To find empirical evidence on firms’ agglomerative behavior in many industries, see Ellison et al. 
(2010) and the references therein. 
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be safer to their business, but a firm with a cost advantage loses both on demand and 
profits if dispersed, contrary to if it is agglomerated with its opponent. 
This chapter is organized as follows: subsection 3.2 fits the paper in the 
literature; subsection 3.3 presents the timing and the assumptions of the model; 
subsection 3.4 solves the two-stage location-price game; subsection 3.5 discusses the 
implications of the results, while subsection 3.6 displays how the location results of the 
model change with the probability of a successful marginal cost; subsection 3.7 
concludes.  
3.2. Theoretical Background 
The model of Hotelling (1929) is a well-known approach when it comes to 
justify the location choices of firms. The original Hotelling model assumes that two 
firms play a two-stage location-price game. In the first stage, firms simultaneously 
choose the location in a linear and bounded city, and in the second stage they 
simultaneously choose the prices. Firms offer a homogenous product, except for the 
location, and have the same cost structure. Demand is perfectly inelastic, that is, each 
consumer must buy one unit of the product. In order to buy the product consumers bear 
a unit transportation cost, which is linear with respect to the distance traveled. Hotelling 
concludes that firms optimally agglomerate in the center of the city. This is the basis for 
the “Principle of Minimum Differentiation”, called so by Boulding (1966). 
However, the original model of Hotelling had some tractability problems due to 
demand discontinuity, which implies that no price equilibrium exists for all the possible 
locations of the firms in the city. An important approach to the Hotelling model was 
made by d’Aspremont et al. (1979). By introducing quadratic (instead of linear) unit 
transportation costs with respect to the distance travelled, the authors conclude that the 
result of central agglomeration disappeared, with firms optimally locating in each of the 
extremes of the city. This result became known as the “Principle of Maximum 
Differentiation”. The introduction of quadratic transportation costs also eliminates the 
tractability problems of the Hotelling model, allowing the existence of price equilibrium 
for all possible locations of the firms. 
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The location behavior raised by Hotelling and d’Aspremont et al. attracted the 
interest of the academic world. Using the same model in a more regional and urban 
economics approach, some scientists attempted to explain the conditions in which firms 
agglomerate in cities, while other scientists were more concerned about the horizontal 
differentiation problem, approaching this model from the interests of Industrial 
Organization. The field expanded significantly, and more important publications 
appeared about this issue. Most of these publications focused on changing the 
assumptions of the original Hotelling model and then concluding about the new location 
decisions of the firms, as it is shown in the previous chapter. 
The most direct reference for the present work is Ziss (1993), who derives the 
results for the two-stage location-price game of Hotelling by allowing for different 
marginal costs between the two firms. Ziss concludes that when the difference between 
the marginal costs is small, firms prefer to locate in different extremes of the city. 
However, when the difference is higher than a given threshold, the low cost firm prefers 
to locate as close as possible to the high cost firm which, in turn, wishes to locate as far 
as possible from the other firm. This leads to the absence of location equilibrium. 
Additionally, if the difference between both marginal costs is high enough, the low cost 
firm drives the high cost firm out of the market.  
Matsumura and Matsushima (2009) extend the location-price game of Ziss 
(1993) allowing for mixed strategies in the location stage. The authors conclude that 
when no pure strategy equilibrium exists, there is a single mixed strategy equilibrium, 
which involves both firms locating in one of the extremes of the linear city with 50% 
probability. Meza and Tombak (2009) design a model with different marginal costs of 
production, but they introduce timing as a first stage in the model, that is, firms are 
allowed to choose in which period of time they enter in the market, and manage to 
extend the pure equilibrium possibilities for a larger array of cost differentiation values, 
where firms still maximally differentiate. 
On other approaches similar to this chapter, Boyer et al. (2003) study the 
location-price decisions when firms choose locations sequentially and then choose 
prices simultaneously. Additionally, those authors assume that the first mover has 
perfect information, while the second mover does not know if the opponent firm has a 
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low or high marginal cost. Although the nature of imperfect information is different 
from our model, the approach of Boyer et al. (2003) signals the importance of imperfect 
information when analyzing firms’ location decisions. Vettas and Christou (2005) 
consider a model with imperfect information where firms know there is a quality 
difference between both firms but they do not know who is in advantage. The authors 
conclude that the larger the quality, the closer firms will locate to the city center, with 
an analogous rationale to ours: Firms risk their luck to be able to be in a strong 
monopoly situation in 50% of the times. 
3.3. The Model 
We consider two firms that compete in a two-staged location price game. Before 
taking any decision firms learn the possible values of the marginal costs and the 
corresponding probability. Then, at the first stage, firms simultaneously choose the 
locations between one of the two extremes of the linear and bounded city of Hotelling. 
Before simultaneously deciding the prices firms learn the exact value of the marginal 
costs, as detailed in Figure 3.1. 
Figure 3.1 – Timing of the game 
 
We consider a very simple type of imperfect information. At the beginning of 
the game firms know that the marginal cost of each firm can be unsuccessful or 
successful. We assume that the unsuccessful marginal cost is equal for both firms, while 
the successful marginal cost might have different values represented by c1 and c2 for 
firm 1 and 2, respectively. The probability of each firm having the successful cost is 
equal for both firms and is represented by      . 
The remaining assumptions are the standard in the Hotelling (1929) model with 
the extension proposed by d’Aspremont et al. (1979). Firms offer a homogenous good 
except for the location. Consumers are uniformly distributed across the linear city. Each 
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consumer buys one unit of good, as the reservation price of the consumers is assumed to 
be high enough so that the market is always fully covered. Consumers incur a 
transportation cost to buy the good, which is quadratic with respect to distance.  
Firms’ location are represented by    and by   , for firm 1 and firm 2 
respectively, where    is the distance from the left extreme of the market and    is the 
distance from the right extreme. Hence, when        , firms are fully differentiated 
and when        , firms are agglomerated in any point of the market. We assume, 
without loss of generality, that firm 1 is never located to the right of firm 2 (     
  ). Moreover, we assume that the unit transportation cost is one, the city length is also 
one and the firms are risk neutral. Note that we assume that    and    can only be equal 
to 0 or 1, as firms must be located in the extremes of the market. 
3.4. Solving the model and results  
The assumption of imperfect information implies that firms are not entirely sure 
what their marginal cost is when they choose where to locate in the linear city. Each 
firm has a successful cost with a probability given by      , and the probabilities of 
occurrence of a successful marginal firm for the firms are uncorrelated. This means that 
there are four possible outcomes in the model, after the location decision. Either both 
firms are successful or unsuccessful, or one firm is successful and the other is not. Then   
the probability of each outcome is equal to 25%. We assume that the unsuccessful 
outcome implies a marginal cost equal to 10. This is without any loss of generality, 
since as we will prove in later on, that due to the inelastic demand assumption, the 
demand and consequently the optimal location decision depends solely on the difference 
between the marginal costs of production of both firms, and not on their absolute value. 
The successful outcome is set between 0 and 10, and before choosing the location, each 
firm knows its own opponent’s successful marginal cost. 
To compute the profit of each firm, first we have to determine their demand. As 
usual in the Hotelling models with price competition the demand of each firm is derived 
directly from the location of the indifferent consumer. The indifferent consumer is 
defined by the consumer which is indifferent between choosing to purchase the good 
between one of the two possible stores. The consumer located in point x obtains utility 
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from the purchase of the good from the firm i in the following manner: 
2)()( iii xxpVxU  , where V is the utility given by the consumption of the good, 
and it is assumed to be too high such that the market is always covered, and pi is the 
price set by firm i. Consumers browse all the firms in the market and choose to buy the 
good that gives them the highest utility. Therefore, each firm has its own market area, 
that is, an area where all the consumers buy in their store. The boundary of this area is 
given by the location of the indifferent consumer, which is given by: 
  
        
    
       
         
 
Therefore, the demand (market area) of firm 1 is given by   while the demand of 
firm 2 is given by    . 
However, when calculating the profit functions for each firm we must ensure 
that the value for the indifferent consumer’s location does not become lower than 0 or 
higher than 1. Hence, the profit function for each firm is given by: 
                
{
 
 
 
                                                                        
                
    
        
         
                         
                                                                             
                with i =1, 2     
and    
 
   
        
   ,    
 
   
        
   . Both the indifferent 
consumer function and the profit function are only valid for        . When 
       , which means that the firms have the same location, the profits functions 
are equal to the ones in Bertrand (1883) model.  
In the first stage firms choose simultaneously their location and in the second 
stage they set simultaneously the price for their good. The game is solved by backward 
induction and the concept of equilibrium sought is Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium 
(SPNE). 
3.4.1. Price Stage 
As firms have perfect information when arriving at the price stage, they choose 
the price that maximizes the profit function considering their true marginal costs, which 
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are already known in this stage. Therefore, we solve the maximization problem for both 
firms under the four possible cases: both firms are successful, firm 1 is successful and 
firm 2 is not, firm 2 is successful and firm 1 is not and both firms are unsuccessful. 
These four cases are denoted by (S,S), (S,U), (U,S) and (U,U), respectively. The general 
expression for the prices that solves the maximization profit problem is given by:
2
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  ̅                                                 (3.1) 
In order to find the optimal price policies we just need to correctly replace   ̅ and 
   ̅ by 10, c1 or c2, depending on the outcome revealed between both stages. However, 
the above expression is only valid when both firms have a positive market share. When 
one of the firms becomes monopolist, it sets the highest possible price such that its 
opponent remains out of market. Replacing the price policies in (3.1), the profit function 
for each firm becomes: 
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                   (3.2) 
Where  ̂  is the marginal cost difference expressed by       and   and  , are the 
same than before, but after replacing the optimal price decision these change to 
   
        
         and    
        
       , respectively. 
Hence, for each marginal cost outcome, the profit’s expressions and the 
thresholds of the different branches change. Nevertheless, since firms already have 
perfect information when setting the prices, the results for this stage become simpler 
after knowing the optimal location decision and the marginal cost. 
3.4.2. Location Stage 
Only after the location decision firms learn their own and their opponent’s final 
marginal cost. This means that when choosing the location, firms have to consider an 
expected profit function dependent on each of the four possible outcomes. Note that 
                                                          
2
 See appendix 3.1 for the detailed derivation of the prices that maximize the profit under the four 
possible cases, and the definition of the general expression for price results. 
69 
 
when both firms have unsuccessful marginal cost, their marginal costs are equal and we 
are exactly in the case of d’Aspremont et al. (1979). On the other hand, when both firms 
have the successful marginal cost, we have the case of Ziss (1993). The expected profit 
function for firm i is given by:
3
 
                                                                              
As both firms are only allowed to agglomerate at one of the extremes of the city 
or fully disperse, we have to compare the profits obtained in each situation. Without 
loss of generality let us assume that firm 2 is located at the right extreme of the linear 
city. Then, firm 1 prefers to agglomerate if: 
                                  
The expected profit functions are obtained combining the thresholds of the four 
possible outcomes.  
The expected profit function for the agglomeration case has a simpler 
specification as it corresponds to the Bertrand case allowing different marginal costs. 
For firm 1 (and similarly for firm 2) the expected profit function is given by: 
             {
         ̂                                         ̂      
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Simplifying we obtain:              {
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Notice that this expected function is obtained replacing in (3.2) the variables xi 
and xj by 1 and 0 respectively. Then, we have the following results regarding firm 1 
profit:  when both firms are successful, firm 1 has profit equal to -(c1-c2) if firm 1 is 
more efficient than firm 2, or has 0 otherwise; when firm 1 is successful and firm 2 is 
not, firm 1 has profit equal to 10 - c1; when firm 2 is successful and firm 1 is not, firm 1 
has zero profit; finally, when both firms are unsuccessful firm 1 has zero profit. 
                                                          
3
 Note that by considering that firms’ profit is similar to firm’s utility, we are implicitly assuming that 
firms are risk neutral. That is, firms maximize their expected profit and they do not care about the 
volatility of their final result. 
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The dispersion case is a bit more complicated, as the profit function is a 
piecewise, and changes between eight different pieces. That happens since different 
values of differences in the marginal costs of both firms imply different demand, and 
consequently different profit functions, due to the nature of demand in the Hotelling 
model. The eight branches are represented in figure 3.2. 
Figure 3.2 – Branches of the Expected Profit Functions for both firms 
 
The interpretation of the eight branches is the following: when both firms are 
successful in the reduction of their marginal costs it is important to distinguish the cases 
when the marginal cost difference is lower than 3, because in these cases firms share the 
market, or when is higher than 3. Under this last case the firm with the lower marginal 
cost stays with all the market. Branches 3, 4, 5 and 6 correspond to cases with 
successful marginal cost differences lower than 3; branches 7 and 8 correspond to cases 
with successful cost differences higher than 3, with firm 1having the high cost and, 
finally, branches 1 and 2 correspond to cases with cost differences higher than 3, with 
firm 2 having the high cost. 
The existence of the eight pieces in the expected profit function for dispersion is 
due to the combination of all 4 cases with the number of branches that exists in each of 
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the cases, i.e., whenever the relationship between the successful marginal costs is such 
that one of the firms becomes monopolist, the expression for the profit changes.
4
 Each 
of the 8 pieces, due to do the aggregation of all possible cases, has a different 
expression for the expected profit function (in this case of dispersion). Nevertheless, the 
expected profit function is continuous with respect to both successful marginal costs 
values of the firms. Table 3.1 presents the results for each of the four outcomes in each 
branch of the expected profit function for firm 1.  
Table 3.1 – Profits of firm 1 for the different branches in the case of dispersion 
Restrictions (S,S) (S,U) (U,S) (U,U) 
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In order to assess the decision of firm 1 we have to compare the expected profit 
in agglomeration and in dispersion for each branch. However, these 8 branches that 
arise for the dispersion case have to be complemented with the two different branches 
                                                          
4
 Appendix 3.2 shows in detail the relationships that led to the expected profit function with 8 branches. 
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that we had on the agglomeration case: When the successful marginal cost difference is 
higher or is lower than 0. Therefore, we conclude that there are ten different pieces in 
the expected profit function of firms within the relevant values for the successful 
marginal costs          . Note that the agglomeration thresholds divide the branches 3 
and 6 of the expected profit function in the dispersion case into two regions, in order to 
separate the case 21 cc   from 21 cc  .These branches are already presented in Figure 
3.2. Notice also that the thresholds of all the branches are independent of the probability 
of firms having a successful marginal cost  , so these are valid for any probability v we 
may want to consider.  
For each of the ten branches, there are different expressions for the expected 
profit function. Our next step is to identify the location decision of firm 1 for each of the 
regions by comparing the expected profit from the two alternative decisions 
(agglomeration or dispersion). Table 3.2 presents the conclusions of this comparison. 
Notice that both expected profit functions (for agglomeration and dispersion) are 
continuous throughout their entire domain. 
Table 3.2 – Expected profit and optimal choice of firm 1  
Branch Dispersion Agglomeration Solution 
1 
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cc
 
2
5
2
1
4
1
12  cc  
Disp < Agg 
2 
8
17
)
3
7
3
(
8
1
24
2212 
ccc
 
2
5
2
1
4
1
12  cc  
Disp < Agg 
3.1 
8
19
4
)1)(
3
1
(
8
1 12
12 
c
cc
 
1
4
1
2
5
c  
Disp < Agg 
3.2 
8
19
4
)1)(
3
1
(
8
1 12
12 
c
cc
 
2
5
2
1
4
1
12  cc  
Disp < Agg 
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After identifying the decision of firm 1 the same analysis is done for firm 2. Due 
to symmetry the results for firm 2 are identical to the ones obtained to firm 1.
5
 Finally, 
to identify the equilibria we compare the decisions of the firms in each piece of the 
function. If both firms prefer agglomeration or dispersion, then that would be the 
equilibrium. On the contrary, if they prefer different location patterns, it means no 
                                                          
5
 The results for firm 2 are exactly the same than displayed in table 3.2 due to symmetry. The only 
necessary changes are between c1 and c2 and vice-versa, and to adapt to the symmetric regions: Region 1 
is symmetric to region 8; Region 2 is symmetric to region 7; Region 4 is symmetric to region 5; Region 
3.1 is symmetric to 3.2; Regions 4.1 and 4.2 are symmetric between them. 
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location equilibrium is found. Figure 3.3 synthetizes the conclusions on the location 
decision, which are fully detailed on appendix 3.3. 
Figure 3.3 – Location Equilibrium with imperfect information and v=0.5 
 
From Figure 3.3 we identify three different results: i) when both firms may not 
obtain a significant success in cost reduction, and therefore both ci and cj are not very 
far from 10, firms will disperse; ii) when the two firms have very different successful 
costs, one being close to 10 and the other not, no location equilibrium is found; iii) 
when both firms may achieve a significant success in cost reduction, and therefore, the 
difference between the successful and the unsuccessful marginal costs is large for both 
firms, agglomeration is an equilibrium result.  
The absence of location equilibrium occurs if one of the firms wants to be as 
close as possible to the opponent (because it has a lower successful marginal cost) and 
the other wishes to be the farthest (because it has a higher successful marginal cost), 
similarly to what happens in the perfect information model of Ziss (1993). 
Some properties of the final location results are easily understandable in Figure 
3.3. First, the results are symmetric with respect to the       line. This is an expected 
result, as firms have no other relative advantage than the marginal costs difference. 
Secondly, the continuity of the expected profit functions implies that the four regions in 
the Figure 3.3 are closed sets. Thirdly, the d’Aspremont et al. (1979) case is also 
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represented in the Figure 3.3 by the point (10;10), that is, when the unsuccessful 
marginal cost is equal to the successful one for both firms. Firms are dispersed in this 
case. Fourthly, there is a line, defined by 7 ji cc , when both firms are indifferent 
between agglomerating and dispersing. In this position, the benefit of agglomerating, 
which is the 25% possibility of obtaining a strong monopoly, is equal to the benefit of 
dispersing, which is the softening of price competition, allowing the practice of higher 
prices when both firms have equal marginal cost conditions. 
3.5. Discussion of the results 
3.5.1 Location 
The differences between the perfect and imperfect information case are striking. 
With imperfect information the agglomeration result is an optimal location outcome for 
both firms, while in perfect information firms would only either disperse or not find 
location equilibrium. So, what motivates firms to agglomerate when the variability of 
their marginal costs gets high? Firms wish to agglomerate due to the possibility of 
having a monopoly, which occurs when firm i achieves a significant cost reduction, and 
firm j does not (this happens with probability of  25%). In this case firms have a great 
difference between marginal costs in that outcome, which, when agglomerated, allows 
them to have high profits. This behavior for both firms in the model explains the 
existence of the agglomeration equilibrium. The question can be better illustrated with 
an example with different situations regarding the successful marginal costs. The 
comparison of the profits for both firms in each of the four possible outcomes when 
              and               is presented in Table 3.3. The case when         
        and                 is presented in Table 3.4. Since we are assuming   
   , the probability of occurrence of each outcome is 25%. 
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Table 3.3 – Profit of both firms by outcome for equal low marginal costs, with       
(       Outcome (S,S) (S,U) (U,S) (U,U) Expected Profit 
(6,6) Dispersion 1/2 3 0 1/2 1 
(6,6) Agglomeration 0 4 0 0 1 
(8,8) Dispersion 1/2 25/18 1/18 1/2 11/18 
(8,8) Agglomeration 0 2 0 0 1/2 
 
When the successful marginal costs of both firms are equal, we find that 
dispersion dominates the agglomeration outcome. For the case          , when 
firms have a similar outcome (S,S) or (U,U), dispersion is more profitable than 
agglomeration since firms are able to soften price competition and share the market 
equally. However, this difference in profits in the dispersion case is exactly 
compensated by the higher profits obtained by the firms in the case of agglomeration, 
when the outcome is the most favorable for firm i (see the first two lines of Table 3.3). 
Therefore, in this case, the expected profit of dispersion and agglomeration is equal. In 
the case of         , when the outcomes are equal, the explanation of the profits is 
similar to the previous case. However, due to the softening of price competition, prices 
are higher in the dispersion case, which allows both firms to obtain a higher profit in 
spite of having less demand. Note also that the less fortunate firm still earns profits 
when fully differentiated from its rival. 
The threshold value of this relationship between dispersion and agglomeration is 
given by 7 for a particular reason: this is the threshold marginal cost (given that the 
unsuccessful marginal cost is 10) below which the successful cost firm takes the 
unsuccessful cost firm out of the market when firms are located in opposing extremes. 
This value has been previously identified by Ziss (although we assume a given city 
length and unit transportation costs, both equal to 1). Therefore, when both firms have a 
successful marginal cost below 7, in the case of firms having different outcomes, the 
successful firm captures the whole market. This implies that the derivative of the 
expected profit function with respect to the difference in the marginal costs is equal for 
both agglomeration and dispersion cases, for         ). 
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Table 3.4 – Profit of both firms by outcome for different successful marginal costs, 
with      . 
(       Outcome (S,S) (S,U) (U,S) (U,U) Expected 
Profit 
(6;6,5) Dispersion Firm i 49/72 3 0 1/2 301/288 
(6;6,5) Agglomeration Firm i 1/2 4 0 0 9/8 
(8;8,5) Dispersion Firm i 49/72 25/18 1/18 1/2 21/32 
(8;8,5) Agglomeration Firm i 1/2 2 0 0 5/8 
(6;6,5) Dispersion Firm j 25/72 5/2 0 1/2 241/288 
(6;6,5) Agglomeration Firm j 0 7/2 0 0 7/8 
(8;8,5) Dispersion Firm j 25/72 9/8 1/18 1/2 73/144 
(8;8,5) Agglomeration Firm j 0 3/2 0 0 3/8 
 
For the case                , both firms prefer to agglomerate. This happens 
because compared to the dispersion case, the gain in the profits when the outcome is 
favorable for firm i or j ((S,U) or (U,S), depending on the firm) is higher than the losses 
caused by all other outcomes, even for the firm that has higher successful marginal cost. 
However, for the case                , both firms prefer to disperse. When firms are 
dispersed and the difference between the successful and unsuccessful marginal costs is 
small, the demand effect is still in operation, which makes up for the difference in the 
higher profits of agglomeration when firms have a favorable outcome. 
3.5.2 Prices 
The comparison between the price policies is only interesting for the case when 
there is location equilibrium for both cases of perfect and imperfect information. 
Differences in the price policies between both cases arise because of the probability of 
non-occurrence of successful marginal costs for both firms and because of the different 
location patterns chosen in the previous stage. 
Regarding location patterns when in a monopoly, the difference between the 
prices in perfect and imperfect information is because the monopolist has to set a lower 
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price when dispersed in order to cover the whole market compared to the agglomeration 
situation. That difference between the prices is constant and equal to 1. On the other 
hand, in a duopoly when firms are agglomerated, price is always equal to the higher 
marginal cost existent between the two firms. In the case of dispersion, the optimal 
pricing policy can be rewritten in terms of their own marginal cost and of the difference 
between the marginal costs of both firms, that is: 
      
 
 
  ̂         | ̂ |    
For the low-cost firm, we find that the price set when firms are dispersed is 
higher than when firms are agglomerated if: 
   
 
 
  ̂         ̂   
 
 
 
Since we are only comparing pure-strategy equilibrium results, that is, the cases 
when there is equilibrium in perfect competition, | ̂ |      √  , this result means 
that the prices when firms are dispersed are always higher than prices when firms are 
agglomerated. 
However, the main determinant of the pricing policy is the probability of the 
outcomes. As stated before, perfect information is the particular case of imperfect 
information when the outcome is always the successful marginal cost for both firms, 
that is, when    . All other outcomes imply higher marginal costs for at least one of 
the firms, a fact that is expected to bring higher prices in the market. Table 3.5 displays 
the pricing policy for the same marginal costs set in Table 3.4 and for      . 
Table 3.5 – Pricing policies of both firms by outcome for different low marginal costs 
(       Outcome (S,S) (S,U) (U,S) (U,U) Average Price 
(6;6,5) Perfect Information Firm i 43/6    43/6 
(6;6,5) Imperfect Information Firm i 39/6 60/6 N/M 60/6 53/6 
(8;8,5) Perfect Information Firm i 55/6    55/6 
(8;8,5) Imperfect Information Firm i 55/6 58/6 63/6 66/6 121/12 
(6;6,5) Perfect Information Firm j 44/6      44/6 
(6;6,5) Imperfect Information Firm j N/M N/M 60/6 60/6 60/6 
(8;8,5)  Perfect Information Firm j 54/6    54/6 
(8;8,5)  Imperfect Information Firm j 54/6 62/6 60/6 66/6 121/12 
N/M – Not in the Market 
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We can see that the perfect information case results in average lower prices for 
the market. This happens mainly because of the nature of the perfect information 
assumed in this model, which determines that firms have lower marginal costs when in 
perfect information, allowing for the setting of lower prices. On the other hand, there is 
another effect changing the prices, which results from changes in the location patterns 
of the firms. Firms now agglomerate for lower values of successful marginal costs and 
agglomeration itself forces firms to practice lower prices in the market. Note that this 
effect only occurs when firms decide to agglomerate, that is, when        . However, 
the dominant effect proves to be the assumed nature of perfect information. 
3.5.3 Profits 
The comparison of profits can only be analyzed when there is location 
equilibrium in both perfect and imperfect information cases. This equilibrium occurs 
only in the shaded area shown in Figure 3.5. This area is clearly defined in Appendix 
3.3. In the upper region, both firms choose to disperse with perfect and imperfect 
information. In the lower region, in perfect information firms disperse and in imperfect 
information firms prefer to agglomerate, as is seen in Figures 3.2 and 3.4. 
Figure 3.4 – Set of parameter values when there is location equilibrium for both cases, 
and profit comparisons for firm i.  
 
(I.I. = Imperfect Information; P.I. = Perfect Information) 
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In the lower region, both firms always prefer to be in imperfect information, in 
spite of having a higher expected marginal cost compared to the perfect information 
case. This happens because in the lower region, there is always a 25% (when      ) 
possibility of both firms having a very profitable monopoly, since the difference 
between the marginal costs of both firms becomes very high in each firm’s most 
favorable outcome.  
By comparing the profits between both cases we find that in the upper region, 
when in imperfect information firms have a higher probability of having higher profits. 
Firm i prefers to be in imperfect information when: 
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Note, however, that firm’s j preferences are symmetric with respect to the line 
     . This means that there is no situation where both firms would like to be in 
perfect information. The reason is rather obvious: when a firm has a disadvantage in 
terms of its successful marginal cost, being in imperfect information would allow the 
firm to have a cost advantage with some probability relative to its rival, which makes up 
for the possibility of negative outcomes where the cost disadvantage becomes higher 
than in perfect information. When the low marginal costs between firms are similar, 
both firms would prefer to be in imperfect information.  
In the upper region, firms are dispersed, independently of being in perfect or 
imperfect information. The differences in the profits arises because when firm i has a 
lower marginal cost, it prefers to be in perfect information where it is sure it will have a 
good profit. However, as its marginal cost becomes relatively higher, firm i prefers 
imperfect information as the mix of the 4 outcomes becomes more profitable, as 
discussed above. Figure 3.5 presents a close-up of the upper shaded region of the final 
result for both firms, where it is better shown that the perfect information outcome is 
never a preferred outcome for both firms at the same time. 
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Figure 3.5 – Profit comparison for both firms in the upper region              
 
(I.I = Imperfect Information; P.I. = Perfect Information) 
 
The result that firms have a higher profit when in imperfect information is a 
puzzling one. In this model, it occurs because the absence of knowledge of the firms 
relatively to their own and their opponent’s marginal costs induces firms to risk more in 
terms of their location, agglomerating more often and leading them to a higher expected 
profit. 
Firms have higher expected profit under imperfect information than under 
perfect information, because under the first hypothesis it is possible that one firm 
obtains a stronger cost reduction than the rival. Hence, the firm would have a cost 
advantage, which explains why the agglomeration decision might appear under 
imperfect information. This is a very interesting result as it contributes to explaining the 
willingness to invest in uncertain cost reducing activities (such as R&D). Firms invest, 
because they have the expectation of obtaining a high cost advantage, which is not 
possible under the perfect information scenario considered here. 
3.6. Effects of changes in firms’ probabilities of successful cost outcomes 
This section discusses what would happen in the second-stage of the game for 
changes in the value of the probability of occurrence of successful marginal costs for 
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both firms. Figure 3.3 and all the subsequent analysis is based on      . Also, when 
   , the model turns out to be the perfect information case of Ziss, while when    , 
we have the d’Aspremont et al. (1979) model, in which the location result is dispersion 
for all the values of    and   , since the successful marginal costs are never going to 
occur and firms end up with equal marginal costs. To perform this analysis, we had to 
compare agglomeration and dispersion expected profits for all the 10 different branches 
of the profit functions, since it is not possible to solve the game for all possible values 
of v with a single mathematical expression, exactly due to the existence of this 
piecewise expected profit function. 
Departing from       and from Figure 3.3, a small increase in this parameter 
increases the probability of both firms having a successful marginal cost outcome at the 
expense of a decrease of the probability of both (S,U) and (U,S) outcomes and a larger 
decrease  in the probability of (U,U) outcome. If the successful marginal costs are 
different between firms, one of the firms will most probably be at a disadvantage 
compared with the rival and will prefer to disperse more often, while the firm with an 
advantage will prefer to agglomerate more often. This will increase the possibilities of 
absence of location equilibrium. Concerning agglomeration vs. dispersion, firms will 
more often have similar outcomes between them ((S,S) + (U,U) > (S,U) + (U,S)), which 
makes firms disperse more often. Summing up, the areas of agglomeration are expected 
to decrease and the areas of dispersion and “no location equilibrium” are expected to 
increase with a small increase of v when departing from      . The results become 
progressively closer to the conclusion of Ziss (1993). 
Similarly, a small decrease in parameter   raises the odds of firms being located 
in the (U,U) outcome. This result induces both firms to disperse more often, which has 
two consequences: the firms will be at the no location equilibrium situation more often, 
as the firm with the higher successful marginal cost will disperse more often in the cases 
when the advantaged firm still prefers to agglomerate; the second consequence is 
similar to the previous case, as firms are expected to have more similar outcomes than 
before, which pushes firms to disperse rather to agglomerate. Therefore, the resulting 
pattern is going to be very similar to the case of an increase in parameter  . The 
exception is that since dispersion occurs more often than agglomeration, the area of “no 
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location equilibrium” got lower at the expense of the area of dispersion.  Hence, we 
conclude that       maximizes the region of agglomeration. This happens because 
that value for the parameter maximizes the probability of both firms of having a 
successful marginal cost while the other firm has an unsuccessful marginal cost, which 
is the outcome that gives the most profit for agglomerated firms. As an example, the 
results for v=0.4 and v=0.75 are displayed in Figures 3.6 and 3.7.  
Figure 3.6 - Location Equilibrium with imperfect information, for v = 0.4 
 
Figure 3.7 – Location Equilibrium with imperfect information, for v = 0.75 
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Recall the perfect information case result of Ziss (1993), in which both firms 
disperse if the difference between both marginal costs is not high, and there is not an 
equilibrium solution otherwise. When departing from v=1 and slowly decreasing the 
probability of successful marginal cost for both firms, we have that the introduction of 
the smallest uncertainty (for instance, v=0.9999) already allows for an agglomerative 
equilibrium. This occurs in the case when both firms have a successful marginal cost 
lower than 7, but when these successful marginal costs are very different between the 
firms. Note that when v=1, the higher successful marginal cost firm has no demand 
when dispersing or agglomerating, so its profits are always equal to 0. However, a 
decrease in v opens a small possibility of monopoly for that firm, that happens when its 
marginal cost is successful and the other firm is not. Then, agglomeration maximizes 
that outcome possibility, while in all other outcomes its profits are equal to 0 anyway. 
So, both firms prefer to agglomerate whenever | ̂ |    and          . This shows 
how fragile the perfect information result may be regarding uncertainty in the 
production costs of firms.  
In addition, when departing from the lower values of v the result of d’Aspremont 
et al. holds, that is, both firms wish to disperse independently of the value of their 
successful marginal cost until v reaches the value of   √ , which is approximately 
0.26795. As v rises above that value, when the difference between the successful 
marginal costs is sufficiently large, the lower successful marginal cost firm starts 
preferring to agglomerate, which leads to a “no location equilibrium” area. However, 
when v reaches 1/3, the higher successful marginal cost firm wishes to agglomerate as 
well due to the increasing possibility of having a monopoly of its own if the marginal 
cost outcome is favorable to it (S,U in the case of firm i). 
These values (v=1/3 and v=1) are the only discontinuities in the location decision 
function, as the regions of agglomeration, dispersion and no location equilibrium react 
continuously to the remaining changes in the values of the parameter v. Overall, we 
conclude that agglomeration for both firms may occur in this setting when          , 
with the highest area of agglomeration occurring when      . 
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3.7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we introduce imperfect information in the framework of Hotelling 
(1929), d’Aspremont et al. (1979) and Ziss (1993), in the sense that firms are unaware 
of which marginal cost they will have before choosing their location. We have opted for 
a simplifying case of imperfect information as firms have two possible outcomes for 
their marginal cost: an unsuccessful marginal cost, equal for both firms, and a 
successful marginal cost not necessarily equal for both firms. We analyze closer the 
case when each firm has a 50% probability of having a successful marginal cost and we 
assume that firms can only be located in the extremes of the market. 
The main conclusion drawn from this work is that agglomerative location 
equilibrium becomes possible when the successful marginal cost of both firms is 
sufficiently different from their unsuccessful marginal cost, and when the probability of 
both firms having a successful marginal cost is between 1/3 and 1. This result is not 
possible in the perfect information models of d’Aspremont et al. (1979) and Ziss (1993). 
The agglomeration result happens mainly because firms are able to risk agglomerating 
and face a typical Bertrand (1883) competition setting in which they could possibly 
conquer all of the market rather than dispersing, when it is necessary to set lower prices 
in order to conquer the same demand. 
This paper proves that imperfect information matters to the analysis of the two-
stage location equilibrium game à la Hotelling, a claim also made by Boyer et al. 
(2003). Moreover, lack of information is an important issue for competing firms, as 
uncertainty arises in some important processes that they may face in many different 
areas of their organization. For instance, estimation of demand; estimation of the impact 
of a certain marketing strategy; uncertainty about worker productivity; uncertainty 
about innovation outcomes; uncertainty about the conditions that other firms in the 
market face… and many more. 
In order to better understand the results of this model, future research should 
focus on making endogenous the uncertainties of the model, for instance, considering an 
investment in marginal cost reduction, considering a suppliers’ market or considering 
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different assumptions for the demand. This would allow for a better understanding of 
how different types of uncertainties would affect the market and firms’ decisions. 
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4. R&D Investments in Spatial Competition 
4.1. Introduction 
This paper studies the behavior of two competitors in the framework of 
Hotelling (1929). We depart from the classical two-staged location-price game by 
introducing a R&D investment stage in the first period. Firms are allowed to invest in 
order to reduce the marginal cost of production of their goods. This marginal cost is 
used later to compete in the market, where firms have to choose the location of their 
store in the linear city and the price that they will set for their good. 
The introduction of this investment in R&D is an interesting feature for the 
analysis of behavior in the Hotelling model. Firms are given another decision variable 
to affect their results. Moreover, this decision variable adds to the fitness of the model 
to the reality: In the original model and in many of its extensions, the marginal costs of 
production are assumed as given, which, in spite of simplifying significantly the 
analysis, is a very strong assumption. Even after considering the nature of the good and 
some other exogenous costs for its production (like, for instance, the cost of raw 
materials), firms are an important determinant in setting the cost of their own good. For 
instance, by possessing a good organizational structure, by amplifying their capacity or 
by investing in R&D, firms may be able to reduce their marginal cost. This capacity of 
influencing the marginal costs tends to be higher the larger is the firm, because larger 
firms have, overall more control on a set of important factors such as the quality of an 
organizational structure; the bargaining power with their suppliers and consumers; the 
financial power to perform investments in capacity and R&D; and so on. Therefore, this 
question of endogenous marginal costs is even more realistic when applied to duopoly 
firms, which is the case in this model. 
However, the hypothesis of perfect information does not fit entirely to the R&D 
case: Firms allocate considerable amounts of staff and funds in order to perform 
research without precisely knowing if there is going to be any innovation. Even if the 
innovation occurs, firms may not know if that innovation will be significant to the 
production process, either in terms of the quality of the product or in terms of its 
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production costs. Therefore, uncertainty is inherent to the innovation process and should 
be considered when modeling investments in R&D. 
We could model imperfect information by assuming, similarly to the previous 
chapter, that after investing firms have a fixed probability that their investment is 
successful and their marginal cost is reduced to the intended objective cost. However, if 
the investment is unsuccessful, it means that firms will remain with the same marginal 
costs. In either case, firms lose their investment cost, which is considered as a fixed 
cost. However, we were not able to proceed to the imperfect information analysis. We 
have found mathematical problems that prevented us to entirety solve the investment 
stage even for the perfect information case. Therefore, we did not proceed on the 
calculations with uncertainty in investment. 
Nevertheless, we have concluded that with perfect information, when firms are 
equally efficient regarding the effects of the investment on the marginal cost reduction, 
they enter a prisoner’s dilemma situation, where at the Pareto optimal firms would not 
invest. However, they enter in some sort of “investment race”, and the Nash equilibrium 
implies investing and incurring in lower profits than in the no-investment situation. 
Given the inelastic demand and the high reservation price assumptions of the Hotelling 
model, firms earn absolutely nothing more for having a lower marginal cost than the 
initial situation, since what determines profits in these conditions is the difference of 
marginal costs of production between both firms. 
This chapter is organized as follows: Subsection 4.2 fits the paper in the 
literature. Subsection 4.3 details the assumptions of the model, while subsection 4.4 
details the perfect information case. Subsection 4.5 shows the Prisoner’s dilemma 
result, while subsection 4.6 concludes.  
4.2. Theoretical Background 
The model of Hotelling (1929) is the main framework for this study. In the 
original Hotelling model, two firms must choose at first stage their location in a linear 
and bounded city, and in the second stage they compete in prices. The good sold by the 
firms is homogenous, except for the location they have chosen in the first stage, and the 
firms have the same cost structure. Demand is perfectly inelastic and consumers incur in 
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a linear transportation cost in order to buy the good. Hotelling concludes that firms 
would optimally agglomerate in the center of the city. A crucial extension to the model 
of Hotelling was the one done by d’Aspremont et al. (1979). By introducing quadratic 
transportation costs (instead of linear) with respect to distance, the result of central 
agglomeration disappeared with firms optimally locating in each of the extremes of the 
city. After the work by d’Aspremont et al., the field expanded significantly and more 
important publications appeared about this issue. Most of these publications focused on 
changing the assumptions of the original Hotelling model and then concluding about the 
new location decisions of the firms, as it can be seen in a detailed review on the chapter 
2 of this manuscript. 
The most direct reference of this work is the paper from Ziss (1993). The author 
derives the results for the two-stage location-price game of Hotelling allowing for 
different marginal costs between the two firms. Ziss concludes that when the difference 
between the marginal costs is small firms prefer to locate in different extremes of the 
city. However, as the difference is higher than a given threshold, the low-cost firm 
prefers to locate as closer as possible to the high-cost firm that, in an opposing fashion, 
wishes to locate the farthest possible from the other firm. This leads to the absence of 
location equilibrium in pure strategies. However, if the difference between both 
marginal costs is high enough, the low-cost firm drives the high-cost firm out of the 
market. Later on, Matsumura and Matsushima (2009) extend the Location-Price game 
of Ziss (1993), but allowing for mixed strategies in the location stage. They conclude 
that there is a mixed-strategy for all cost differentials in the game. For the cost 
differentials where no pure strategy equilibrium exists, the mixed equilibrium involves 
each firm choosing to locate in each extreme of the market 50% of the times. 
In terms of endogenous marginal costs, Matsumura and Matsushima (2004) 
present an appealing model about mixed duopolies: Two firms, one of public and other 
of private nature, compete in a three-stage R&D-Location-Price game, similarly to this 
paper, in a linear market à la Hotelling. The public firm wishes to maximize social 
welfare, while the private firm wishes to maximize its own profits. They conclude that 
the private firm incurs in an excessive strategic cost-reducing investment, although the 
locations chosen by both firms are equal to the ones chosen by a social planner. In a 
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very similar approach, Matsumura and Matsushima (2012a) introduce a model where in 
the first-stage firms invest in cost-reducing activities, but they focus only on smaller 
differences between the marginal costs of production of both firms. 
A different type of R&D investments coupled with uncertainty is the model from 
Harter (1993). Firms choose what type of horizontally differentiated good they will 
manufacture, but entry only occurs when the investment is complete, which means 
firms may have different time periods for entering. In a discrete variation, Gerlach et al. 
(2005) model the case where firms have a given probability of entering the market or 
not, but they have to choose their degree of differentiation before entering (or not). 
However, these approaches are not related with cost-reducing investments, with is the 
focus of this chapter. 
4.3. The Model 
The basic assumptions of the model are as following: Two firms compete in a 
three-stage R&D-Location-Price game. In the first stage, firms choose simultaneously 
the marginal costs that they are going to use in the subsequent stages of the game. The 
investment function is equal to the one assumed in Matsumura and Matsushima (2004), 
which is given by               
 , where   is the initial marginal cost of both firms 
and    the marginal cost firms have chosen to be their final one. Since there is a clear 
relationship between the investment and the cost reduction, in this framework to choose 
the final marginal cost is equivalent to choose the amount of funds to invest. One can 
see that the investment cost function has the desired and realistic properties: A lower 
final marginal cost implies larger investment costs for the relevant set of parameters 
( 
  
   
  , for     ) and lowering marginally the marginal cost implies an increasing 
investment effort for the firms (
   
    
  ). 
Also, firms are assumed to have no initial advantage over the other except for 
the parameter   , which represents the efficiency of firms when investing in R&D. A 
lower    implies higher efficiency when investing in the R&D function, which means 
that if       there exists an advantage for firm i. 
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After choosing the level of investment, firms choose simultaneously their 
locations within the linear and bounded city of Hotelling, which is assumed to have 
length equal to one. The location variables are represented by    and    for firm 1 and 
firm 2 respectively, where    is expressed as the distance from the left extreme of the 
market and    is the distance from the right extreme. Note that under these 
specifications of distance, when        , firms are fully differentiated and when 
       , firms are agglomerated in any point of the market. We assume also, 
without loss of generality, that firm 1 is never located to the right of firm 2, which is 
equivalent to impose that        .  Finally, in the third-stage, firms simultaneously 
choose prices, which are represented by    and   , respectively, for firm 1 and firm 2. 
The remaining assumptions are equal to Hotelling (1929), with the proposed extension 
by d’Aspremont et al. (1979): The goods produced by the firms are homogenous to the 
eyes of the consumers except for the location that firms choose. Consumers are 
uniformly distributed across the linear city and are obliged to buy one unit of good in 
order to survive. Therefore, the reservation price of the consumers is assumed to be high 
enough such that the market is always fully covered by the existing firms. Consumers 
incur in a transportation cost to buy the good that is quadratic with respect to distance. 
Without loss of generality, we assume that the unit transportation cost is equal to one 
and that the initial marginal cost of both firms is set to 10, similarly to what we did in 
the previous chapter.  
4.4. Solving the model and results 
In the perfect information case, firms participate in the three stage game without 
any uncertainty regarding the outcome of the investment in R&D: If firms invest a 
given quantity  , they are certain that they will obtain the corresponding new marginal 
cost, given by   . We solve the game using backward induction. 
The demand of each firm is derived directly from the location of the indifferent 
consumer. Typically in price competition in models à la Hotelling, each firm has its 
own market area, that is, each firm has an area in which all consumers located there buy 
in their store. The boundary of that area is given by the point x where the indifferent 
consumer is located. Firm 1 will have a demand equal to  , while firm 2 will have a 
demand equal to    . The indifferent consumer is located in: 
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However, one must consider, when drawing the profit functions for each firm 
that the indifferent consumer location can never be lower than 0 or higher than 1. The 
profit function for each firm is represented by    with i = 1, 2 and is given by: 
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For i=1, 2 and    
 
   
        
   ,    
 
   
        
   . The upper 
part of the expression corresponds to the case where firm i has all the demand, while the 
lower part corresponds to the situation where the firm is unable to participate in the 
market, due to its price being high enough comparing with the one from the rival. In 
addition,, this indifferent consumer function and the profit function are only valid for 
the case of        . When        , firms are in the same location. In this case, 
the idea of the indifferent consumer stops making sense and the resulting profits are 
similar to the ones in Bertrand (1883). 
4.4.1 Price Stage 
The price behavior when one firm sells the good for all the market is obvious: 
this firm wants to set the highest price that allows it to keep the entire market. The 
“threshold” price increases with the distance from the opponent’s store, ceteris paribus. 
When a firm does not have any consumer, the price is equal to the marginal cost. 
The interesting case is when both firms have their own market areas. After 
differentiating the profit function with respect to the price for each firm and after 
equalizing to zero, we obtain the best-response functions in terms of pricing. Combining 
the expressions for both firms we get, for each firm: 
                  
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
  
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
   
 
 
   
Replacing both prices in the profit function, we get: 
93 
 
                
{
 
 
 
 
         
    
                 
                                                ̂   
              
    
        
 
            
          
                        ̂    
          
                                                                                                            ̂   
 
Where  ̂  is the marginal cost difference expressed by       and   and  , are the 
same than before, but after replacing the optimal price decision these change to 
   
        
         and    
        
       , respectively. 
4.4.2 Location Stage 
To solve for the location stage, the usual methodology of deriving the profit 
function with respect to the decision variable and equalizing to zero is not the most 
adequate, mainly for two reasons: The resulting values and equations are too 
complicated to withdraw direct conclusions and the optimal result does not take into 
consideration the natural boundaries for the location of the firms, that is         
and          . Therefore, we have assumed just like in the previous chapter that 
both firms are restricted to choose only between locating in one of the extremes of the 
linear city. This means that in terms of location strategy, firms can only be 
agglomerated or fully dispersed relatively to their opponent. 
Therefore, the problem of the optimal location is reduced to finding whether it is 
more profitable for both firms to locate between two possible choices. By the straight 
comparison of both profits, we find that firm i prefers to agglomerate when: 
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The resulting value is the one already obtained by Ziss (1993), but considering 
fixed length and transportation costs. Note that this result is valid because for a lower 
difference in the marginal costs, the low-cost firm does not wish to leave its own 
extreme. 
However, for  ̂       √  , the low-cost firm does not wish to be dispersed 
with the high-cost firm, since that would imply lower profits. The high-cost firm always 
wants to be far from the low-cost firm, as it benefits in two ways: It increases its 
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demand it increases the price of its good, due to the softening of price competition. 
Therefore, in this case there is no location equilibrium in pure strategies, as one of the 
firms prefers to be as close as possible to the opponent, while the other firm prefers to 
be as far as possible. 
Contrary to Ziss (1993), who considers the possibility of entry, we assume that 
the high-cost firm has to remain in the city even if it has negative profits. In this 
situation the negative profits arrive only from the investment costs taken in the first-
stage. The choice of keeping the high-cost firm in the market has a useful purpose: to 
limit the maximum price that the monopolist can set, which makes the analysis of profit 
maximization more rigorous. If a second firm did not exist, the monopolist could set a 
price equal to the reservation cost of consumers, which is assumed to be sufficiently 
high. Therefore, the existence of a potential entrant keeps the monopolist aware, 
allowing for prices not to be that high and allowing the value of the “premium” for 
achieving a monopoly situation at a reasonable level. 
In order to proceed with the analysis we consider a mixed strategy for the 
location stage. Using part of the result of Matsumura and Matsushima (2009), we 
assume that when there is no pure location equilibrium, firms play a mixed strategy that 
implies that half of the times firms agglomerate in one of the extremes and in other half 
of the times, they locate in the opposing extremes of the market. So, the optimal 
location pattern is given by: 
   {
                                    ̂   (   √ )
                                                                           (   √ )   ̂  (   √ )
                                 ̂  (   √ )
 
 
Therefore, the profits of the firms, after replacing for the optimal location 
decision, are given by equation 4.1: 
           ̂       ̂           
      , for  ̂     
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          , for     ̂       √   
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In all branches of the profit function except for the middle one, it is represented 
an expected profit , since half of the times the firms are agglomerated and in the other 
half they are fully dispersed, which results from the mixed strategy played  (Matsumura 
and Matsushima, 2009). The first and last branches of the profit function correspond to 
the case where only one of the firms sells the good for the entire market, independently 
of the final location outcome. The interval for the difference of marginal costs is also 
identified by Ziss (1993), and it is the case when the high-cost firm, even when fully 
differentiated relatively to its opponent, is not able to obtain any demand. In all the 
cases, firms still have to pay the investment cost. 
4.4.3 Investment Stage 
In the third-stage, firms have to decide the amount of money to invest in cost-
reducing activities, given the future decisions on location and pricing. As mentioned 
before, the investment cost function depends on a technology parameter   . For our 
analysis, we have fixed the parameter of firm 2 to       , which still allows us to 
assess the behavior of firms when they have an advantage/disadvantage in terms of their 
marginal cost of production. Therefore, this parameter is set without loss of generality. 
Note that the game is fully solved with respect to the parameter   , which represents the 
efficiency of firm 1 when engaging in cost-reducing activities. 
However, we faced some problems in finding the optimal decision of both firms, 
since we are optimizing on a piecewise function in a problem with two variables. Then, 
a direct calculation does not allow us to find the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. 
Therefore, we could not solve the model for all values of the technology parameter. 
We started by analyzing what is the optimal investment decision of firms in each 
branch of the profit function. For the middle branch of equation 4.1., both firms are 
dispersed and their profit is given by: 
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When firm 1 manages to obtain a significant cost advantage, firms play the 
mixed strategy and their profits are given by the second and fourth branches of equation 
4.1: 
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and:  
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Respectively, when firm 1 is monopolist, its profits are given by the first branch of 
equation 4.1: 
                                      
                                         (4.5) 
While firm 2 only pays its investment costs. We only show these three options 
(middle branch; firm 1 with an advantage; firm 1 as a monopolist) since for       , 
firm 2 never achieves a sufficient marginal cost advantage whatever the technology 
parameter for firm 1.. 
Solving the investment stage, firms maximize their profits given they can choose 
the optimal value of investment, which determines the marginal cost of production of 
their good. For the branch where both firms disperse, firms maximize their profits by 
choosing the following marginal costs: 
9132
1071320
1
1
1



a
a
c  and 
9132
801320
1
1
2



a
a
c  
Given the location choice of both firms, note that these values are only valid 
when  ̂       √  . Therefore, replacing c1 and c2 is the restriction, we can see this 
solution is only valid when    
 √   
  √    
, that is, approximately 0.17457.  
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From the case where the profits of both firms are given by equations 4.3 and 4.4,  
the investment choice of both firms obtained from the maximization of these profits is 
given by: 
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Since these values are only valid if     ̂       √  , after replacing 
these solutions and solving with respect to α, we have that the solution is only valid for: 
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That is, approximately                   .  
For the branch where firm 1 holds the monopoly situation (equation 4.5), the 
optimal marginal costs chosen by firm are given by 
1
1
1
2
120
a
a
c

  and 102 c , which is 
valid only if           .  
A careful analysis of the above results reveals that the branches relatively to the 
technology parameter of firm 1 are conflicting. When                    or 
when                   , the adequate branch is not unique since for these 
values of    more than one optimal branch solution is found. 
Then, the direct result for the marginal cost that we obtain from solving each of 
the branches separately might not be a Nash Equilibrium. Each firm has other 
investment possibilities that are not covered in a single branch option. For instance, 
when we calculate the profits for each branch, we are implicitly assuming that the profit 
of the firms will always be given by that expression, which is not always the case. In 
more practical terms, imagine that we are maximizing for the branch where there is a 
moderate disadvantage by firm 2 (that is, the branch where     ̂       √  ). 
For some values of the investment value chosen by firm 1, which is given by (
18588
3715880
1
1
1



a
a
c ), firm 2 would most likely prefer to invest a bit more in order to 
decrease the advantage of firm 1 to a value lower than     √  , which would imply a 
98 
 
different profit outcome than the one that was subject to the maximization problem. In 
other words, and following closely the definition of Nash Equilibrium, the value found 
in the maximization case of this branch for firm 2 (
18588
1555700
1
1
2



a
a
c ) is not necessarily 
the optimal marginal cost value chosen by the firm given all its investment possibilities, 
which a piecewise function cannot cover entirely. 
Therefore, we inspect what would be the optimal choice of a firm given the 
choice of the other firm, by comparing the branch possibilities that we have. We did the 
computation for the profits in equation 4.2 where both firms have demand and are 
dispersed in the linear city. Unfortunately, our analysis is limited due to the fact we 
cannot test all possible pair of values of    and   . We test the values that were chosen 
by firms in the unrestricted case. So, the choice of marginal cost for firm 2 when firm 1 
chooses: 
9132
1071320
1
1
1



a
a
c  
Is summarized in Table 4.1. Similarly, we summarize in the same table the 
choice of marginal cost for firm 1 when firm 2 chooses its optimal reaction in the 
restricted case, which was given by: 
 
9132
801320
1
1
2



a
a
c  
After checking the best responses for each case, we verified for which values of 
α the responses were valid. Then we compared, in case of conflicting solutions (two or 
more valid solutions for each α) which options would the firm prefer. 
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Table 4.1 – Best-response functions of firm 1 and 2 given their investment option in the 
first branch when  
9132
1071320
1
1
1



a
a
c  and 
9132
801320
1
1
2



a
a
c . 
 Optimal Response Valid if Chosen if 
Firm 
1 
9132
1071320
1
1
1



a
a
c  
17457.01 a  21759.01 a  
94564752
188605447520
1
2
1
1
2
1
1



aa
aa
c  
26589.01 a  21759.013942.0 1  a  
1
1
1
2
120
a
a
c

  
15035.01 a  13942.01 a  
Firm 
2 
9132
801320
1
1
2



a
a
c  
17457.01 a  17457.01 a  
9132
16132733962112
1
11
2



a
aa
c  
All 1a  17457.014653.0 1  a  
4416468
419062700
1
1
2



a
a
c  
19605.01 a  14653.0
9
1
1  a  
102 c  
9
1
1 a  
9
1
1 a  
  
Therefore, we can see that, contrary to what the initial analysis suggests, the 
choice of marginal costs, given by: 
(
9132
1071320
1
1
1



a
a
c ;
9132
801320
1
1
2



a
a
c ) 
is a Nash Equilibrium for this stage only when 21759.01 a , that is, when both 
firms consider that their current choice is the best given the current choice of the 
opponent. Consider, for instance, that for a lower value of 1a  firm 1 would choose a 
different marginal cost given the choice of firm 2. Finding the optimal investment result 
for all other values of 1a would not be feasible, given that there is no direct way to find a 
generic optimal response function for any of the firms. In this example, since firm 1 
would choose a different value, its optimal choice would be different. That would imply 
also that the optimal reply of firm 2 would change, which would change again the 
optimal response of firm 1. Finding an optimal response for each 1a  would imply 
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tracing all these iterations, which we consider that as an unfeasible procedure. 
Therefore, we only solve the model when 21759.01 a . 
This impossibility in finding the Nash equilibrium for the investment game for 
all the possible values of firm efficiency led us to conclude that pursuing the case when 
there is imperfect information in the R&D stage would not be that interesting, since we 
would be unable to make a direct comparison with the perfect information case. 
4.5. Prisoner’s Dilemma in R&D in the Hotelling framework 
Even though we were not able to fully solve the previous three-stage model 
presented before given that one of the technology parameters was set, it is still possible 
to solve the model if we consider two similar firms in an Hotelling market, which 
means considering two firms that have equal technology parameters. This simplification 
leads firms to choose the same marginal cost of production, since it eliminates all the 
problems related to analyze optimization problems in piecewise functions, which leads 
both firms to have their profit functions as expressed in equation 4.2., since and where 
both firms are always dispersed for any level of the technology parameter. A similar 
assumption is followed by Matsumura and Matsushima (2012a), since they only 
consider the possibility of smaller cost differences between firms, in order to work only 
with the case where both firms are dispersed.  
Given that the investment functions are equal, firms maximize profit (equation 
4.2) with respect to final production cost. Note that by this point, firms have symmetric 
profit functions with respect to the decision variables. Firms invest in production cost 
reduction until the marginal benefit equals the marginal cost of investing. Table 4.2 
shows the optimal production cost calculation. 
Table 4.2 – Investment Best-Response Functions and Final Marginal Production Cost 
for firm i 
Marginal Benefit 
of Investment 
Marginal Cost 
of Investment 
Best-Response 
Function 
Final Production Cost 
Decision 
 
 
(     )  
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Replacing the marginal production costs of both firms in equation 4.2, firms’ 
profits become only dependent on the efficiency parameter a , which solves the model. 
36
1
2
1
 i                                                                                                               (4.6)                                                                            
In this equation (4.6), the first term refers to the firms’ operational profits while 
the second term represents the investment costs. A striking result emerges as firms’ 
profits decrease with higher levels of efficiency in their investment. It would be 
expected that, since firms would have access to better ways of reducing their production 
cost, the profits would be higher. However, the operational profit remains the same, 
while the investment costs increase when   decreases. 
In the Hotelling model when transportation costs are quadratic and production 
costs are symmetric, firms share the market and earn profits equal to one half times the 
unit transportation costs. Our model replicates this result for every value of  , since 
firms are dispersed and choose the same production cost. However, since investment is 
totally neutral towards firms’ profits, these would be better off if they could agree to not 
invest on that resource. This resembles the classical prisoner’s dilemma game, which is 
exactly the result for the investment stage. In this simplified version, firms would have 
the choice to invest (choosing the optimal value defined above) or not. In the Nash 
Equilibrium of this game, both firms invest, despite a Pareto optimal solution that would 
occur if they do not invest. Table 4.3 exhibits that example, which is only valid for 
18/1 , since for lower values of   the investing firm achieves a monopoly 
situation. 
Table 4.3 – The Prisoner’s Dilemma game in the investment stage (for   
 
  
) 
                   Investment Firm j 
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What can explain this unexpected result? The efficiency of the investment in 
terms of the Hotelling model plays a similar role to the unit transportation costs in terms 
of firms’ profits: although it is common sense that the society and firms may benefit 
from lower unit transportation costs, in the Hotelling framework these costs are the 
source of differentiation between firms, which makes the local monopolies stronger, so 
they can set higher prices to their segment of consumers without fearing the opposition 
of the other firm. So, the existence of an investment function hurts firms in the sense 
that their local monopolies are threatened due to the possibility of investment by the 
rival. Firms must defend themselves from that threat which, in the end, yields them the 
same operational profit, since they end up dispersed, with the same marginal cost, and 
therefore, same demand. 
4.6. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, and in line with the previous chapter, we have tried to make 
endogenous the marginal cost decision of both firms, in order to understand the 
implications on firms’ location, pricing, and resulting profits. Furthermore, we analyzed 
the effects of uncertainty in the investment decisions, by having a probability of non-
occurrence of a decrease in the marginal cost of production. However, our efforts were 
stopped by the mathematical unfeasibility of fully solving a 2-variable optimization 
problem of a piecewise function. 
After fixing the technology parameter of one of the firms, we could only find a 
Nash Equilibrium in the investment stage for values where the technology parameter of 
the remaining firm was not too big. In this case, firms disperse and the relationship 
between their profits and demand depends (naturally) on the relationship between their 
technology parameters: for 40.01 a , firm 1 would have a higher marginal cost and 
therefore a lower profit, with the reverse happening when 40.01 a . 
Then, we reported a curious result found when considering firms with the same 
investment capacity. Instead of increasing profits as expected, an improvement in the 
technology parameter of both firms reduces firms’ profits. This happens because firms 
invest as they fear that the opponent conquers their demand. Consequently, both firms 
defend their positions, even though they would be better off by not investing at all, and 
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end up having the same operational profits. We feel that this result may be justified by 
the inelastic demand assumption usually taken in the Hotelling model, which prevents 
the market to expand itself beyond new customers. 
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5. Cost Inefficiency and Optimal Market Structure in the Spatial 
Cournot Framework 
5.1. Introduction 
Most studies about firms' behavior and market structure assume that firms are 
equal in many characteristics. Although this is a very natural assumption, since it allows 
researchers to isolate the effects of firms' asymmetries from the effect one is trying to 
study, in truth firms do not always face the same conditions, especially when they have 
significant market power as in the case of a duopoly. When a small number of firms 
compete for the same market, they usually follow strategies to differentiate themselves 
in order to increase profits. Differentiation strategies can rely on the production process; 
R&D investments; advertising campaigns; distribution channels; product quality; 
product variety, and many more. 
In this paper, we adapt the spatial quantity competition setting allowing firms to 
have different marginal costs of production. The difference in marginal cost may be 
interpreted as a summary of a great variety of differences between firms, which may 
benefit one firm over the other. Under this framework our main question is: how firms 
react in terms of the location decisions when facing a production cost (dis)advantage? 
Additionally we analyze the optimal decisions of the social planner when facing firms 
with different technologies of production. We allow the social planner to control the 
locations of the stores of both firms, as well as to remove the inefficient firm out of the 
market if its presence hurts the global social welfare of the economy. This paper tests 
the robustness of Anderson and Neven (1991) results when firms face different 
marginal costs, as well as the conclusions of Matsumura and Shimizu (2005) regarding 
social welfare. In addition, this paper provides a starting point for analyzing more 
complex questions as the ones that happens when different marginal costs are 
endogenous. Examples for which the modeling of different marginal costs is suitable are 
the analysis of location-dependent marginal costs in the city; the analysis of R&D 
investment decisions of firms; the analysis of models where firms are uncertain about 
their marginal costs; the study of incumbent vs. entrant problems with different 
marginal costs; and so on. 
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Traditionally, quantity competition models are more adequate for markets in 
which the productive capacity decision of each firm is inflexible. When adding space, 
this model is suitable when the allocation of output by each firm to the different market 
points is also relatively inflexible, with energy markets being a good example of a 
market that fits in this setting (Anderson and Neven, 1991). 
Therefore, we test what is the optimal reaction of firms when these have 
exogenous differences in their marginal costs of production. Additionally, we consider 
what would be the optimal choice of a social planner to maximize the social welfare, 
when he is allowed to change firms’ location, but not the optimal quantities sold. We 
also study the case where the social planner is allowed to remove one of the firms out of 
(or symmetrically, forbidding one of the firms from entering on) the market. We 
compare this situation with the non-spatial case.  
We conclude that the central agglomeration result known in the literature holds 
for any difference in the marginal costs of both firms, which comes in opposition with 
the result found in price competition, where no pure equilibrium in locations is found if 
the marginal costs become too big, with the only pure equilibrium being total dispersion 
between firms (Ziss, 1993). Regarding social welfare, we conclude that central 
agglomeration result only holds if the difference between the marginal costs of both 
firms is not too high. Also, when allowing the social planner to prevent the high cost 
firm from entering the market, we conclude that this firm would not be allowed to enter 
if the marginal cost difference becomes too high. Additionally, we conclude that for low 
values of the marginal cost difference, the optimal location pattern implies that firms are 
always located in the center of the city, either in monopoly or in duopoly. 
We conclude as well that the conditions that lead the social planner to remove 
the inefficient firm do not change significantly with the introduction of the space 
dimension. That is, when removing an inefficient firm, the social planner must be more 
worried about the degree of inefficiency of the firm than with level of transportation 
costs in the economy. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Subsection 5.2 provides the theoretical 
background for the model. Subsection 5.3 presents the model and solves the two-stage 
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location quantity game problem of profit maximization for each firm. Subsection 5.4 
includes the analysis of the problem of the maximization of social welfare. Subsection 
5.5 concludes. 
5.2. Theoretical Background  
The idea of competition between two firms when in the first place firms choose 
the location in a linear city and then compete in prices was developed by Hotelling 
(1929). This two-stage game attracted the interest of many scientists, since it provides a 
relatively simple tool to introduce space (either physical or product space) in 
competition between firms. Hotelling concluded that firms would agglomerate in the 
center of the city, which became widely known as the "Principle of Minimum 
Differentiation". 
However, 50 years after the original paper by Hotelling, a paper by d'Aspremont 
et al. (1979) proved that by introducing quadratic transportation costs in the previous 
framework, firms would optimally be located in the extremes of the linear segment. 
This new feature also allowed for better mathematical tractability, since under this 
assumption the demand and profits become continuous functions with respect to the 
price decisions of the firms. The mathematical tractability, combined with the intriguing 
result of that game led to a significant expansion of the field in the 1980s and the 1990s. 
Many papers were published in important journals in Economics, either generalized or 
specialized in Regional and Urban Economics and in Industrial Organization during that 
time. This conclusion is withdrawn from the chapter 2 of this dissertation. 
The introduction of competition in quantities in the linear city framework is due 
to Greenhut and Greenhut (1975). Each firm chooses to deliver a given quantity to 
separable markets that are located throughout every point in the city. Some years later, 
Hamilton et al. (1989) and Anderson and Neven (1991) replicate the two-stage game by 
Hotelling using quantity instead of price competition in the second stage. Hamilton et 
al. (1989) conclude that when transportation costs are linear, firms choose to 
agglomerate at the city center. Anderson and Neven (1991) extend this result allowing 
for different transportation configurations, and concluded that central agglomeration is 
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the optimal result if the transportation costs are convex. This equilibrium result is also 
extended for n firms if transportation costs are linear. 
Since the appearance of Cournot two-stage game, some important extensions 
and results followed. An important extension is Gupta et al. (1997), which abandon the 
uniform distribution of consumers across the city and studied the location equilibrium 
allowing for different types consumers' distribution. The authors conclude that both 
agglomeration and dispersed equilibrium may arise. For the case of duopoly, if the 
consumer density is sufficiently thick in all points of the city, then central 
agglomeration is the only equilibrium. A related approach is due to Shimizu (2002), 
who studies the degree of complementarity/substitutability between the goods sold by 
both firms, and for the linear city case concludes that the agglomeration result remains 
unchanged independently of the relationship between both goods. 
Matsumura and Shimizu (2005) focused on the social welfare results of the 
locations decisions. They conclude that, when in a duopoly, agglomeration at the center 
can be an optimal location concerning social welfare, given that consumer density is 
sufficiently thick in all points of the market. Chamorro-Rivas (2000) and Benassi et al. 
(2007) lowered the reservation costs of the consumers, unrestricting the model in the 
sense that every firm does not have to supply every point of the market. Chamorro-
Rivas (2000) conclude that a second equilibrium solution arises, and therefore central 
agglomeration is no longer a unique equilibrium. Benassi et al. (2007) find that for even 
lower reservation costs than Chamorro-Rivas, central agglomeration ceases to be 
equilibrium and firms disperse in a symmetric pattern. 
The question on how firms behave if they have different marginal costs is yet to 
be answered conveniently in the competition by quantities setting. In Bertrand, this 
problem was addressed by Ziss (1993), who conclude that the principle of maximum 
differentiation holds if the difference between the marginal costs of both firms is not too 
big. After a certain threshold, firms are not able to find location equilibrium, since the 
low-cost firm wishes to be as close as possible to the opponent, while the other firm 
wishes to be as far as possible. An important extension is the work of Matsumura and 
Matsushima (2009), which extends the location-price game of Ziss but allowing for 
mixed strategies in the location stage. For the cost differentials where no pure strategy 
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equilibrium exists, the mixed equilibrium involves each firm choosing to locate in each 
extreme of the market 50% of the time. 
5.3. The Model  
The model follows all assumptions detailed in Anderson and Neven (1991), 
which in turn are similar to the ones in Hotelling (1929) except for the ones that allow 
competition in quantities to be tractable. In our model two firms compete in a two-stage 
location-quantity game in a linear city, assumed to have length equal to 1. In the first-
stage both firms choose simultaneously their location in the city, and then, in the second 
stage, they compete in quantities across all markets in the linear segment. The goods 
sold by both firms are homogenous and therefore are perfect substitutes. Transportation 
costs are supported by the firms and the unit transportation cost is assumed to be linear 
with respect to the travelled distance. Both firms are able to discriminate between 
consumers, since firms control transportation, or in other words, the unit transportation 
costs between consumers are assumed to be high enough such that they are unable to 
make a profit by selling goods between them. The difference from the framework of 
Anderson and Neven (1991) is that we allow firms to have different marginal costs of 
production. The linear market therefore consists in a continuum of market points which 
are assumed to have uniform density. In each point there is a market with an inverse 
demand function for the good given by )100( QP  . 
 
5.3.1. Quantity Stage 
In the first stage, firms decide simultaneously how many goods they sell to each 
point in the market. Firms are allowed to discriminate between different markets in the 
city by providing different quantities for each market point. In each point, the 
calculations are equivalent to a non-spatial Cournot, with the marginal cost of each firm 
being its unit transportation cost to that specific point plus the marginal cost of 
production. Therefore, the profit function for firm i is given by: 
iiijijijixi qcxxtqqxxqq ))(100(),,,(,   
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With q representing the quantities produced in this point; t  the unit 
transportation cost; x  representing the location variable; c representing the marginal 
cost of production; and with i=1,2, and j representing the opponent firm. Maximizing 
both firms’ profits with respect to quantities, which is the second-stage variable, we 
have that the optimal quantities supplied by each firm i to a given point x is given by: 
2
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* iixj
ixjxi
cxxtq
xqq
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  
Solving both best-response functions, we have the optimal decision of firm i 
depending on the marginal costs and location decisions of both firms, and the market 
point for which both firms are selling the product. 
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The total profit for each firm is given by the sum of the profits of all market 
points. The profits in a given market point is given by the following expression: 
9
)22100(
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The sum of profits in all the points is given by; 
dx
xxtxxtcc
xx
jiji
jii )
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
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                                      (5.1) 
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However, equation (5.1) cannot be computed directly due to the existence of the 
absolute value in the expression, due to transportation costs. Therefore, the integral 
expressions have to be separated before being computed, as done similarly by Anderson 
and Neven (1991).We are able to separate the integrals due to the assumption that 
21 xx  , that is, firm 1 is never located “at the right” of firm 2. With this, we know 
exactly the sign of the transportation costs in each of the possible cases: For the market 
points between 0 and 1x , we have, for firm 1: 
dx
xxtxxtcc
xx
x
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Between 1x  and 2x , the sum of profits in all market points is given by: 
dx
xxtxxtcc
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x
x
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While for the market points between 2x  and 1, the sum of profits of firm 1 is given by: 
dx
xxtxxtcc
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x
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Then, after summing up the 3 integrals (and doing a similar procedure for the 
profits of firm 2), we obtain the profits of both firms. These are dependent on firms’ 
location choices, firms’ marginal costs and the value of unit transportation costs. The 
profit results of both firms lose their symmetric property after this integral 
transformation. Therefore, firm’s 1 profits are given by: 
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While for firm 2 the profits are given by: 
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5.3.2. Location Stage  
To determine the optimal location for each firm, we apply the first-order 
conditions to each firm's objective function, with respect to the location variable. The 
derivatives of both firms’ profits are given by: 
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After equalizing these expressions to zero, we solve the system of equations with 
respect to the location variables, and we obtain the optimal location decision 
irrespective of the optimal location decision of the other firm. We arrive at the 
following result, for which the second-order conditions are satisfied.
1
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2
1
;
2
1
( 21  xx  
Hence we arrive at Proposition 5.1. 
                                                          
1
 By solving the first-order conditions and verifying the second-order conditions, other solutions were 
found. However, these either did not respect the constraint that firm 1 must not be located at the right of 
firm 2 (for which the corresponding profits are not correct, due to the specification of the integral we have 
built) or did not respect the fact that firms must be located inside the linear city. These results were 
therefore not considered. 
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Proposition 5.1: Independently of the value of the marginal costs for both firms, and 
given that the dimension of the market is big enough such that both firms have no 
negative profit in all points of the market, central agglomeration is the unique 
equilibrium for the two-stage location-quantity game. 
Proof:  Result of the first and second-order conditions of both firms’ profit 
maximization. 
After replacing the optimal location in the profit functions of both firms, these 
retain their symmetric property. The profit of firm i becomes: 
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The first result appearing in this model is that the location decision of both firms 
is unaffected by the marginal costs values of both firms. This result is interesting, and 
goes against the initial intuition that a firm with high marginal costs would decide to 
move away from the opponent to one of the sides of the market, in order to conquer 
more demand in a small region of the city instead of locating in the center. However, 
analyzing the profit derivative (Equation 5.1) of the high-cost firm with respect to its 
own location decision after fixing the location of the other firm in 5.02 x , which is 
given by: 
9
)4002483)(12(
)5.0(
),( 1211
2
1
211 
 txcctxt
x
x
xx


 
We find that the incentives to agglomerate at the center are similar to the ones in 
Anderson and Neven (1991), that is, by deviating from the center firms increase the 
transportation costs in a large part of the market and decrease the transportation costs in 
a short part of the market, leading to a decrease in the profits. The different marginal 
costs only change the penalty for moving away from the center: If the marginal costs are 
too different, the high-cost (low-cost) firm has a lower (higher) penalty from moving 
away from the center. This occurs because having such a disadvantage (advantage), 
firms sell less (more) quantities to all the points in the market, and so the transportation 
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costs decrease (increase) when moving to non-central positions. This penalty is always 
positive for all feasible values of the model.  
A second conclusion emerges from the comparison with the price competition 
model. We verify that not only that the difference between the marginal cost matters, 
but also that the absolute value of the marginal costs has an important role. In Bertrand 
competition, due to the assumption of inelastic demand and sufficiently high reservation 
price, having zero or huge marginal costs of production is similar in terms of profits for 
both firms as long as the difference between them remains the same. In Cournot 
competition, a more realistic result arises; the difference is not the only determinant of 
profits, since having a lower marginal cost expands the markets in all points of the city, 
leading to higher profits for both firms (given that the difference between both is kept 
constant). Note that the profits of the firms cannot be written in terms of the difference 
between marginal costs, as it is possible in price competition (e.g. see Ziss (1993) or 
Matsumura and Matsushima (2009)). 
We have to make the remark that this location result depends crucially on the 
assumption that firms are obliged to sell in every point of the market. If that would not 
be the case, and the market dimensions in each point were not too big, the most 
important effect in justifying the location decision of both firms, which is the 
minimization of transportation costs, would be weaker, and firms could focus on selling 
to smaller market niches. 
5.4. Social Welfare  
5.4.1. Duopoly  
In Bertrand studies of the classic Hotelling model, the social welfare analysis is 
confined to analyzing the optimal location decision of firms. Due to the existence of 
inelastic demand, changes in price affect only the distribution of the welfare between 
firms and consumers, but not its total value, and therefore the only social welfare 
maximizing problem is related with the minimization of the transportation costs. When 
competing in quantities, however, the social welfare is not only sensitive to locations 
and to the difference in the marginal costs, but also to price policies. A price decrease 
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from one firm leads not only to an additional advantage over the other firm, but also to 
an expansion of the markets, since demand has some price elasticity. 
5.4.1.1. Maximization of social welfare 
We seek a second-best solution, that is, we consider that the social planner can 
intervene only in the first-stage, choosing the location of the firm's plants in order to 
maximize the social welfare of the city. The measure of social welfare considered is the 
sum of consumer surplus with the profits of both firms. The profits are equivalent to the 
producer surplus since there are no fixed costs. The consumer surplus is calculated 
similarly to the profits, that is, by summing the consumer surplus of all market points 
throughout the city. 
Here we set the marginal cost of the efficient firm to 0. We do so after 
concluding that the value of marginal costs is not indifferent as in the case of Bertrand. 
Nevertheless, this assumption is made without loss of generality, as changes can be only 
found in the magnitude of the resulting values. We start by calculating the consumer 
surplus, which will later be added with the firms' profits, totaling the objective function 
of the social planner, the social welfare. Then, after finding the optimal solution for the 
social planner, we seek a further explanation for that behavior, by computing the 
optimal solution when the social planner is maximizing only the firms' profits or only 
the consumer welfare. Then, we check if the social planner is interested in removing the 
less efficient firm from the market imposing a monopoly instead of a duopoly market 
structure. The consumer surplus in each market point is given by the following 
expression: 
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Then, consumer surplus is calculated using a definite integral, similarly to the 
one we have presented in the previous subsection: The integral must be separated in 
three parts, which correspond to three different functions for the consumer surpluses in 
a given point, since the absolute value expression changes given the positioning of firm 
1, firm 2 and the market point we are calculating. After summing the consumer surplus 
with the profits, which are represented by equations 5.1 and 5.3 and after replacing c₂ 
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with 0, we have the expression for the total social welfare of the city, dependent on the 
dimension of each market, the unit transportation cost and the location choice of both 
firms. This expression is given by: 
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Matsumura and Shimizu (2005) conclude that, in the case of a uniform 
distribution of the consumers, the locations that maximize social welfare are the same 
that firms choose in the location stage, that is, agglomeration at the city center. In the 
previous section we proved that the difference between marginal costs of production is 
irrelevant to the optimal location decision. However, is central agglomeration still 
optimal when concerning social welfare? Considering the problem of maximizing social 
welfare with respect for both location variables, we solve the system of equations that 
satisfy the first-order conditions, given by: 
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By solving these first-order conditions, we verify if the second-order conditions 
are fulfilled. We arrive at two candidates for maximal. However, for one of the 
candidates we have found that both the restrictions 21 xx  and the fact that both firms 
should be inside the linear city were not respected, therefore we only kept one 
candidate, which is central agglomeration. The second-order conditions for this 
candidate are given by: 
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And: 
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Of the three restrictions the second-order conditions impose, only the last is 
binding since if the third is verified, all others are verified. After representing the 
condition in order of the marginal cost of firm 1, we reach Proposition 5.2:  
Proposition 5.2: Central Agglomeration maximizes social welfare if and only if '11 cc   
with 
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c , that is, if the inefficient firm is 
not too inefficient. 
Proof: Result of the first and second-order conditions of the total welfare maximization. 
The second-order conditions for the central agglomeration solution hold only if 
'
11 cc  , that is, if the disadvantage of firm 1 becomes too high, the central 
agglomeration result ceases to be optimal from the social welfare point of view.
2
 Hence, 
central agglomeration only holds as an optimal result if the inefficient firm is not too 
inefficient. For higher values of the marginal cost of the inefficient firm, no solution is 
found.
3
 
                                                          
2
 There is another solution that satisfies the second-order conditions for all the feasible value of the 
parameters, but the location pattern either falls out of the linear city or to the constraint 21 xx  , which 
does not reflect the true profits of the firms, due to the way the definite integral is constructed. 
3
 Since we are maximizing a continuous function in a compact set, there must be a solution. However, we 
aren't able to find it for all values for 1c . We think that the solution involves, naturally, locating the 
inefficient firm in one of the extreme of the market, such that it sells less quantities possible. However, 
we are not able to prove that so far. 
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After replacing the central agglomeration result in the social welfare result, it 
becomes: 
54
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To better understand this location decision by the social planner, we separate the 
analysis of the optimal decision of the social planner when maximizing each of the 
components of the total social welfare. First we consider the consumer surplus and 
secondly the profits of both firms. This way, we intend to analyze what is the effect of 
the different components in the optimal decision taken by the social planner. Note that 
the maximization of the producer surplus is equivalent to considering both firms 
colluding in the location stage.  
5.4.1.2. Consumer Surplus 
The total consumer surplus, which is obtained after summing the consumer 
surplus of all the market points using the definite integral similarly to what was used 
when determining the profits of firms, is given by: 
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We compute the derivative of the consumer surplus and we equalize to zero, 
therefore satisfying the first-order conditions. Two solutions meet the first-order 
conditions, namely (
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second-order conditions confirm that the first solution is satisfied for all the values of 
the parameters, while the second solution is never satisfied. Therefore, we arrive at 
Proposition 5.3. 
Proposition 5.3: Irrespectively of the marginal cost of production of the inefficient firm, 
consumer surplus is maximized when both firms agglomerate at the center. 
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Proof: First and second-order conditions of the consumer welfare maximization 
problem. 
A similar result is presented in Matsumura and Shimizu (2005), with central 
agglomeration being an optimal result to consumer welfare independently of the 
consumer distribution in the city. The intuition of this result is that the efficiency of 
transportation of both firms is the highest when located at the center, so that they 
provide goods all over the city with lower costs overall when located there, which 
maximizes the quantities sold. This component of the social welfare does not contribute 
to the explanation on why the second-order conditions of the maximization problem 
cease to verify for a large difference in the marginal costs of both firms, since the 
consumer welfare maximization is an agglomerative force to the decision of the social 
planner. Then, the dispersion force must be the maximization of firms' profits. 
5.4.1.3 Producer Surplus 
When maximizing the producer surplus, we have that the central agglomeration 
result appears again as a candidate for a maximum. The producer surplus is given by the 
sum of the profits of both firms after they have decided on the production of their 
quantities. The expression is: 
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After seeking for the first-order conditions for the maximization with the 
location variables, similarly to the maximization of the total of the social surplus, we 
arrive at two candidates for maximum/minimum. However, in one of these solutions we 
have found, both the restrictions 21 xx  and the fact that both firms should be inside the 
linear city were not respected, therefore we only kept the first solution, which was 
central agglomeration. The second order-conditions are given by: 
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Only the last restriction is binding, given all the others are satisfied when the last 
one is. Organizing the restriction with respect to the marginal cost of the inefficient 
firm, we arrive at proposition 5.4. 
Proposition 5.4: Central agglomeration maximizes producer surplus if ''11 cc   with 
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Proof: first and second-order conditions of the producer surplus maximization problem. 
Hence, only if the difference between marginal costs of both firms is not that 
big, the social planner would be interested in agglomerating the firms in the city center. 
Even after considering that the dimension of the market is big enough such that both 
firms serve the market, the central agglomeration result may not be a maximum for 
firms' profits.
4
 This result happens because when one firm becomes too inefficient, the 
social planner prefers to remove that firm from the city central position such that it 
produces the fewest quantities possible. 
5
 
                                                          
4
 The problem found in finding a second solution for the remaining feasible values of the model is similar 
to the total social welfare case. 
5
 Note that the optimal solution found for the social planner is a second best, since the social planner 
cannot control the quantities produced by each firm. If that was the case, then the optimal solution (after a 
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If the inefficient firm stays at the center, it produces quantities to all locations in 
the city at a lower margin than the efficient firm. Moreover, it forces the efficient firm 
to lower its output, which reduces the sum of their profits. However, we are not able to 
find what would be the optimal choice of the social planner for higher values of the 
inefficient firm’s marginal cost. Our guess, based on intuition, is that it would be better 
to push the inefficient firm to one of the market extremes, therefore letting the efficient 
firm enjoy higher profits on the market end that is farther from the inefficient firm; and 
most importantly, pushing the inefficient firm implies having the efficient firm 
producing higher quantities comparing with the case where both firms are located at the 
center, which is naturally more efficient given the lower cost of production of this firm. 
5.4.1.4. Discussion 
The previous result sheds some light on the result for social welfare as a whole: 
what motivates the social planner to make firms leave the central location is the 
component associated with the profits of the firms and not the consumer surplus. 
Analyzing the effects of changing the marginal cost of the inefficient firm on total 
social welfare, given that firms are agglomerated at the city center, allows a better 
explanation of the intuition behind this result. 
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So, if 1c  becomes sufficiently big (
11
400
1
t
c

 ), the derivative becomes 
positive, which means that a decrease in the marginal cost of the inefficient firm 
decreases social welfare. This strange result happens because at a certain point, the firm 
is so inefficient that by producing the good it lowers at a higher extent the profits of the 
efficient firm. Imagine now a small decrease in the marginal cost of the inefficient firm. 
It has two positive effects. A first effect is that the inefficient firm is able to produce 
more goods, which leads to an expansion of its profit. A second effect is an expansion 
of the total quantity and a reduction of the price in all markets, which expands the 
consumer surplus. However, there is also a negative effect: The efficient firm is forced 
                                                                                                                                                                          
certain threshold for the difference in the marginal costs between both firms) would be asking the 
inefficient firm to stop its activity, therefore letting the efficient firm producing all quantities. 
121 
 
to reduce its output, due to the expansion of the opponent's quantities. After 
11
400
1
t
c

 ,  the negative effect becomes stronger than the sum of the positive effects. 
Nevertheless, this result is never attained for the solution range we were able to solve, 
since the central agglomeration location ceases to be optimal for a lower threshold value 
of 
80
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c . Nonetheless, it shows how 
detrimental it is for the overall welfare to maintain the inefficient firm in the city center. 
5.4.2. Optimal Market Structure  
In Industrial Organization, it is typically assumed that having more than one firm 
is positive in terms of social welfare, since it expands consumer surplus more than the 
contraction in the producer surplus. This result is often associated with the analysis of 
non-spatial Cournot markets, when firms have the same marginal costs. However, as 
shown in the previous section, the presence of an inefficient firm might lead to lower 
producer surplus, which compromises the social welfare purposes. Is it possible that for 
too high levels of inefficiency the social planner prefers to remove the inefficient firm 
from the city, allowing for a monopoly of the most efficient firm? To answer this 
question, we compare the social welfare in the monopoly case with the one obtained a 
duopoly situation. Then, this analysis is equivalent to a three-stage model, where in the 
first stage the social planner chooses the market structure between monopoly and 
duopoly, in the second stage chooses the optimal location of firm(s) and in the third 
stage firms choose their quantities. Once again, we seek a second-best solution, since 
the social planner only controls the first two stages of the game. 
Naturally, we assume that the monopolist is the efficient firm and therefore its 
marginal cost of production is set to 0, as in the previous subsection. By standard 
calculations we determine the quantities supplied by the monopolist to each market 
point in the city. Then, the profits and consumer surplus for each market point are added 
using a definite integral. The resulting expression is the social welfare, which depends 
on the location choice, dimension of the market and transportation costs. The social 
planner then chooses the optimal location for the monopolist, such that it maximizes 
social welfare. This location is again the central location ( 5.0mx ), since it minimizes 
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the transportation costs.
6
 The social welfare in the case of the monopolist firm is given 
by: 
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The second order conditions are always met. We have to compare this value 
with the social welfare in the case of a duopoly, which is expressed in equation 5.3. By 
doing the difference between both expressions, we conclude that the social planner 
prefers to let only the efficient firm operating in the market when '''11 cc  , with 
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c , that is, when 1c  becomes sufficiently 
high. Since we have not found the solution for the duopoly situation outside the central 
agglomeration one, we cannot compare that situation with the one from the monopoly. 
However, we are led to believe that the more inefficient the second firm is, the better it 
would be for the monopoly situation in terms of social welfare. Still, we rigorously 
complete Figure 5.1 with only what we have proved so far. 
In the previous subsection, we have determined that the central agglomeration 
solution holds while 
77
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cc . Also, we 
have to consider the restriction that both firms serve the entirety of the market, given by 
tc  501 . Figure 5.1 shows the relationship between the three expressions and the 
market structure solution of the three-stage game. 
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 Notice that if the monopolist maximizes his profits the choice of location would be the same. 
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Figure 5.1 – Solution of the Entry Stage 
 
We can see that when both firms are obliged to serve all points in the market, 
there are three different regions of equilibrium outcomes. When the marginal cost of the 
inefficient firm is low, duopoly is the preferred situation for the social planner. As the 
marginal cost rises, monopoly becomes the preferred outcome. For higher values of the 
marginal cost, we are not able to find the optimal values of location in the duopoly case, 
so the comparison between both cases is not possible. 
Proposition 5.5: For the values where we have found a solution for the social welfare 
maximization problem in a duopoly situation, if the marginal cost of the inefficient firm 
becomes higher than '''1c  with 
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c , the 
regulator prefers to remove it from the market. 
Proof: Straight comparison of the social welfare results for the monopoly and duopoly 
situation. 
Proposition 5.5 also occurs in the case of a non-spatial Cournot. In that case, the 
social planner prefers to remove the inefficient firm if 
11
250
1 c . This threshold can also 
be found in our results after replacing t=0. The effect of transportation costs in this 
threshold is decreasing, that is, an increase in t lowers the threshold value for the 
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inefficient firm to be removed, so the higher the transportation costs, the lower is the 
contribution of an inefficient firm to the social welfare. Summing up from the 
perspective of the social planner, the higher the transportation costs in the economy, the 
harder it is to sustain an inefficient firm in the market. However, the effect of the 
transportation costs is relatively small compared to the effect of the marginal cost of the 
inefficiency firm. That result is clear in figure 5.1, when looking at the condition in 
which the social welfare of both monopoly and duopoly are equal: The threshold is 
almost vertical, meaning that a change in the transportation cost does not affect that 
much the amount of inefficiency needed for the social planner to remove the inefficient 
firm. Therefore, we can conclude that in the spatial Cournot framework developed by 
Anderson and Neven (1991), the difference between the spatial and the non-spatial case 
is not very significant. Transportation costs have only a small effect in the firms’ profits 
and in the relationships between both firms. Moreover, the assumption that both firms 
have to sell in all points of the market (which is an assumption that mathematically is of 
the highest importance, allowing the use of an integral to quickly sum up all the market 
points) is very restrictive in terms of the results, since firms are not allowed to have 
local monopolies and are therefore “forced” to be in the city center in order to save on 
overall transportation costs. However, breaking this assumption is not a straightforward 
task in mathematical terms, with Benassi et al. (2007) being the best example. 
5.5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we analyze the two-stage quantity-location game when firms have 
different production costs. We solve the profit maximization problem by both firms, as 
well as the social planner problem both when it controls the firms' locations and when, 
additionally, it decides whether the inefficient firm can enter the market. 
We conclude that the central agglomeration result of Anderson and Neven 
(1991) and Hamilton et al. (1989) still holds for any difference in the marginal costs of 
both firms. In terms of social welfare, we conclude that the central agglomeration result 
found by Matsumura and Shimizu (2005) only holds if the difference between the 
marginal costs of both firms is not too high. The dispersion force comes from the 
producer surplus, since the consumer welfare is always maximized with firms 
agglomerating in the center of the city. When allowing the social planner to prevent the 
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inefficient firm from entering the market, we conclude that when we are able to find a 
solution for duopoly, the optimal location outcome implies that firms are always located 
in the center of the city, either in monopoly or in duopoly. Moreover, we conclude that 
the social planner prefers a monopoly when one of the firms is sufficiently inefficient, 
and that higher unit transportation costs facilitate (at a small scale comparing with the 
inefficiency levels of the other firm) the existence of monopolies for the social planner. 
Future research should focus on explaining the reasons why firms would 
differentiate in terms of marginal costs. That could occur, for instance, when analyzing 
location-dependent marginal costs in the city, analyzing R&D investments decisions of 
firms, analyzing models where firms are uncertain about their marginal costs, studying 
incumbent vs. entrant problems with different marginal costs, studying supplier/retailer 
relationships, and many more. 
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6. Location Decisions in a Natural Resource Model of Cournot 
Competition 
6.1. Introduction 
In this chapter we are interested in assessing the location choice of two 
competing firms that need to acquire an essential input which is set in a specific 
location. This input is costly to transport from its extraction/location point to the 
transforming industry. Moreover, we assume that the sale of the natural resource is 
controlled by a monopolist that is not related with any of the two firms, which 
introduces another component to the strategy of the location decision process. As an 
example of industries that share part of these location problems, one can think of 
products that are dependent on other commodities, such as iron or wood, whose final 
goods have to be transported to cities after being produced. Another interpretation 
would be of a location resource that can only be acquired through one transportation 
breaking point that is being controlled by an intermediary. For instance, acquired raw 
materials stored in ports, whose seller faces a local monopoly towards transforming 
industries. 
We have further extended the model to allow the owner of the downstream firms 
to delegate the quantity competition decisions to a manager. Delegation is a relevant 
topic in the firms’ strategic behavior, since it allows the owner to follow a different 
strategy other than profit maximization with credibility – that is, hiring a manager with 
different objectives commits the owner to a policy that the opponent knows that is 
credible. The most notable example on the importance of delegation as a way to 
increase the firms’ profits is shown in a typical Cournot framework, where one firm 
using delegation can outperform a rival firm that does not use it, by being more 
aggressive and supplying a higher quantity, mimicking the Stackelberg duopoly result. 
The owner offers an incentive for the manager to be more aggressive, and that results in 
a higher profit for the firm (e.g. Vickers, 1985; Fershtman and Judd, 1987). However, if 
both firms are allowed the possibility to use delegation, they use it and the result is a 
prisoner’s dilemma in which the firms choose to get a manager, and get worse off in 
terms of profits, supplying a higher quantity comparing to the normal competition case. 
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We deal with the question of location using the linear city framework created by 
Hotelling (1929). We use an adaptation of the model created to analyze competition by 
quantities, developed by Hamilton et al. (1989) and Anderson and Neven (1991). 
We conclude that when the unit input transportation cost is equal to zero, firms 
optimally locate in the city center, but as soon as this cost rises, firms move in a quasi-
linear fashion towards the extreme of the city, where the input resource is located in. 
Firms stay in the natural resource position when the unit input transportations costs are 
higher or equal than the output ones. Moreover, firms are always located in the same 
position, therefore we conclude that firms are agglomerated whatever the value of the 
unit input transportation cost. In our setting, the upstream firm earns higher profits than 
the downstream firms jointly, due to its monopoly position and due to the fact it does 
not pay transportation costs. Furthermore, if the social planner is allowed to choose the 
locations of the firms, the chosen locations are practically similar to the ones chosen by 
the firms.  
For the delegation results, we conclude that similarly to the no delegation case, 
firms move from the city center to the location of the natural resource, but at a non-
linear fashion with respect to the unit input transportation costs: for the same cost value, 
firms are closer to the natural resource. Additionally, downstream firms have lower 
profits, while the upstream firm hugely benefits from this change, mainly due to an 
increase in the input quantities demanded. 
This chapter is organized as follows: the next subsection presents the theoretical 
background of the article; subsection 3 details the assumptions of the model and solves 
the game attached to our problem; subsection 4 analyzes the results of the model; and 
subsection 5 concludes. 
6.2. Theoretical Background 
The original game involving a location stage in the linear city concept is due to 
Hotelling (1929). In a two-stage game, firms first decide their location in the linear city 
and then both firms set the prices simultaneously. Hotelling concluded that firms would 
locate in the city center, given his assumptions about the market. Fifty years later, 
d’Aspremont et al. (1979) revolutionized the field by assuming quadratic instead of 
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linear transportation costs, which eliminated discontinuities in demand that the original 
Hotelling model had. D’Aspremont and others concluded that firms would prefer to be 
located one at each extreme of the market, in order to soften price competition. This 
original result, allied with the new mathematical tractability of the model, originated a 
significant expansion in the field through the late 80s and 90s, in which many authors 
tried to restore the original minimum differentiation result from Hotelling, and as it is 
shown in the chapter 2 of this manuscript. 
Amongst the immense literature on the subject, some papers introduce valuable 
insights regarding location theory. Ziss (1993) allowed for different marginal costs of 
production, and concluded that if one firm has a significant advantage over the other, 
location equilibrium ceases to exist. Anderson et al. (1997) changed the assumption of 
uniform distribution of consumers in the linear city, and concluded that firms may have 
asymmetric location configurations, even if the distribution of consumers is symmetric 
towards the center and firms are homogenous. Irmen and Thisse (1998) considered a 
market with n dimensions in which firms can differentiate, and conclude that if one 
dimension is sufficiently more important than the others, then firms choose to 
differentiate only on that dimension in order to soften price competition. Firms decide 
to remain homogenous on all other dimensions, in a result that mirrors both Hotelling 
and d’Aspremont solutions. In a paper that has a similar idea to ours, Aiura and Sato 
(2008) consider a natural resource that is present in the middle of the linear city, and 
which firms have to transport to their location. Lai and Tabuchi (2012) consider the 
possibility that firms may need more than input to produce the good, and study duopoly 
competition when inputs are exogenously distributed around the city. However, these 
models do not consider price competition, and ignore the possibility that the rights for 
the exploitation of the natural resource may be owned by one or more firms, so their 
results are not comparable with ours. 
This chapter is about quantity competition in the spatial setting. Anderson and 
Neven (1991) firstly formulated a two-stage game similar to Hotelling, but the price 
stage is replaced by a quantity stage, and some assumptions were changed in order for 
this framework to be tractable. The authors conclude that when the demand is linear, 
and transportation costs are convex and are not very high, such that firms are able to sell 
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the product in all points of the market, agglomeration in the city center occurs. Gupta et 
al. (1997) change consumer density functions as well, and conclude that agglomeration 
occurs if the population density is sufficiently “thick” in all market points of the city. 
Mayer (2000) extends this analysis by introducing different production costs along the 
city, and concludes that when the convexity of the production cost function holds, firms 
agglomerate between the minimum cost location and the city center. This article by 
Mayer has some similarities to ours, as we develop further on. 
Although we do not investigate directly the vertical relationships between firms 
(that is, the possibility of integration or foreclosure, see Rey and Tirole (2007) for a 
review), we do consider the existence of an upstream firm that sells inputs to 
downstream firms. We introduce that analysis in the spatial framework of Hotelling 
which, to our knowledge, is limited to several papers
1
: An early approach is by Gupta et 
al. (1994), in which an upstream firm serves n downstream firms, which have to choose 
their location in the linear city. Matsushima (2004) analyses the location decision of 
downstream firms by fixing the upstream firm’s location at the extremes; Liang and Mai 
(2006) consider the case with two inputs and two downstream producers, and study the 
possibility of subcontracting, given that one of the upstream firms produces cheaper 
than its rivals; Beladi et al. (2008; 2010) formulate vertical relationships but in a 
specific downstream market where each firms makes a variety that cannot be made by 
other firm, and find the optimal location decisions of firms both in the simultaneous and 
in the sequential case; Matsushima (2009) analyses the effects of integration in the 
location outcome of firms, and extends the endogenous location decision to both 
upstream and downstream firms; Kouranti and Vettas (2010) compare the location 
outcomes depending on when the upstream and downstream firms choose their 
locations, and conclude that when upstream firms choose their first, firms location 
becomes closer to the center which intensifies competition; Matsushima and Mizuno 
(2012) conclude that firms after integrating locate farther from the opponent, and that 
larger firms are more likely to integrate than smaller ones. However, all these 
approaches involve price competition between firms. 
                                                          
1
 We are referring to articles in which the location choice of downstream firms is endogenous, not those 
papers who consider horizontal differentiation but in which location of the firms is exogenously 
determined (e.g. Colangelo (1995); Chen (2001); Hackner (2003)). 
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Mukherjee and Zanchettin (2012), on the other hand, analyses quantity 
competition instead of price competition. However, the authors do not work on the 
Hotelling framework of differentiation, and model product differentiation as the degree 
of substitutability. So, our paper is a rather novel approach to the existence of upstream 
firms towards the equilibrium location outcome of the downstream firms. 
Moreover, our problem is also related to the classical problem of industrial 
locations researched by Weber (1929). Firms have to decide where to locate given the 
position of the raw materials and the markets. However, our problem differs in the sense 
that the market is a continuum of points instead of a single location, and the raw 
material’s extraction is controlled by a monopolist. 
Regarding delegation, in the literature there are usually three types of incentive 
contracts between the owner and the manager that are analyzed in this context. The 
incentive contract used first, and probably the most used in the literature is the linear 
combination between firms’ profits and revenues, firstly introduced by Vickers (1985) 
and used by, for instance, in Fershtman (1985); Fershtman and Judd (1987); Sklivas 
(1987); Scymanski (1994); Ishibashi (2001); Huck et al. (2004) and Hoernig (2012). 
Another type of incentive contract combines the profits of the firm with its relative 
performance in the market, that is, a combination between the profits of the firms and 
the profits of its opponents. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) formulate a model using 
these incentives, along with Miller and Pazgal (2001; 2002; 2005). Other type of 
incentive contract used is related with the market share, since it combines the profits of 
the firms with the market share the firm obtains. This contract is used in Jansen et al. 
(2007), as well as in Ritz (2008). 
A few attempts have been made regarding the introduction of delegation in 
spatial competition models. Barceno-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga (2005) delegate the price 
decisions in the standard d’Aspremont framework, and conclude that delegation is 
profitable for both firms, as it results on further differentiation comparing to the non-
delegation case. Other approaches include Liang et al. (2011) and Matsumura and 
Matsushima (2012). While in the model present in the former, firm owners delegated 
the latest stage with linear transportation costs for both Bertrand and Cournot, and 
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concluding that the locations depended crucially on the reservation price of consumers, 
the latter did not focus on the optimal location decision problem of firms. 
6.3. The Model 
There are two downstream firms which compete in a market that is spatially 
differentiated. The market is composed by a continuum of markets distributed evenly in 
a linear city of length [0,L], and we assume that L=1 without loss of generality. Each 
location in the linear city is assumed to have an inverse demand function, which is 
linear, and is defined by P=10-Q, similarly to Anderson and Neven (1991). In order to 
being able to produce one unit of the good, downstream firms must acquire one unit of a 
natural resource (fixed coefficients technology). We assume that the natural resource is 
located in the extreme of the linear market, as it would be the case when thinking of raw 
materials such as wood or iron. We assume that one upstream firm, not related with the 
downstream firms, managed to get the full extraction rights of this resource, having 
therefore a monopoly position. This firm is located in the same place as the natural 
resource, that is, in the extraction point.  
Downstream firms have to transport the raw resource from the extraction point 
to their production plant in order to be able to produce the output. After the good is 
produced, these firms transport the goods throughout the market points of the linear 
city, in order to sell it to the consumers. The transportation costs are assumed to be 
linear with respect to the different points of the product space, and the unit 
transportation cost of the natural resource is given by t, while the unit transportation 
cost (given by T) of the output good is fixed to 1. The value of output transportation 
costs is constrained by the dimension of the market, since it allows both firms to sell in 
all points of the city, independently of any combination of locations that may arise, 
which is an assumption that is common in the literature of Cournot Spatial Competition 
(see Anderson and Neven (1991) for an example). Both downstream firms sell in all the 
markets if the sum of both unit transportation costs are relatively small, that is, if 
AtT
7
2
 , where t and T are the transportation costs and A the dimension of the 
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market.
2
 Downstream firms are assumed to bear both transportation costs, that is, the 
transportation costs of bringing the natural resource to the production plant, and the 
transportation costs of the distribution of goods through the markets in the city. All 
three firms are assumed, without loss of generality, to have no marginal costs of either 
extracting the natural resource, or transforming the natural resource into an output good. 
The timing of the game follows. 
Figure 6.1 – Timing of the game 
 
In the first stage, the downstream firms choose simultaneously their location x1 
and x2 in the linear city, which are restricted to be inside of it, that is, x1 and x2 [0,1]. 
We assume without loss of generality that firm 1 will never choose a location “to the 
right” of firm 2, that is, 21 xx  . In the second stage, the upstream firm chooses the 
quantities to sell of their input good. We assume, similarly to Clementi (2011), that the 
input price is formed due to a mechanism, in which “the downstream firms submit an 
aggregate input demand schedule to a walrasian auctioneer, while simultaneously the 
input provider submits his aggregate supply schedule. This auctioneer matches the input 
demand and supply and finds the market clearing price” (Clementi, 2011, p.6). Finally, 
in the third stage, firms choose simultaneously their quantity schedule, that is, firms 
choose the quantity they are going to supply to each market in the city. We seek a 
Perfect Subgame Nash Equilibrium, and we solve the game by backward induction. 
6.3.1 Output Quantities Stage 
First, we calculate the optimal quantity decision in each point of the city. 
Downstream firms will have the following profit in point x: 
                                                          
2
 To obtain this condition, we test what are the minimum values for t, T and A for which a firm located in 
x=1 sells the good at the point x=0, where the input firm and the rival are located. If the firm can sell a 
positive quantity at x=0, then it can sell in all points of the market, since x=0 is the worst condition that a 
firm could face to sell its product. This condition is obtained similarly in the baseline case of Anderson 
and Neven (1991). 
Downstream firms 
choose output
quantities for each 
point
Firms obtain the 
profits
Downstream firms 
choose the 
location of their 
plants
Upstream firm 
chooses production 
quantities of the 
input
time line
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Where xi, is the profit of firm i in point x, xiq ,  and xjq ,  are the quantities 
chosen by the firm and its opponent for point x, respectively, I  is the input price set by 
the upstream firm, and the following parts of the equation 6.1 represent the 
transportation costs: The first part is the transportation cost of the output between the 
location in which the firm set its plant and the consumer in point x; while the second 
part is the transportation cost of the raw material to the location chosen by the firm in 
the first stage. Summing up, the unitary profit in each point is given by the price of the 
good minus the input price and both transportation costs. 
Firm i maximizes its profit by choosing the optimal quantities for each point. 
After satisfying the first and second-order conditions of both firms, these quantities are 
given by: 
3
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Where xiq ,*  is the optimal quantity chosen by firm i on market point x. To 
obtain all the quantities supplied by the downstream firms, we have to sum the 
quantities offered to all the points. However, due to the existence of the absolute value 
for the output transportation costs, the integral has to be separated in three different 
parts, one for each of the combinations of points that are “at the left” of firm 1; 
“between” firm 1 and 2 and “at the right” of firm 2, in order to remove the absolute 
value from the integral expression (e.g. see Anderson and Neven, 1991). 
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After computing the integral, we obtain the following total quantity for firm i. 
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6.3.2 Input Quantities Stage 
If we sum the quantities demanded for both firms, we get the demand function of 
the upstream firm, depending on the location choice of the downstream firms, of the 
input transportation costs and of the input price. Solving the equation in order of the 
input price, we obtain the inverse demand function of the input, which is given by: 
2
19321
2
2
2
121  u
Qtxtxxxxx
I                                                                  (6.4)    
Where Qu is the quantity demanded of the input, obtained by summing both 
downstream firms’ demand. The profit function of the upstream firm is simply given by 
multiplying the input price by the quantities sold, since the upstream does not pay any 
production or transportation cost. Maximizing it with respect to the quantity (FOC and 
SOC respected), the optimal quantity chosen by the upstream firm is: 
6
19
* 21
2
2
2
121 
txtxxxxx
Qu                                                                      (6.5) 
Replacing Qu* in the above inverse demand function (equation 6.4) we get the 
input price with respect to the input transportation cost and the location choice of both 
firms. Replacing the input price on the firms’ demanded quantities (equation 6.3), we 
observe that this input price clears the market, since the quantities supplied equals the 
quantities demanded. 
The profit of the upstream firm is therefore given by: 
24
)19( 222
2
12121 
xxtxtxxx
u                                                                 (6.6) 
6.3.3 Location Stage 
After knowing what their input price will be, firms are now left with the decision 
of choosing where to locate in the linear city. The steps to solve the problem involve 
very long mathematical expressions. After calculating the firms’ profit in each market 
point, the total profit of each firm is obtained by summing all market points using the 
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three-step integral that was presented in the previous subsection. Then, the profit 
functions are maximized regarding the location variables 1x and 2x . 
The solution is given by: 


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
ttt
xx  
Where  is an amount that depends non-linearly on t.3 This solution satisfies the 
second-order conditions, and is better understandable in Figure 6.2. The location is 
equal to both firms, meaning that firms agglomerate whatever the cost of input 
transportation. 
Proposition 6.1: Given that there is an upstream firm selling the input at the 
extreme of the market and that downstream firms bear all transportation costs in an 
extension of Anderson and Neven (1991), firms choose to agglomerate, independently 
of the value of the unit transportation cost. 
Proof: Solution of the maximization problem of optimal location for the firms. 
Figure 6.2 – Optimal location decision for both firms 
  
                                                          
3
 The value of θ is displayed in the appendix 6.1. 
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From figure 6.2 it is clear that as the unit input transportation costs increase, firms start 
to locate closer to the raw material location. If there are no input transportation costs, 
and firms have to pay only the cost for the acquisition of the input and the transportation 
cost of the output, both firms choose to locate in the middle of the linear city, since it is 
the one that minimizes transportation costs for a firm that is capable of selling in all 
points of the market (e.g. Anderson and Neven, 1991).
4
 
This location result is in line with the work of Mayer (2000). The author extends 
the framework of Anderson and Neven (1991) by considering different production costs 
in different points of the city. Mayer (2000) concludes that the firms will agglomerate 
somewhere between the location that minimizes production cost (in our case, in the 
extreme where the input firm is located) and the location that minimizes transportation 
cost (the middle of the city). In fact, our model can be seen as an extension to Mayer, in 
the sense that it gives an endogenous explanation for the occurrence of different 
production costs that may occur in the city.  
                                                          
4
 Note however, that in spite of what it looks like in Figure 6.2, the optimal location is not linear with 
respect to the input transportation cost. 
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6.4. Discussion of the results 
6.4.1 Location 
So why does this happen to the optimal location choice of both firms? To better 
understand what pushes the firms to the edge of the market we proceed to the 
decomposition of different effects on firms’ location decision. 
We divide the profits of the downstream firms between four components: 1) the 
input acquisition cost 2) The input transportation cost 3) The output transportation cost, 
and 4) the sales revenue. We represent the costs as their contribution to the profit 
function, and therefore these are negative throughout the entire domain. We do the 
analysis knowing what the optimal decisions of firms are at the input and output 
quantities stage, to focus only on the location consequences. Moreover, since we 
already know beforehand that both firms will choose to locate in the same point of the 
market (proposition 6.1), we set 21 xx   for this first part of the analysis. 
We will look at the specific case where the unit input transportation cost is fixed 
(t=0.5). Then, we decompose the profit in its four components (each depending on x), 
and we calculate the derivative with respect the location for each case. These derivatives 
are presented on Table 6.1 and Figure 6.3.  
Table 6.1 – The Four Components of the profit function at t=0.5 
Component Derivative of the profit component with respect to 
Location 
Input Purchasing Cost(1) 
24
19
8
25
4
1
3
1 23  xxx  
Input Transportation Cost 
(2) 24
19
12
1
4
1 2  xx  
Output Transportation 
Cost (3) 24
37
2
7
4
5
3
2 23  xxx  
Sales Revenue (4) 
36
11
36
29
6
7
3
2 23  xxx  
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Figure 6.3 – The derivatives of each component of the profit function of firm i with 
respect to location 
 
(1) Input Purchasing cost; (2) Input Transportation cost; (3) Output transportation cost; (4) sales revenue 
For t = 0.5 the optimal solution for the location of both firms is 23865.0x
(point 1 in Figure 6.3). We can see that the four effects have very different magnitudes. 
At the optimal solution, which is represented by point 1, it is shown the pressure that 
both input and output transportation costs exert over the location of the firms, that is, 
when the firm is located in point 1, deviating from this point would have a bigger effect 
in terms of their output and input transportation costs, compared to the input purchasing 
costs and output sales.  By moving towards its right, both firms are expected to save 
from output transportation costs at the expense of the input transportation costs. The 
effects of the input purchasing and of the sales revenue are smaller at the equilibrium 
point. Note that the sales revenue is not maximized at the city center as one would 
initially expect but it is maximal for a location near the left extreme (point 3 in Figure 
6.3). This happens because the input purchasing price varies as well with location, 
which harms the sales possibilities of both firms in the downstream market. Note also 
the nature of the input purchasing costs: Given firms’ current optimal position, these 
costs would be at their maximum at point 2. However, the costs decrease both at the left 
and at the right locations. This means that the downstream firms are located closer to 
the point where the upstream firm would choose them to be (input purchasing costs are 
equal to upstream profits). 
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The above analysis assumes t=0.5 . However, for different values of t the effects 
have the same nature although with significant changes in their magnitude: As t 
increases the input purchasing costs curve goes up, meaning that there is a pressure for 
firms to go to the center. The input transportation costs curve goes down, meaning that 
the incentive to locate closer to the upstream firm increases. The output transportation 
costs curve does not change, and the sales revenue curve goes down. The combination 
of these effects results in the outcome shown in figure 6.2. 
6.4.2 Transportation Costs 
An important perspective of this problem is to investigate the effects of changing 
the transport cost on the different components along the optimal solution path. If we fix 
the optimal location of firms for every value of the unit input transportation cost we get 
a different picture of the problem. Figure 6.4 presents the variation of the four 
components relatively to the point where the unit input transportation costs are equal to 
zero. Therefore, the figure details what happens to the four components as the unit input 
transportation cost increases: as soon as the unit input transportation cost increases, 
firms “travel” closer to the left extreme, and both transportation costs increase – The 
output costs increase since the firm is now on average more distant from its consumers, 
in spite of selling less quantities overall; the input costs increase directly due to the 
increase in its unit transportation costs. However, when the unit input costs become 
nearly half of the unit output costs, the total input transportation costs start to decrease, 
as the firms become relatively closer to natural resource location. The output 
transportation cost increases in an increasing fashion because further movements of the 
firms to the extreme of the market increases at an increasing rate the average distance to 
the consumers in the city, in spite of the decrease in total quantity sold. It is left to say 
that further increases in the unit input transportation costs do not bring any effects to 
any of the firms’ decisions, leaving the results of the model unchanged.  
140 
 
Figure 6.4 – Profit variation of the 4 components along the optimal path 
 
((1) Input Purchasing cost; (2) Input Transportation cost; (3) Output transportation cost; (4) sales revenue) 
 
The sales revenue and the input purchasing costs evolve differently as well. The 
sales revenue decreases, and there are two effects determining that change: A stronger, 
negative effect which is the dislocation from the city center, which leads to an average 
sale of less quantities in each market point. And a positive, weaker, but surprising 
effect, which is the lowering of both firms “unit production costs”, given by the sum of 
the input price with the input transportation price per unit (as shown in figure A.6.1 in 
the Appendix). These results lead us to investigate what happens to the input purchasing 
costs (or equivalently, to the upstream profit): We verify that these costs get lower with 
the increase of the unit transportation cost, since two negative effects occur: 
Downstream firms purchase less quantities and the input price decreases.
5
 We can 
conclude when summing the 4 components, that the profit decreases with an increase in 
the unit input transportation costs. 
 
                                                          
5
 Remember that costs are represented as a negative function. When the variation is negative, this means 
that the costs are increasing, and vice-versa. 
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Another interesting relationship is found in the consequences of an increase in 
the unit input transportation costs (along the optimal path) on the input price set by the 
upstream firm. After the occurrence of an increase in the unit input transportation cost, 
there are two effects affecting the input price determination: 1) the marginal cost of the 
downstream firm, which is an ambiguous effect, depending on the product between the 
unit input transportation cost itself and the distance to the natural resource. This effect is 
negative to the input prices for lower values of the unit transportation cost, but becomes 
positive after a certain threshold; and 2) the demand for the output good, which 
becomes lower since the firms become farther from the market center, which decreases 
the demand for the input good. The second effect is always larger than the first, which 
leads to a decrease in the input market price at a slower rate with the increase in the unit 
input transportation cost. 
Proposition 6.2: Given the conditions of our model, the input price I  is decreasing with 
an increase in the unit input transportation costs, until these become irrelevant (t>1). 
Proof: We are unable to do the proof analytically due to the complicated mathematical 
expressions resulting from the location result. We present the solution numerically for 
all the values of parameter t. Figure 6.5 shows clearly that the derivative of the input 
price with respect to the unit input transportation costs is negative, except for the case 
where t=1. 
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Figure 6.5 – Derivative of the input price with respect to the unit input transportation 
costs 
 
Then we conclude that our model is a particular endogenous case of the model 
of Mayer (2000), since the production costs in each location are a function of the 
location of both downstream firms, and can be divided in two parts: The first part is the 
input price, which is determined by the quantities that both firms are able to sell in the 
downstream market, as well as is determined on the value of the unit input 
transportation cost itself. The second part is the input transportation cost, which is paid 
by downstream firms, which depends on the unit input transportation cost, and the 
distance of the own firm relatively to the supplier. 
6.4.3 Profits 
In this subsection we compare what happens to the profit of the firms if they 
were not allowed to change their location easily. Therefore, we separate the analysis 
between two cases: The short, and the long-run. In the former, firms are not allowed to 
change their location after seeing a change in the unit input transportation costs. Setting 
the location of the firms is a process that implies having a good amount of irreversible 
costs, which obviously impedes firms to adjust quickly to short-run changes. Therefore, 
the difference between short and long-run is that firms are unable to change their 
location setting in the short-run. We do this analysis to assess if there are significant 
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differences in this framework between being and not being able to change the location 
of the firms, in terms of their profits. 
6.4.3.1 Long run analysis 
Naturally, the profit of all three firms decreases when facing higher unit input 
transportation costs (Figure 6.6). The upper line indicates the profit for the upstream 
firm, while the lower line indicates the profit of each of the downstream firms (equal for 
both firms). We conclude a bit surprisingly that the upstream firm suffers more with the 
increase of the input transport cost than the downstream firms, whose profit remains 
relatively unaltered. The surprise comes from the fact that the downstream firms are the 
ones bearing these transportation costs, so they could have been more affected by those. 
Figure 6.6 – Long-Run Profit of the upstream and downstream firms depending on the 
input transportation cost. 
 
(D1 = Downstream Firm 1; D2=Downstream Firm 2; U = Upstream firm) 
This result happens due to the effect detailed in the previous section: The 
upstream firm loses profits because the input price decreases at a slower rate, while the 
quantity sold in the input market also decreases. Downstream firms, on the other hand, 
lose profits because they are progressively farther from the majority of its consumers 
and because of the increase in the total transportation costs. The difference in the 
decrease happens mainly because the overall quantities sold in the market decrease 
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(remember, the input quantities sold equal the output quantities), and the profit margin 
the upstream firm is larger, since it is monopolist on the market. Moreover, downstream 
firms benefit from the abovementioned reduction of the input price, which reduces the 
effect the total transportation costs have on their profit. 
Proposition 6.3: Given an increase in the unit input transportation cost, the upstream 
profit decreases more than the profit of each downstream firm. 
Proof:  Similarly to the previous proposition, the proof we present is based in the 
simulation for all possible values of the unit input transportation cost. Figure 6.7 
compares both derivatives, and shows that the upstream firm is the one that loses more 
profit with an increase in the transportation cost. 
Figure 6.7 – Comparison between the derivatives of the upstream/downstream profits 
with respect to the unit input transportation costs. 
 
(D1 = Downstream Firm 1; D1+D2=Sum of both downstream firms’ profits 2; U = Upstream firm) 
However, Figure 6.6 clearly displays one of the main weaknesses of the Cournot 
framework: The effects of the change in the input transportation costs on the profits of 
the firms are very small, or close to irrelevant. We can see that both firms do not have 
their position in the market at risk, or do not even suffer too much if they do not follow 
the optimal location decision. This happens because of the assumption that the output 
transportation costs cannot be too big in relation to the market size. Then the effect of 
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moving towards the extreme of the linear city has on the firms’ profits is low. 
Abandoning this assumption proves to be a very complicated task (e.g. Chamorro-
Rivas, 2000; Benassi et al., 2007). 
6.4.3.2 Short run analysis 
Location is, by its nature, something that is very expensive to change in the 
short-run, due to the high fixed costs that are associated with that change. We implicitly 
assume that the unit input transportation cost does not change in the short-run, since 
firms are able to see this cost before choosing the location of their plant. However, if we 
assume that both downstream firms cannot change their location (departing from the 
case where there were no unit input transportation costs: 5.021  xx , the effects on the 
profits of the firms are amplified, as shown in figure 6.8. 
Figure 6.8 – Short-Run Profit of the upstream and downstream firms depending on the 
input transportation cost. 
 
The interpretation of this situation goes as follows: Assume that initially there 
were no input transportation costs, or there was a natural resource in the center of the 
city. However, for some unexpected reason, the unit input transportation costs were 
raised, without downstream firms having the possibility to change their location. 
Naturally the profits decrease for all the firms, but the effect is not much different from 
the long-run case, except, of course, for values of the unit transportation cost higher 
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than 1, in which further decreases have an effect that does not exist in the short-run 
case. 
We can see, under this assumption, that the profit is not too sensitive to changes 
in the transportation costs or changes in the location of firms. That is one of the reasons 
why profits are not usually analyzed in the context of spatial models: Smaller changes 
in transportation costs may bring different outcomes, but the consequences of not 
changing location itself in the profits are very slim. In other words, the crucial 
determinant of the amount of profits firms get is the dimension of the output good 
demand. 
6.4.4 Social Planner 
Next, we consider what would be the solution for the social planner if he 
controlled the downstream firms’ location. The solution we seek is therefore a second-
best, since we only allow the planner to control the first stage of the abovementioned 
game. 
Knowing what the output and input quantities are going to be in future stages, as 
previously shown in equations 6.2 and 6.5, the social planner is left to maximize the 
total surplus (TS) of this market, that is, the sum of the profits (of the upstream firm and 
the downstream firms) and the consumer surplus (CS). 
CSTS U  21  
To find the consumer surplus of all consumers, we need to calculate the 
consumer surplus in all points x and then, using an integral similar to the one that is 
used in previous subsections, sum the CS of all the points x. This integral can be broken 
in three parts due to the existence of two different absolute values. The profits of the 
three firms are the same used on previous calculations. The solution for location is 
given by: 
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Where  is a value that depends non-linearly on t. 6 Figure 6.9 shows the result 
of both centralized and uncentralized equilibrium regarding firms’ location. We can see 
that, a bit surprisingly, the social planner equilibrium is very similar to the one found 
before, and pratically undistinguishable in Figure 6.9. This leads us to conclude that 
firms, when thinking about maximizing their own profit, are choosing a location very 
close to what it would be the location chosen by a central planner.
7
 This result goes in 
line with the one found by Matsumura and Shimizu (2005). In addition, the social 
planner also chooses the same location for firm 1 and 2. Note that this result arises from 
the fact that both firms, by assumption, are obliged to sell on every point of the market.
8
 
Figure 6.9 – Location Choice for Firms and Social Planner 
 
This conclusion happens because firms and the social planner have similar 
rationales for their objectives, which is the minimization of transportation costs. Firms 
intend to minimize their transportation costs in order to provide cheaperly different 
goods in each market point. That way, they are able to provide more quantities of each 
good, therefore maximizing their profit. The social planner, on the other hand, is 
                                                          
6
 The value for this parameter is displayed in the appendix. In addition, the second-order conditions are 
met. 
7
 Note that, in spite of being very close in Figure 6.9, the locations chosen in both cases are not exactly 
equal. 
8
 It is unsure though whether the social planner would prefer a different solution. If the sole purpose was 
the minimization of the input and output transportation costs, then probably the social planner would 
distribute both firms along the product space. 
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interested in having the highest quantities in every market point, and that is only 
possible if firms find a way to minimize their transportation costs, such that they can be 
competitive in every point.
9
  
The negligeble difference between the private and social choices is justified by 
the worriness that the social planner has with individual values of the consumer surplus 
and upstream firm’s profits. By staying closer to the center, consumers will get larger 
quantities of goods, and this means as well that the upstream firm will have higher 
demand for its input. However, these effects are very small compared to the importance 
of a correct location choice for both the quantities sold in the downstream markets and 
therefore, the profits that the downstream firms will receive. The importance of this 
effect, which is an objective for both firms and regulator, justifies the proximity of the 
result. 
Since the social planner only controls the location stage, the results towards the 
profit of the three firms are similar as it was analyzed in the previous section. The total 
surplus does not differ significantly between both cases, even though the one resulting 
from social planner maximization is naturally superior. 
6.5. The case of Delegation 
Here we have introduced two delegated firms in the vertical model we have 
detailed before. Our objective was not to see whether firms would prefer to be delegated 
or not, but yet to analyze how location, quantities and profits results would change in 
the presence of a downstream market with two delegated firms, with these firms having 
managers that are more aggressive than the owners. We have therefore assumed that 
both owners offered their managers an incentive contract that was weighted as 50% for 
the profit that firm had, and 50% to its revenues, therefore following the first type of 
incentive contracts detailed in subsection 6.2. 
We keep the same timing of the game. The only difference is that in the last 
stage, the manager chooses the quantities to offer in each point of the linear city. We 
                                                          
9
 Note that the social planner is interested in minimizing transportation costs not only because they are a 
source of inefficiency (in classical price competition models with horizontal differentiation this is the 
only source of inefficiency the social planner faces), but also because better placed firms are capable of 
selling more quantities, contributing to total surplus in every point of the market. 
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have assumed that the owner would keep the choice of location, since it is a variable 
more associated with the medium/long-run. We solve the model by backward induction 
and therefore we start by computing the optimal quantities chosen by the manager in the 
last stage. The objective function of the manager combines the profits and the revenues 
for each point in the market. Therefore, for the market point located in x, the objective 
function of the manager of firm i (i = 1, 2) is given by: 
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This objective function results from the average between the profits and the 
revenues. Similarly to the non-delegation case, Firm i maximizes its objective function 
by choosing the optimal quantities for each point. After satisfying the first and second-
order conditions of both firms, the quantities are given by: 
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Comparing to the optimal quantity chosen by the firms’ owners, we conclude 
that the quantity chosen by both managers is higher than the quantities chosen in the 
non-delegation case. This is due to the more aggressive behavior of the manager 
stimulated by the incentive to obtain extra revenue. After summing the quantities for all 
points, using an integral in a similar way used in the non-delegation case, the quantity 
for each firm i is given by: 
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Summing the quantities for both firms, we obtain the input market demand 
function faced by the upstream firm. The inverse demand function is therefore obtained 
by rearranging the demand respectively to the input price, which yields: 
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Where 
uo
Q  is the quantity produced by the upstream firm, which differs from 
the quantity uQ in the non-delegation case. Note that the input price in both cases is very 
similar, except that in the delegation case it is higher by 10. To obtain the profit of the 
upstream, we just multiply the input price for the quantity sold, which leaves the 
upstream firm with the decision of choosing the optimal quantity *
uo
Q  that maximizes 
its profit. After satisfying the first and second-order conditions, the quantity chosen is 
given by: 
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Notice that the upstream firm produces a higher quantity, which is an expected 
result given that the demand for their product has increased. Compared to the non-
delegation case, the upstream firm sells more at a higher price, which is in line with the 
usual result when a firm faces an increase of the demand for its good. The profit of the 
upstream firm is given by: 
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                                                        (6.7) 
Given that both the location decisions and the unit transportation costs are 
bounded between 0 and 1, by comparing equations 6.6 and 6.7 for the case of non-
delegation and delegation respectively, we verify that delegation benefits greatly the 
upstream monopolist, who takes full advantage of the increasing demand for its product. 
After replacing the input price and the quantities chosen in the profit of both 
firms, we obtain the profit of the firm. The owners look to locate their firms in order to 
maximize their profit. The location outcome we found is the following:
10
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 Now all that is left is for owners to choose the location of their plants. However, for the current model, 
we have not been able to find the optimal solution for all possible values for the unit input transportation 
costs, given that the only solution found (respecting both first-order and second-order conditions) fails to 
be inside the linear city for the entirety of the domain. Even though a maximum must exist given that we 
are optimizing inside a compact set. 
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With the value of  shown in more detail in the appendix 6.1. Figure 6.10 
depicts the location results for the delegation and non-delegation cases. We can observe 
that the location chosen by the owner (for the values for which the solution is valid) is 
closer to the location of the input production in the case of delegation, given the same 
unit input transportation cost. Note however that, since there must exist a maximum for 
this problem, we can assume that it follows the same trend of the valid part of the 
solution: Both firms keep approaching the input location in a decreasing fashion, until 
the unit input and output transportation costs are equal.  Similarly to the non-delegation 
case, both firms choose to be located in the same position, irrespectively of the value of 
the unit transportation cost. 
Figure 6.10 – Location result with and without delegation 
 
(D = Delegation; ND= No Delegation 
To better understand the rationale of this result, we separate the profits in the 4 
components: The 1) Input purchasing cost, 2) Input transportation cost, 3) Output 
transportation costs, and 4) sales revenue. We fix the unit input transportation costs to 
t=0.5, to establish a comparison with the non-delegation case. We also assume, since we 
have verified that it happens throughout all domain, that the firms are agglomerated, 
that is, 21 xx  . 
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Table 6.2 – The Four Components of the profit function at t=0.5 
Component Derivative of the profit component with respect to 
Location 
Input Purchasing Cost (1) 
16
13
48
155
8
1
6
1 23  xxx  
Input Transportation Cost 
(2) 16
13
24
1
8
1 2  xx  
Output Transportation 
Cost (3) 48
77
12
41
8
5
3
1 23  xxx  
Sales Revenue (4) 
48
7
48
23
24
7
6
1 23  xxx  
 
Figure 6.11 shows clearly the difference between the delegation and the non-
delegation case. The derivatives differ in their value, but they are all very similar 
between the input location and the city center. The only exception is the sales revenue 
component, in which the differences are more striking comparing to the previous case. 
We can see the curve is now steeper, meaning that the sales revenue component has a 
lower effect in determining the optimal location position, or in other words, that the 
total of sales revenue is less sensitive to changes in location comparing to the non-
delegation case. This variation is in line with the location pattern found: When the effect 
of sales revenue is to “push” the firm to the city center, this effect is now weaker, so 
firms move rapidly to the input location. However, when this effect is reversed, 
“pushing” the firm to input location, this effect is also weaker in the delegation case, 
and accordingly the location result would (if the location pattern within the linear city is 
similar for higher values of t) move slower to the spot where the input is produced. 
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Figure 6.11 - The derivatives of each component of the profit function of firm i with 
respect to location 
 
(1) Input Purchasing cost; 2) Input Transportation cost; 3) Output transportation cost; 4) sales revenue) 
 
In addition, the similar configuration of the four curves indicates that most 
likely, the optimal location decision of firms within the domain is similar to what we 
have described earlier: The location decision curve continues in a similar fashion until it 
reaches the point where both firms locate in the same place than the upstream producer. 
Even though we have not made endogenous the delegation choice by both firms, 
as well as the parameter for the incentive contract, we can see in Figure 6.12 that 
delegation is hazardous to both firms, in a way that they do not even have positive 
profit.
11
 Most likely (though not confirmed in our work), the prisoner dilemma that 
exists in the non-spatial Cournot case is replicated here, and both firms have to choose a 
higher value for their incentive parameter than what they would if they were allowed to 
cooperate. 
                                                          
11
 Note, however, that we do not have the optimal solution when t is higher than approximately 0.57. We 
assume that the behavior of the true location solution, and the subsequent profits, are similar to the non-
delegation case, which would imply that an increase in the transportation costs does not change much the 
profits of the firms. 
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Figure 6.12 – Long-Run Profit of the upstream and downstream firms depending on the 
input transportation cost. 
 
However, the penalty for not cooperating is higher in this case due to the 
presence of the upstream firm, since the higher the quantities demanded, the higher the 
price for the input will be. The managerial “quest” for increasing revenues greatly 
increases the purchasing costs of the downstream firms, which is the main reason for the 
negative results. The negativity arising from these results is exacerbated due to the fact 
that the upstream firm is a monopolist in the input market. If the input market faced 
perfect competition, then the consequences would only arise from the increase of the 
quantity demanded, and there would not be any consequences on the pricing. So, the 
higher the number of firms in the market (assuming similar firms), the lower are the 
consequences in terms of the profit for these downstream firms. In line with this 
explanation, the upstream firm’s profit is now higher than in the non-delegation case, 
and the difference that existed between both businesses is now higher in this case. 
6.6. Conclusion 
In the context of spatial competition, few articles have analyzed the implications 
of a vertical relationship in forming the marginal costs that firms have to face. In this 
chapter, the presence of an input that is required for firms to be in the market, and the 
subsequent problems of acquiring and transporting the good for the business to be 
successful, along with the strategic duopoly interaction makes this model suitable to 
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explain the behavior of industries that are very dependent on vertical relationship to be 
successful. 
In the framework of spatial competition by quantities developed by Anderson 
and Neven (1991), we conclude that the transportation costs are crucial to the location 
decision of both firms, in an almost linear relationship between the location chosen and 
the unit input transportation costs. However, by analyzing the resulting profits and the 
social welfare, input transportation costs seem to have a minor role. Additionally, both 
firms agglomerate, independently of the unit transportation costs. This happens because 
of the strategic substitutiability nature of quantity competition, which makes firms 
concentrate more on being better located relatively to the demand than relatively to its 
opponent. This is the reason why we find that the location outcome chosen by a social 
planner is close to the solution chosen by the firms themselves: The main concern in 
both cases is with the transportation costs, and this is the most important driver for the 
location decision. 
We also conclude that an increase in unit input transportation costs cripples 
more the profit of the upstream monopolist than the profit of the downstream firms, 
even though the latter supports the transportation costs. The reason is that the 
downstream firms sell less in the downstream market, which means a decrease of 
demand in the upstream market, leading to a decrease in the quantities sold, and in the 
price as well. 
Regarding the delegation case, we can see that the optimal location pattern is 
different, even though firms are still agglomerated for all possible values of unit input 
transportation costs. Downstream firms move at a non-linear rate to the location of the 
input good, staying closer to the upstream firm comparing to the non-delegation case. 
This change happens due to a higher pressure from the “sales revenue” profit 
component. In terms of profits, we conclude that the gap between upstream and 
downstream firms becomes higher, with the former highly profiting due to the latter’s 
increased quantity purchase. Similarly to the non-spatial case, both firms using 
delegation is negative for their profits, but it is left to answer in this framework if there 
is a “delegation arms race” that forces owners to employ managers while giving them 
high incentives for revenue maximization at the expense of their own profits. 
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More important than its results, this chapter may be the starting point for an 
interesting analysis of the consequences of vertical relationships in the spatial 
competition literature. Even though the framework of Anderson and Neven (1991) has a 
very interesting nature, this model may not be the most suitable to the development of 
this vertical analysis, given the (mathematical) requirement that both firms must sell in 
all market points. Breaking this assumption would induce competition between firms, 
which would have been forced to choose their location with the concern of a better 
coverage of the market respectively to their opponent. However, leaving this 
assumption implies finding deep mathematical problems that would probably 
undermine a good analysis of vertical relationship’s implications on the downstream 
firms’ profits, quantities sold and location decisions. 
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7. Conclusion 
The main objective of this dissertation was to contribute to the literature on 
spatial competition models, namely on achieving a better understanding on why firms 
pick a given location in the market to develop their activities. Moreover, the location 
variable itself is regarded as a strategy tool that firms have at their disposal to better 
manage the relationship with its rival on a given market. 
We started by showing the relevance of the spatial competition literature. From 
Chapter 2 it is clear that this field, i.e. the Hotelling framework and its subsequent 
developments are still important in the Economics science as a whole, with many 
published articles on the most important journals in the Industrial Organization and 
Regional Economics fields, as well as in economics journals that do not focus on a 
specific topic within its scientific domain. Then, our literature review proved the 
existing complexity around these models, and how many different factors may be a 
justification for the optimal location decision that firms have to take, even in the 
simplest form of markets where a city is linear and when there are only two firms 
competing. 
In our original contribution to the literature on spatial competition models, we 
have extended the base frameworks of price (d’Aspremont et al, 1979) and quantity 
(Anderson and Neven, 1991) competition with a spatial component. In terms of price 
competition, we have proved in chapter 3 that uncertainty regarding costs of production 
may have firms choosing a different location setting than they would if the information 
was available since the start of the game. We think that the assumption that there is cost 
uncertainty before firms choose their location is very realistic, and therefore that this 
result makes an important contribution to the literature. We have simplified the choice 
of location of firms, but the effects that lead firms to agglomerate would still be verified 
in the full location choice setting: firms may agglomerate because of the possibility of 
having a monopoly in the market. On chapter 4, we focused on justifying why would 
firms have a different marginal cost, and we introduced cost-reducing activities in the 
original two-stage location then price game. To our dismay, we could not find an 
equilibrium solution for all values of the investment game due to the fact that the profit 
function is a piecewise function, whose branches depend on the amount of demand that 
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firms may have. However, we find that when firms have the same efficiency, they get 
trapped in a prisoner’s dilemma result for the investment, that is, firms would prefer to 
not have investment possibilities. 
For the quantity competition case, which is based on the work of Anderson and 
Neven (1991), in chapter 5 we found that allowing firms to have different marginal 
costs of production does not have any effect in their location equilibrium result. We also 
find that a social planner would prefer to remove the inefficient firm out of the market if 
it becomes too inefficient relatively to its opponent. Moreover, if the inefficient firm has 
to stay on the market, the central agglomerative solution ceases to be equilibrium. This 
happens because the profit margins of the efficient firm are higher, and the inefficient 
firm by staying in the center produces more quantities and steals part of this profit 
margin. Therefore, our guess, based on intuition, is that the inefficient firm would be 
moved to one of the extremes of the market in order to produce as little as possible.  
In chapter 6, we introduced a natural resource as an essential input for two 
competing firms, and we conclude that, the larger the transportation costs of that 
resource, the closer both firms would move to the input location, which resembles the 
classic problem of Weber (1929). We also prove that delegation is harmful in that case, 
since downstream firms would pay an increasing cost for their raw material due to the 
larger amount of input quantities ordered. Therefore, for the same values of the unit 
input transportation cost, firms’ owners choose to be farther to the city center, 
comparing to the case of no delegation. We suspect that the delegation possibility acts 
as a prisoner’s dilemma as well: if both firms had to choose between delegating and not 
delegating, they would choose delegation to protect themselves from the opponent, but 
would end up being worse than if they did not choose to delegate. 
After all this work, our feeling is that the frameworks by d’Aspremont et al. 
(1979) and Anderson and Neven (1991) have assumptions that hindered part of the 
analysis and the impact that our contributions could have in the literature. Regarding the 
price competition framework, the assumption of inelastic demand, i.e. the fact that the 
consumers located in each market point can only buy the same quantity, irrespectively 
of the price that is offered to them, hinders the analysis that involves different marginal 
costs of production between firms and therefore, cost-reducing activities. One important 
159 
 
motivation for firms to reduce their marginal costs is not only the fact that they can steal 
the market share from their opponents, but also that they could make their product 
affordable for different layers of their market, and therefore their total quantities sold 
would not only increase with a decrease in their marginal costs of production due to the 
business they have stolen from their opponent, but also because lower marginal costs 
would allow for lower pricing, and therefore new consumers could start buying the 
market good. The latter effect is not a possibility in the original d’Aspremont et al. 
framework. This problem is very clear in our results in the Prisoner Dilemma analysis in 
chapter 4. Firms overinvested in R&D only to see their operational revenues unchanged, 
due to the inability of attracting new customers to their stores after the decrease of their 
good prices, following an equal decrease in the marginal costs of production. The 
inelastic demand assumption does not capture the whole benefits of investing in cost-
reducing R&D that could happen in most markets. Therefore, finding a better way to 
insert more realistic R&D settings in the Hotelling model, or finding an alternative way 
of expressing price competition with spatial components that could allow a correct 
assessment of R&D investments could be a road for future research. 
Concerning the quantity competition framework, the restricting assumption is 
the one that obliges the market to be big enough such that both firms sell in every 
market point. This assumption implicitly removes any possibility that firms could be 
monopolists in few points of the linear city, This assumption has huge effects regarding 
the optimal location decision of firms. If firms have to sell in every point of the linear 
city market, what is the point for them in locating outside of the city center, where their 
transportation costs are minimized? If it is impossible to achieve a local monopoly, why 
would firms want to be located closer to one of the edges of the market? But the most 
important consequence of this assumption is the fact that the competition mechanism 
between firms is not very important. The consequences for the own location decision 
when a rival firm changes its location are not very significant. This is especially clear in 
chapter 5, in the result where irrespectively of their marginal costs of production, firms 
will always locate in the city center. It would be expected that in the case where one of 
the firms has a significant advantage over the other, the firm possessing a disadvantage 
would have the incentive to move away from the city center in order to diminish that 
disadvantage in some points of the market, achieving better results only in some points 
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of the city. However, by definition, the difference in the marginal costs cannot be too 
big, because then the inefficient firm would not be able to sell in all points of the 
market, contradicting the model’s assumption itself. Moreover, the effect in terms of 
magnitude of the value of unit transportation costs in this chapter is too low, suggestion 
that the location variable is relatively unimportant to the firms’ profits and decision 
comparing to the effect of firms’ marginal costs of production. We feel that, both in the 
case of price and quantity competition, a correct analysis of the differences in marginal 
costs of production is hindered by these assumptions. 
In terms of policy implications, we feel that our work is somewhat limited, and 
some avenues for future research could exist in the open questions we leave regarding 
these policy implications. After adding ingredients and assumptions to the basic 
Hotelling model, it is hard to find markets that fit in the exact assumptions of the 
markets we have tested here in this work. Nevertheless, some policy insights can be 
drawn (with some carefulness) from our work. Even though we have not proved some 
of them, these could be a starting point for future work. On the d’Aspremont et al. 
(1979) model, the social welfare analysis is confined to the analysis of where should 
firms locate in order to minimize the overall transportation costs of the economy. In the 
model with cost differentials, the case is not that simple. Since firms have different 
marginal costs of production, the most efficient firm should produce most of the 
quantities in order to save on the economy’s production costs. So, location is not the 
only determinant of maximum social welfare. Firms end up dispersed for some values 
of the difference between them, but similarly to the non-differential case, firms should 
be pushed to more central positions in order to minimize transportation costs. However, 
the most efficient firm should optimally be closer to the center than its opponent.  
In the quantity competition framework, the expected conclusion is that the social 
planner should not have much to worry about. Firms usually pick location decisions that 
are already optimal to the point of view of the social planner, mainly because they share 
the common goal of choosing an efficient location relatively to the transportation costs 
of the economy. In chapter 5, however, we have concluded that a firm that is not 
competitive enough should be removed from the market, or at least it should focus in 
market niches such that the efficient firm produces the bulk of the quantities. This is not 
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in line with the firms’ location outcome, in which they would prefer to be located at the 
city center all the times. In chapter 6, however, the conclusions regarding the social 
optimum are closer to the prediction of the literature. Firms’ optimal location choice, 
given that the markets are big enough such that firms are obliged to sell in all points of 
the city, when there is a resource located in the extreme city, are very similar to the 
locations that the social planner would choose, meaning that there is not much room for 
a social planner to act in this type of market.  
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Appendix 
Appendix 3.1: Optimal prices of the second stage of the game 
For the case when both firms are successful, the profit function of each firm is 
given by: 
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For i=1,2 . Using the first order condition of profit maximization (with second 
order conditions verified) for the middle branch, firms set a price schedule. For the case 
where one of the firms has an advantage such that it gets all the demand, the monopolist 
optimally sets the maximum price possible such that its opponent remains out of the 
market. Therefore, the prices that maximize the profits are the following: 
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Where  ̂  is the marginal cost difference expressed by       and   and  , after 
replacing the optimal price decision, change to    
        
         and 
   
        
       , respectively. 
Replacing the optimal prices in the profit function, the profit for firm i (i=1,2) 
becomes: 
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Similarly to this first case where both firms are successful, we present the other 
three cases.  
When firm 1 is successful and firm 2 is unsuccessful, the profits are given by: 
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Similarly to the previous case, the optimal price schedule is given by: 
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After replacing the prices the optimal profit functions become: 
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For the case where firm 1 is unsuccessful, and firm 2 is successful, the profit 
functions are given by: 
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Similarly to the previous case, the optimal price schedule is given by: 
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After replacing the optimal price schedule, the profit functions become: 
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For the case where both firms are unsuccessful, the profits of each firm is given by: 
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For i=1,2. The optimal price chosen by each of firms is given only by one branch, since 
independently of their successful marginal cost firms will always have their actual 
marginal cost equal to 10. 
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Replacing the optimal price in the profit function, the profit for firm i (i=1,2) becomes: 
)222(9
)342(
),(
222
ji
jjii
jii
xx
xxxx
xx


  
Appendix 3.2. Expected profit function of firm 1 in case of dispersion 
To obtain the profit function in the case of dispersion, it is enough to replace 
x1=x2=0 in the above profit functions for all four cases. That includes replacing the 
thresholds for each branch. We only present the results for firm 1 because the result for 
firm 2 comes from symmetry, and the functions could be easily constructed from the 
previous section. 
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From the weighted combination of these four cases, different expressions for the 
profit function arise depending on the values of c1 and c2. These are the regions shown 
in Figure 3.2. 
Appendix 3.3 
From the direct comparison of agglomeration and dispersion cases (like shown 
in Table 3.2), we can conclude whether firms 1 or 2 prefer to disperse or agglomerate. 
From the joint analysis of both results, we concluded whether the result would be: 
Agglomeration, Dispersion or No location equilibrium (in the case both firms have 
different opinions on their location decision). Note also that the decision regarding both 
firms is symmetric, which allows the direct comparison between different regions, since 
every region has a symmetric region. 
Table A.3.1 – Location choices of each firm and resulting location outcome 
Firm 1 Region 
(Firm 1; 
Firm 2) 
Firm 2 Result 
Disp < Agg 1 and 7 Disp < Agg Agglomeration 
Disp < Agg 2 and 8 Disp < Agg if     
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The results displayed in the last column are summarized in Figure 6.3. 
Appendix 6.1 
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Figure A.6.1 – Input price and unit production costs for the optimal path. 
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